Policing Excellence
The Transformation of New Zealand Police
2009–2014
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Commissioner’s Foreword

Policing Excellence has transformed the way we police and brought huge improvements in the results we deliver to the public we serve.

Thanks to the changes we’ve made, Police is now absolutely focused on preventing crime and meeting the needs of victims. We have harnessed the latest technology to deploy our resources in the right places at the right times and we are building valuable and enduring partnerships with our communities and partner agencies to address the causes of crime and crash.

In short, Policing Excellence and the Prevention First operating model that underpins it have made us more mobile, visible, efficient and effective than ever before and our communities safer places to live, work and play.

Our results speak for themselves. When we embarked on Policing Excellence in August 2010, we set some very ambitious targets. These were a 13 percent reduction in recorded crime, a four percent increase in prevention activities and a 19 percent reduction in non-traffic prosecutions.

We have exceeded each of those targets. When Policing Excellence ended on 30 June, 2014, recorded crime had reduced by 20.1 percent, prevention activities had increased by 5.8 percent and non-traffic prosecutions had reduced by 41.3 percent.

That equates to nearly 90,000 fewer crimes and tens of thousands of fewer victims, greatly reducing pressure on the criminal justice system and freeing-up frontline officer time to focus on crime prevention.

These gains also ensure we are well on track to meet our Better Public Services targets.

For me, key Policing Excellence milestones include:

» The creation of 34 Neighbourhood Policing Teams in priority, vulnerable neighbourhoods to identify and resolve the causes of crime;

» The deployment of 7,000 smart phones and 4,100 tablets, allowing our staff to spend less time behind a desk and more time out in their communities, where they can most effectively prevent crime and reduce victimisation. A more mobile workforce has resulted in estimated productivity gains of 30 minutes per officer per shift – more than half a million hours a year;

» The reinvestment of more than 1.2 million hours of frontline officer time enabling an increased focus on preventative tasks and the creation of an extra 214 prevention focused police roles;
The creation of Victim Intervention Plans for high-risk repeat victims, helping them stay safe and avoid revictimisation;

The establishment of 12 District Command Centres to ensure our resources are deployed when and where they’re most needed;

More effective working arrangements with community groups, volunteers, iwi and other partners to develop and implement strategies in the justice, social and transport sectors to reduce crime and victimisation and deliver better services to New Zealanders;

A steady rise in public trust and confidence in Police to 78% in the past six years – during a time of unprecedented change.

Changes to workforce management that have freed up 414,325 hours of frontline activity for reinvestment into prevention and saved Police an estimated $14.9 million in reduced leave accruals between October 2011 and June 2014;

The issuing of just over 74,000 pre-charge warnings From 1 September 2010 to 30 June 2014, considerably reducing the flow of new charges to district courts.

Implementing a change programme of this nature and scale has been challenging for our people. By being resilient we have created many opportunities and achieved many rewards. Key to the success of Policing Excellence has been the involvement of our staff throughout the entire journey. In 2009, we undertook a grassroots review of policing in New Zealand and asked our people how we could improve. Their ideas were outlined in the document *Fit for the Future*, which formed the foundation for Policing Excellence. Much of what we have achieved references back to initial input from the frontline.

I want to thank and congratulate all staff for their enthusiasm and support for Policing Excellence. The fact we have been able to implement such a demanding programme so successfully while retaining high levels of staff engagement and increasing the public’s trust and confidence in Police is testament to their professionalism.

I have been closely associated with the design, implementation and embedding of Policing Excellence since its inception – initially as District Commander of Counties Manukau and as Deputy Commissioner: Operations. Without doubt, Policing Excellence and Prevention First have brought about the biggest transformation Police has undergone during my 36 years in the job.

But we’re not at the end of our journey. We must always seek to improve and explore options to do things better and differently. In doing so, we will build on the success and momentum of Policing Excellence and embark on the next phase of our journey under the banner of “Policing Excellence: the Future”.

Mike Bush MNZM
Commissioner of Police
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Part 1 Introduction

1.1 Part 1 outlines:

» Context and background
» The case for change
» Getting started

Context and background

1.2 The intent of this report is to document the five year (2009 – 2014) Policing Excellence (PE) journey from concept through to implementation and embedding.

1.3 PE is the largest, strategically significant and operationally relevant change programme undertaken by New Zealand Police to date. PE changed the face of policing in New Zealand, shifting the emphasis away from being predominantly reactive and offender focused, to being proactive, prevention and victim focused, resulting in a modern, mobile and accessible police service.

1.4 From the outset, clear and agreed PE targets were set to be achieved by 30 June 2014: increase preventative policing by 4%; reduce crime by 13% and; reduce non-traffic prosecutions by 19%. These targets were well surpassed as outlined in Figure 1 below:

Figure 1: Results against agreed targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGREED TARGETS</th>
<th>KEY RESULTS AS AT 30 JUNE 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4% shift in police prevention activities</td>
<td>Prevention activities increased by 5.8% (compared to 2008/09). This equates to 1.26 million hours freed-up for reinvestment into prevention activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% decrease in recorded crime</td>
<td>Recorded crime reduced by 20.1% to 353,564 offences (compared to 2008/09 – 442,540).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19% decrease in prosecutions (non-traffic)</td>
<td>Prosecutions dropped by 41.3% to 98,279 (compared to 2008/09 – 167,298).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The case for change

1.5 The business drivers for PE arose from a mix of circumstances that, combined, placed pressure on the delivery of existing and future policing services. These circumstances included:


» The changing operating environment, including unsustainable increases in demand across police and the Justice Sector;

» The need for police to modernise, coupled with opportunities to lift productivity e.g. through better use of technology.

1.6 During the decade preceding PE, the police operating environment became increasingly complex. Despite reported crime continuing to decline, the actual social cost of crime increased at a disproportionate and unaffordable rate.

1.7 This situation was unsustainable and placed a heavy burden on the wider Justice Sector. Sector costs grew by 79% in the 10 years to 2008 - 2009. At the same time, there was ever-increasing demand on police across a broader range of services, reflecting the changes in social, demographic and economic conditions.

1.8 Police officers were faced with managing changing priorities and demand for their time. It became evident they were restricted by a lack of productivity-enhancing technology to support them in their work. Officers were largely in reactive mode, weighed down by having to manage outdated processes, while expected to maintain service delivery to the highest levels and standards.

Getting started

1.9 Police responded to these challenges by identifying a range of business optimisation opportunities to promote sustainable efficiencies and improve productivity. An extensive round of ‘grassroots’ workshops with frontline staff resulted in a range of improvement opportunities. Those opportunities were injected into a work programme initially called ‘Fit for the Future’. This was later re-named a ‘Comprehensive Approach to Policing Excellence’ (CAPE). CAPE (and Fit for the Future) was established in response to a government invitation for the entire public sector to demonstrate better value for money.

1.10 In late 2009, the Police Commissioner reported to Cabinet\(^1\) on the work resulting from CAPE. This work would enable management of future demands on police and aimed to put victims and the safety of law abiding citizens at the heart of policing.

1.11 Police mapped out a new crime prevention strategy to respond to the challenges being faced by police, the Justice Sector and New Zealand in general. In 2010, in response to these challenges, police committed to embark on a medium to long-term change programme that would fundamentally change the way police operated. This change programme was called Policing Excellence.

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\(^1\) [CAB Min (09) 13/8(48) refers].
1.12 PE originally consisted of 11 workstreams, led by police district commanders. The intent was to increase police productivity and efficiency to allow greater investment in crime prevention. These benefits would have positive flow-on impacts for the court system, the wider Justice Sector and the public. The 11 workstreams were:

1. Police Model/Neighbourhood Policing
2. Alternative Resolutions
3. Case Management
4. Crime Reporting Line
5. Rostering to Reduce Demand
6. Mobility
7. Cost Recovery
8. Policing Act Opportunities
9. Support Services to the Frontline
10. Asset Management
11. Performance Management

1.13 At the same time, a large body of work was underway in the Counties Manukau Police District following the government’s commitment of 300 additional staff. As part of that work, Counties Manukau explored options for reducing demand and increasing productivity by focusing on prevention activities and reducing victimisation – particularly in high-risk communities. Out of that work emerged a new Police Model and a template for deploying policing teams in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods. These teams became known as Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs).

1.14 Analysis of the 11 workstreams saw them reshaped and changed in 2011 to better reflect the transition from the design stage to the implementation stage of PE. This included district commanders no longer having responsibility for leading the workstreams (with the exception of the Alternative Resolutions workstream). Instead, district commanders were assigned district-level responsibility for leading workstream implementation.

1.15 The breakdown of workstream changes are described in Figure 2, page 10.
Figure 2: Workstream changes from Stage 1 (Design) to Stage 2 (Implementation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIGINAL WORKSTREAMS (STAGE 1 – DESIGN)</th>
<th>AMENDED WORKSTREAMS (STAGE 2 – IMPLEMENTATION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Policing Model (Neighbourhood Policing) Emphasis on Neighbourhood Policing Teams (included Crime Prevention and Demand Reduction; Victim Centric; Productivity Improvement; Performance Framework). | Police Model (Prevention First) with 5 sub-workstreams:  
  » Prevention First (including NPTs)  
  » Deployment (incorporating RTRD)  
  » Victim Focus  
  » Productivity (Continuous Improvement)  
  » Performance Management Framework |
| Alternative Resolutions including:  
  » Pre-charge Warnings  
  » Written Traffic Warnings  
  » Pre-arrest Warnings  
  » Community Justice Panels | Alternative Resolutions  
  The concept of pre-arrest warnings was abandoned. |
| Case Management | Case Management includes:  
  FMC, ISU, CJSU and NIA case functionality |
| Crime Reporting Line | Workstream split into phases:  
  Phase 1 – CRL into Canterbury and Eastern Police Districts  
  Phase 2 – CRIS technology enhancement  
  Phase 3 – CRL into remaining Districts  
  Phase 4 – SNEN and website (to be completed as part of business as usual) |
| Rostering to Reduce Demand (RTRD) | Transferred into Deployment (sub-workstream of the Police Model) |
| Mobility | Excludes SMART phones for Road Policing (separately managed by National Manager: Road Policing) |
| Cost Recovery | No change |
| Policing Act Opportunities | No change |
| Support Services to the Frontline (Auckland Project) | Support Services to the Frontline split into:  
  » HR functions review  
  » Finance functions review |
| Asset Management | Discontinued (transitioned to business as usual) |
| Performance Management (Leadership) | Discontinued (transitioned to business as usual under HR) |
Part 2 Results

2.1 Part 2 outlines:
   » Results against agreed targets
   » Staff engagement
   » Public satisfaction/trust and confidence
   » Effective partnerships
   » Key results by the workstreams directly contributing to the 4%, 13% and 19% targets
   » Stakeholder benefits
   » Critical success factors

Results against agreed targets

2.2 Police demonstrated strong performance during the implementation and embedding of PE, well surpassing its agreed 4%, 13% and 19% targets required to be met by 30 June 2014 (see Figure 1, page 7).

2.3 Between 2008/09 to 2013/14, the Police spend on prevention increased from 14.48% to 20.25%. At the same time, total recorded crime continued to trend down. All police districts reported a significant decrease in recorded crime compared to the 2008/09 baseline.

Figure 3: Reduced total recorded crime (2008/09 – 2013/14) overlayed with increased prevention expenditure^2

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^2 Police has recast the 08/09 data against the current Output Costing Model. The data provides a valid and evidence-based auditable comparison between 2008/09 and 2013/14 prevention outputs.
Staff engagement

2.4 During the time PE changes were being introduced, staff motivation and engagement showed positive upward trends. 2014 staff engagement survey results revealed improvement in key areas:

» The Police Performance Index sat marginally ahead of the State Sector benchmark of 63.8 and the Engagement Index significantly higher than the benchmark of 69.3.

» The number of people in Police identified by the survey as being ‘fully engaged’ rose significantly from 24.5% in 2013 to 27.5% in 2014. This was considerably higher than the state sector benchmark of 19.3%.

» As in previous surveys, Police scored commendably high in the areas of camaraderie; and pride and achievement in the positive impact of policing in the community.

» Key drivers of engagement identified in the 2014 survey centred on the themes of ‘growth and progression’; ‘recognition for making a difference’ and; ‘inclusion in what goes on’.

Public satisfaction/trust and confidence

2.5 In keeping with improvements in staff engagement, public satisfaction with police services increased from 79% in 2009 to 84% in 2014 – this during a time of unprecedented change in Police. Equally, the 2014 New Zealand Citizens’ Satisfaction Survey had Trust and Confidence in police at 78%3, maintaining a six-year upward trend.

Effective partnerships

2.6 PE enabled police to work more effectively with community groups, volunteers, iwi and other partners to develop and implement strategies in the justice, social, and transport sectors to reduce crime and victimisation. For example, the 2014 Performance Improvement Framework (PIF) follow-up review report noted specific examples of police developing a gang strategy with central agencies; police collaborating with senior public servants in the regional leadership pipeline projects; and extensive police contribution to the Injury Prevention Strategy.4

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3 Trust and confidence reduced marginally from 79% (30 June 2013) to 78% (30 June 2014).
Key Results by the workstreams directly contributing to the 4%, 13% and 19% targets

<table>
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<tr>
<th>WORKSTREAM</th>
<th>KEY RESULTS</th>
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</table>
| Prevention First | » Prevention activities increased by 5.8%.  
» Spend on prevention increased from 14.48% in 2008/09 to 20.25% in 2013/14.  
» A further 214 prevention focused police roles.  
» Established 12 x District Prevention Managers.  
» 34 Neighbourhood Policing Teams in place in priority locations.  
» Key preventative tasks (such as foot patrols, check points) increased by 158% between 2008/09 and the year to April 2014.  
» A 2013/14 National Tactical Plan.  
» 12 x 2013/14 District Tactical Plans.  
» Focus on addressing the drivers and underlying causes of crime, using a range of problem-solving tools, supported by timely intelligence. |
| Victim Focus   | » A victim-centric approach including the introduction of the Victim Focus Framework and Graduated Response Model.  
» Reduced recorded crime equates to approximately 89,000 fewer offences and, therefore, fewer crime victims.  
» Established 12 x District Victim Managers.  
» Victimisation flags and ‘scorecards’ available in NIA.  
» Victim Intervention Plans created for high-risk, repeat victims.  
» More than 9,000 staff completed online and face-to-face Victim Focus training. |
| Deployment     | » Officers more efficiently deployed and more accessible to communities.  
» The Deployment Model is expected to generate 220,000 hours per year for re-investment into prevention.  
» Established 12 x District Deployment and Workforce Managers.  
» 1 x National Command and Coordination Centre.  
» 12 x District Command Centres.  
» 12 x District Workforce Management Groups.  
» Workforce Management has freed-up 414,325 hours of frontline activity for reinvestment into prevention and has saved Police an estimated $14.9 million in reduced leave accruals between October 2011 and June 2014. |

5 Leave balances (and the dollar savings amount associated with them) vary at different points in time. They depend on seasonal leave taking and the natural accrual of leave.
| WORKSTREAM       | KEY RESULTS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
Stakeholder benefits

2.7 Implementation and embedding of PE initiatives produced a range of benefits to a cross-section of stakeholders.

Figure 4: Stakeholder benefits

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<th>STAKEHOLDER</th>
<th>BENEFITS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Trust and confidence in NZ Police direction and Better Public Services delivery, as evidenced by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Reduced crime, crash and victimisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Responsible management of finances in tough economic times (living within baseline).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» More efficient and effective operating model.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Improved use of technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Focus on, and investment in, frontline policing services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Sector</td>
<td>Fewer people entering the Justice Sector (Courts and Corrections) through a combination of: the 41% drop in prosecutions; less crime; a focus on the drivers of crime and repeat victims, offenders and locations; and a suite of partner agency initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Social Sector Agencies</td>
<td>Police working more closely with Justice and Social Sector agencies providing better service to victims and offenders, ensuring strong community connections. NPTs, together with inter-agency partners, developed tactics to respond to high levels of repeat victimisation and offending in priority neighbourhoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Districts</td>
<td>Police districts have a greater understanding of demand (both overt and latent), and improved critical command information sources available to them. This, added to the overall intelligence picture, enables districts to deploy the right resources to the right place at the right time to prevent crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontline Police Officers</td>
<td>Officers prevent and reduce crime and crash with a greater focus on crime victims. They’re more visible, effective and efficient in their time and able to focus on prevention tasks and activities. Officers are using improved systems, processes and technology in their day-to-day duties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>Victims receive an improved service from police and feel they are informed, safe, supported and listened-to. There is less chance of victims being revictimised.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Offenders</td>
<td>Low-level, minor offenders are kept out of the courts and prison system by improved use of discretion (Alternative Resolutions). The use of new mobile technology ensures offenders are less able to provide false details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Members of the public have increased trust and confidence in police, and recognise New Zealand has reduced crime and crash, less victimisation and a more visible, effective and efficient police service.</td>
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</table>
Critical success factors

2.8 Police leaders encouraged frontline staff to provide early input into the requirements to move toward a greater focus on prevention; reducing victimisation; placing less people before the courts; and deploying resources more effectively and efficiently.

2.9 The convergence of frontline and leadership perspectives was pivotal to the success of PE.

Figure 5: Critical success factors

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<th>CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTOR</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>PE implementation and embedding had the full support of the Executive and wider leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>A robust governance framework was established to oversee, direct and monitor all PE activities. Five layers of governance, led by the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners, ensured benefits realisation and reporting in line with government expectations. Governance arrangements included an External Advisory Board comprising senior sector agency partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment and buy-in</td>
<td>Understanding, commitment and buy-in at all levels that a mindset change was required to implement, embed and realise the benefits of PE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture/mindset shift</td>
<td>A mindset shift drove a culture that supported continuous improvement and recognition that service delivery tomorrow would be different to today – increasing awareness of, and support for the change rationale.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for police districts and monitoring change impacts</td>
<td>Support was provided to districts to understand and apply the changes. This included monitoring change for any negative impacts or unnecessary disruption to core service delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear target setting</td>
<td>Across and within the multiple PE workstreams the three core targets (4%, 13%, 19%) became widely known, accepted and referenced, providing focus and quality command-led decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit management</td>
<td>The benefit management regime provided a structured process for monitoring PE generated productivity gains (frontline time freed-up); and the reinvestment of that time into performance improvements in prevention and victim focused activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance dashboard and embedding criteria</td>
<td>The regular publication of a performance dashboard ensured districts maintained their focus on the changes and provided an accountability mechanism. This meant the end-state was unambiguous.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>A suite of internal and external communication channels and tools supported PE implementation, embedding and benefit realisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 PE benefits fall generically into two classes: (1) Productivity – Hours, FTE or finances freed for more productive use enabling a 4% shift into prevention activities. (2) Performance – a 13% reduction in recorded crime through a focus on the crime triangle (victims, offenders, locations); the drivers of crime; and a 19% reduction in prosecutions.
Part 3 The Police Model: Prevention First

3.1 Part 3 outlines:
» Prevention First: The National Operating Strategy
» Victim Focus
  » District Victim Managers
  » Victim History Scorecard
  » Graduated Response Model
  » Victim Intervention Plans for high-risk and repeat victims
  » Victim Focus Training
» The Deployment Model
  » Deployment: Critical Command Information (CCI)
  » Deployment: Tasking and Coordination (T&C)
  » Deployment: Workforce Management (WFM)
» The 5 drivers of crime
» 2013/14 National Tactical Plan
» Changing mindsets
» Leadership
» Leadership framework
» Performance Management Framework
» Continuous Improvement
» Recognition for The Police Model: Prevention First

Figure 6: Prevention First: The National Operating Strategy

Prevention First: the National Operating Strategy

3.2 ‘Prevention First: The National Operating Strategy 2011–2015’ was launched in December 2011. As the central element of the Police Model it places crime prevention and the needs of victims at the forefront of policing.

3.3 Prevention First guides how police reduce crime while, simultaneously, improving services to New Zealanders by reinvesting freed-up time into crime prevention activity and better support for victims.

3.4 This strategy means a reduction in the economic and social costs associated with crime, while reducing harm experienced by New Zealanders. In turn, this contributes to the Government’s Better Public Services outcomes.

3.5 Prevention First is a balanced approach which recognises police have, and will continue to have, a major role to play in response, investigations and enforcement of crime. These policing functions remain as critical components of service delivery.

3.6 Prevention First requires all staff to seek out prevention opportunities as part of their daily work. This involves looking beyond single issues associated with individual cases.

3.7 Community groups, volunteers, iwi and other community partners all enable police to effectively deliver Prevention First. These groups work with police to develop and operationalise similar strategies in the justice, social, intelligence and transport sectors to help achieve Prevention First outcomes.

3.8 Prevention First provides police with the means to remain tough on criminal offending while reducing victimisation by concentrating effort on the underlying drivers of crime, in tandem with tactical interventions aimed at preventing crime before it occurs by:

» Leveraging community services and networks to protect vulnerable people, particularly repeat victims;

» Acting with urgency against priority and prolific offenders; and

» Developing innovative and sustainable, practical solutions using problem-solving approaches to manage crime hotspots and priority locations.

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“Instead of getting out of bed and saying ‘who can I lock up?’ it’s about ‘what crime can I prevent today?’ It’s a mind-set change for all police.”

INSPECTOR, COUNTIES MANUKAU DISTRICT

“... It’s about taking time at the front end – with victims, offenders, locations – and being thorough. It’s always better to prevent a crime or crash before it happens than pick up the pieces later. For example, arresting high-priority offenders quickly, submitting quality intelligence notings, acting urgently on forensic hits and reducing the number of drivers speeding or not wearing seat-belts are all great for prevention.”

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PREVENTION
Victim Focus

3.9 For many years preceding PE and Prevention First, staff were actively encouraged to weight effort in favour of offenders. For example, an officer’s output and overall performance was often measured against the number of offenders arrested as opposed to the number of crimes prevented or victims prevented from being revictimised.

3.10 Victim Focus is central to the Prevention First strategy. It makes victims the primary focus of the overall police response and supports the police vision of creating communities where individuals are safe and feel safe.

3.11 Six percent of the New Zealand population suffer 54% of all crime. Repeat victims are people and places (e.g. repeat petrol station drive offs; repeat thefts from supermarkets). Some repeat victims will also be offenders.

3.12 Police recognise that by better supporting the most vulnerable, the likelihood of revictimisation can be significantly reduced, thereby reducing future demands on police time and resources. For Victim Focus to have the desired effect, a new approach was required from all staff interacting with victims.

3.13 A new victim framework was piloted in Tasman and Waikato districts before being rolled out nationally in December, 2012. The framework ensures police place a higher priority on supporting victims of crime; that victims receive a better service; and a more informed approach to decision making and the use of resources.

3.14 Victim Focus has encouraged staff to see the world from a victim’s viewpoint, be attuned to their needs and vulnerabilities, and provide them with a high level of service at every opportunity.

3.15 The change in focus is evidenced by the attitude of frontline officers – the way they think, behave and engage with victims of all crime categories.

“Hawke’s Bay Intelligence did a profile of the young man, which helped us decide the most effective way to work with him. Youth Aid met the boy and gave him good prevention advice, identifying goals for him to improve his life and job prospects, and getting him on the right path. The youth hasn’t been a victim since last September and Youth Aid continues to work with him to ensure he achieves some of his goals.”

SERGEANT, EASTERN DISTRICT

3.16 Under the Victim Focus workstream a number of initiatives and enabling tools were developed and provided to districts and the frontline:

» District-based Victim Managers.
» A Victim History Scorecard (VHS).
» A Victim Graduated Response Model.
» Victim Intervention Plans (VIP) for all high-risk and repeat victims.
» Tiered victim training catering for three categories of users.
» Integrated management of identified high-risk and repeat victims within the district T&C regime.

District Victim Managers

3.17 Victim Managers are in place in each district with an overview of all victim-related matters (e.g. coordinating development of Victim Intervention Plans for ‘red-flagged’ repeat victims; monitoring the total number of victims in the district; and reinforcing the graduated response approach to staff).

Victim History Scorecard

3.18 A Victim History Scorecard (VHS) tool was established to automatically capture victimisation history from police information systems and translate this into a risk score.

3.19 The VHS provides an automatic ‘flag’ that a person has previously been victimised. For example, if it is known a person is a repeat victim then staff spend more time speaking with them over the phone, at the scene and in follow-up interactions.

Graduated Response Model

3.20 A Graduated Response Model was developed to guide staff in their interactions with victims:
» Bronze response – victims receive appropriate crime prevention advice.
» Silver response – a bronze response plus a follow-up visit and phone call to provide additional support.
» Gold response – Victim Intervention Plans are developed. These plans often involve partner agencies to address the underlying causes of repeat victimisation and put steps in place to break the cycle.

3.21 Officers apply the bronze, silver or gold graduated response model in their interactions with victims. For example, a first time burglary victim will receive simple, practical crime prevention advice (lock your doors and windows; install security lights or deadlocks) while a serious repeat victim will get a gold response which includes the development of a Victim Intervention Plan.

3.22 When a victim calls a Communication Centre or the Crime Reporting Line their previous victimisation history is immediately known. NIA also contains victim information and assigns a Red, Amber or Green flag depending on the level/history of victimisation.

3.23 Officers access police systems (including via their iPhones and iPads) to see if a person has a history of victimisation. Any Red, Amber or Green flag, along with a victimisation history scorecard, inform officers of a person’s victimisation history so the graduated response model can be applied accordingly.
**Victim Intervention Plans for high-risk and repeat victims**

3.24 For repeat victims, Victim Intervention Plans (VIP) are developed and taskings assigned for follow up (either by police, another agency or agencies, or any combination of police/agency response).

3.25 The interventions in a VIP are specific to the needs of individual victims. They range from providing crime prevention advice (e.g. ‘target hardening’ advice to a burglary victim); right through to ongoing, multi-agency interventions to help a vulnerable person who has been a victim multiple times.

3.26 Before closing a VIP, it is checked (usually by a District Victim Manager) to ensure all prevention actions have been explored and completed, and that the risk of repeat victimisation has been reduced.

**Victim Focus Training**

3.27 A three-tier Victim Focus training package was developed. This included specialist training for District Victim Managers; e-learning for all frontline staff; and a more intensive face-to-face training programme for sergeants and above (approximately 1250 staff).

3.28 Training was delivered to more than 9000 staff on the Victims’ Rights Act and the new graduated response model.

**The Deployment Model**

3.29 The Deployment Model is a pillar of the Prevention First strategy. The model provides a structured and disciplined framework that enables decision makers to deploy resources with a nationally consistent approach to the local crime and crash environment.

3.30 Deployment is about being prepared, informed and flexible so resources can be mobilised pre-emptively and quickly to achieve and maintain demand reduction.

3.31 The Deployment Model has four components: 1. Critical Command Information (CCI); 2. Tasking and Coordination (T&C); 3. Workforce Management (WFM); 4. Operational Delivery.
Figure 7: The Deployment Model

Workforce Management

Critical Command Information
- Actual Strength
- Performance
- Intelligence
- Demand
- Strategic Priorities

Interpret Criminal Environment (Understand the Drivers of Crime)

Real-time response urgent & immediate

Tasking and Coordination

Operational Delivery

Assess Impact (Effectiveness of Tactics)

Influence the decision maker

Crime & Crash
- Victim
- Road Policing
- Organised Crime & Drugs
- Offender
- Families
- Alcohol

22
3.32 Under the Deployment Model the following initiatives were established in each district:

» District Deployment Managers were appointed to lead the development and execution of the model at district level. All Deployment Managers attended a national workshop as part of their development.

» WFM Groups were established to deliver district-wide centralised rostering to ensure sufficient and appropriate staff availability for deployment on each shift to meet operational requirements. Minor reconfigurations were made to the Police HR system to support WFM.

» A new and improved T&C process was developed, implemented and published in the Police Manual.

» District Command Centres (DCCs) were established to provide a 24/7, real-time overview of demand. These centres manage the deployment of staff into preventative activities to beat demand and prevent crime. A national operating model was written to support the DCCs.

» The following decision support tools were developed and provided to districts:
  » Demand profile to identify overt and latent demand – including victims, offenders and locations.
  » Actual Strength profile to understand staff capability and capacity.
  » Real Time Intelligence for Operational Deployment (RIOD).
  » Scheduled Events (a pre-programmed dispatch event).
  » Smart Client (a customised mapping tool providing operational information in real-time to assist with deployment).

» A Deployment Model and Deployment Manager’s Guide was developed, published and issued to districts.

**Deployment: Critical Command Information (CCI)**

3.33 Supervisors use victim/offender/location data and other intelligence resources to inform their CCI and T&C decisions. With this big-picture view, resources are deployed accordingly.

3.34 CCI is a significant input into the T&C process. CCI describes all the information decision makers should consider before deploying resources.

**Deployment: Tasking and Coordination (T&C)**

3.35 T&C sits at the centre of the Deployment Model and is used to set and agree national, district and area priorities.

3.36 The ‘3i’ model (influence, interpret, impact) describes the relationship between intelligence, decision makers and the crime and crash environment.
This information is fed into the T&C process to ensure deployment decisions are informed by good intelligence. Intelligence-informed policing and T&C support the Prevention First approach.

Communities are key stakeholders in the T&C process and actively encouraged to participate. Communities include other government departments, local body councils and community groups or individuals with an interest in crime and crash prevention.

**Deployment: Workforce Management (WFM)**

Deployment Managers and Centralised Workforce Management Teams have been established in each district, better balancing resources between response and prevention activities.

Significant reductions in leave balances have been achieved through WFM and a fairer, more equitable leave system is in place alongside improved rostering for staff training and development; and improved rostering forecasts for major events (e.g. Rugby Sevens/ VIP tours).

There is continued monitoring of district performance for indicators such as average leave balance per FTE.

Consistent WFM practices have been established across districts and service centres. For example, the Royal New Zealand Police College implemented efficiencies around staff training requirements (reducing the number of no-shows to training courses and ensuring staff are programmed to attend training before any certification expires).

Significant savings have been identified to date from managing and reducing leave balances. Between October 2011 and June 2014, Deferred Days Off (DDO); Time Off In Lieu of overtime (TOIL); and Annual Leave balances were reduced by 87%, 51% and 14% respectively for all districts using WFM.

This represents a total saving of 414,325 hours. Using June 2014 average hourly rates of $36.04 (Annual Leave and TOIL) and $33.97 (DDO), this equates to an estimated saving of close to $15 million.
The 5 Drivers of Crime

3.45 The Prevention First operating strategy required police to improve its understanding of and response to the 5 drivers of crime (Families; Alcohol; Youth; Road Policing; and Organised Crime and Drugs). As a result, police are more focused on and engaged in addressing the underlying causes of crime. This in turn has contributed to sustainable reductions in crime.

Figure 9: The 5 drivers of crime and corresponding tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drivers of Crime</th>
<th>Alcohol</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Road Policing</th>
<th>Organised Crime &amp; Drugs</th>
<th>Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>Problem Drinking</td>
<td>Problem Drinking</td>
<td>Problem Family Violence</td>
<td>Problem Disproportionate Māori youth offending</td>
<td>Problem Fatigue &amp; Dangerous/ Careless Driving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>1. Develop, implement and embed District-level collection plans specific to alcohol offending</td>
<td>1. Use ODARA to engage with and support vulnerable families (new POL 1310, Intimate Partner Vulnerability Factors, Child Risk Factors)</td>
<td>1. Increase the perception of apprehension for the fatal 5 offences</td>
<td>1. Increased focus on truancy, holding parents accountable by collaborating with partner agencies</td>
<td>1. Increased focus on truancy, holding parents accountable by collaborating with partner agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Undertake quality licensed premises compliance checks in high risk locations using the Graduated Response Model and focus on licensee responsibility &amp; sales of alcohol to minors</td>
<td>2. Identify and engage with repeat victims of crime connecting them with appropriate community programmes and/or government agencies using an information sharing approach</td>
<td>2. Implement the safe system approach under the Government’s Safer Journeys strategy</td>
<td>2. Identify and implement effective Responsiveness</td>
<td>2. Identify and implement effective Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Apply tactics to target public place drinking, including employing high visibility patrols at risk times and locations</td>
<td>3. Identify dysfunctional crime families. Target them using Neighbourhood Policing Team tactics and a problem solving approach</td>
<td>3. Apply tactics to target public place drinking, including employing high visibility patrols at risk times and locations</td>
<td>3. Identify dysfunctional crime families. Target them using Neighbourhood Policing Team tactics and a problem solving approach</td>
<td>3. Identify dysfunctional crime families. Target them using Neighbourhood Policing Team tactics and a problem solving approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.46 The 5 drivers of crime – Families; Alcohol; Youth; Road Policing; and Organised Crime and Drugs – also overlay the 3i model (see Figure 8, page 24). The focus on the 5 drivers involves viewing the source of problems, problem solving, reducing repeat victimisation and targeting repeat and prolific offenders and priority ‘hotspot’ locations.
2013/14 National Tactical Plan

3.47 The 2013/14 National Tactical Plan came into effect on 1 January 2013. It was designed to give a ‘back-to-basics’ operational context and perspective to the Prevention First operating strategy by providing districts with a fit-for-purpose tactical options menu.

3.48 This enabled resources to be used more efficiently and consistently by employing the ‘right’ tactics and sharing what works well.

3.49 In addressing the drivers of crime, many of the underlying issues intersect, overlap and impact on each other. On that basis a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary approach was recommended. This recognised that the National Tactical Plan would be most effective through a whole-of-police approach in collaboration with partner agencies.

3.50 In addition to the recommended tactical options, staff needed to apply other initiatives when developing tactics (e.g. such as those outlined in the National Road Policing Strategy and The Turning of The Tide Action Plan8 – a Whanau Ora crime and crash prevention strategy developed by iwi and police).

3.51 Districts determined how the tactics should be best deployed and how the outcomes sought would be measured. Via the Performance Management Framework (PMF), support was provided to districts to achieve their outcomes.

Changing mindsets

3.52 Police consciously set out to achieve a mindset and culture shift that put prevention and the needs of victims at the forefront of policing.

3.53 Prevention First provided the vehicle and mandate for this shift to occur. It introduced a coherent operating strategy implemented in tandem with changes to district structures, systems, processes and operating style – all rolled out under the umbrella of PE.

Leadership

3.54 The necessary mindset and cultural changes were driven by the wider Police Executive to ensure all leaders were actively engaged in the transformation process and the move to prevention-focused policing, e.g. this was achieved through formal communication activities such as district-based staff days.

3.55 At the frontline, all staff assumed a leadership role through being more visible and engaged in their communities, spending more time and effort on reducing victimisation and on activities promoting crime prevention.

Police has significantly lifted its system change capability, driven largely from the top. There have been changes to structure and accountabilities and a range of sophisticated tools have been put in place.

Progress has been made on aligning Police culture, values and behaviour as there is evidence that frontline staff have bought into the Policing Excellence Strategy and Prevention First operating model, because they have seen benefits from the strategy. When thinking about how to address the five drivers of crime, districts increasingly approach it in terms of prevention and reducing victimisation.

Leadership Framework

3.56 Building on the learnings from the PE journey, a new Leadership Framework was under development in early 2014. The framework’s purpose is to demonstrate the varying degrees of responsibility and focus held by leaders throughout police. Levels within the framework extend from ‘Individual Contributor’ to ‘Lead Police’ emphasising leadership as an essential element of every employee’s role.

3.57 A core component of the framework is demonstrating both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of leadership. This is expressed through the terminology ‘Operational Leadership’ and ‘People Leadership’. The Leadership Development Model, a component of the framework, explicitly sets the expectations as to ‘how’ leaders lead at each level.

3.58 At 30 June 2014, the framework continued to take shape as it was tested with internal audiences. This included identifying what is required to help leaders consciously incorporate the framework into their day-to-day leadership practice and responsibilities.

Performance Management Framework

3.59 As part of PE, it was anticipated a Performance Management Framework (PMF) would provide an aggregated view of various data sources. This would enable districts to better forecast crime rates and determine what success looks like by tracking progress towards its goals, and targets – including the effectiveness of prevention-focused tactics and activities. It was further anticipated the PMF would provide the ongoing tracking mechanism for benefit realisation.

3.60 Throughout the PE lifecycle several PMF options were explored, developed, piloted and assessed.

3.61 An interim PMF was established and used while a final solution was developed. The interim framework included:

» A monthly Balanced Scorecard dashboard.
» District Command Assessments.
» District Tactical Plans.
» National and District T&C.

9 Rebstock, P. (February 2014). Performance Improvement Framework follow-up review: New Zealand Police. State Services Commission, the Treasury, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; Wellington, New Zealand
» Benefit monitoring.

3.62 [At the time of going to print, an updated PMF was under development. Making the most of electronic dashboards available on mobility devices, the updated PMF will feature a balanced set of performance indicators, available in near real-time. In turn, this will support the ability for commanders and senior managers to have meaningful performance conversations at the right times with the right people].

Continuous Improvement

3.63 A Continuous Improvement (CI) model was developed and implemented as part of PE.

3.64 A dedicated Centre for Continuous Improvement (CiCI) was set up in 2012 with the primary objective of implementing a CI framework, supported by an organisational culture that:

» actively engaged frontline staff in identifying and implementing service delivery improvements; and

» enabled the productivity, efficiency and effectiveness of police services (including their user-friendliness and ‘people focus’) to be optimised.

3.65 The CiCI developed an operating framework and implemented associated delivery processes. This included the roll-out of a district ideas process and trial of an online CI tool known as ‘Spigit’.

3.66 To 30 June 2014, more than 650 ideas had been submitted through the district ideas process. Many of these were implemented locally, and others were being assessed, consulted and implemented nationally.

3.67 Two CI challenges were run as part of the Spigit trial. The first challenge focused on how police vehicles could better meet the needs of staff. 118 ideas were submitted and, of these, three were supported for implementation, specifically:

a. A trial of boot boxes in vehicles – for efficient storage and ease of access to operational equipment.

b. Vehicles fit-for-purpose – developing a more diverse vehicle fleet.

c. Protective screens – installation of screens between the front and rear seats of patrol cars (operated by staff in one and two-person police stations).

3.68 The second challenge focused on efficiency. 76 ideas were submitted and, of these, 16 were subject to assessment for potential implementation.

3.69 The CiCI continues to gather momentum as more frontline staff become aware of options and opportunities to submit ideas.

3.70 Operational learnings are a vital part of CI. Recognising this, the CiCI focused on and established a ‘Lessons Learnt’ process.

“ Over time, we expect Continuous Improvement to reduce the Police need for large-scale transformational change by investing in ongoing process improvements. Change is a mainstay in Police and no idea is too big or too small to contribute to making a difference. ”

ACTING DIRECTOR, CENTRE FOR CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
3.71 The Police Model: Prevention First received national and international attention (particularly from the United Kingdom and Australia) indicating the model is of interest and relevance to international policing jurisdictions.

3.72 In July 2014, the Police Model: Prevention First was recognised at the highest level within the public sector. At the 2014 IPANZ Gen-i Public Sector Excellence Awards, the Police Model: Prevention First won the prestigious overall Prime Minister’s Award for Public Sector Excellence and Excellence in Improving Public Value through Business Transformation category.

**Figure 10: IPANZ excellence**

From left: Police Deputy Chief Executive Strategy, Mark Evans; Commissioner of Police Mike Bush; Waikato District Commander, Superintendent Bruce Bird; and The Treasury Deputy Secretary, Budget & Public Services, Fiona Ross (category sponsor) at the 2014 IPANZ Gen-i Public Sector Excellence Awards.

“This is a great example of an organisation that has responded to the call for smarter, better public services for less. By challenging the accepted methods, they have transformed the way they operate to deliver better services to New Zealanders.”

IPANZ PRESIDENT, JOHN LARKINDALE
Part 4 Neighbourhood Policing Teams – Prevention First personified

4.1 Part 4 outlines:
- Neighbourhood Policing Teams
  - NPT tactics
  - NPT desired outcomes
  - NPT impact
  - NPT withdrawal considerations

Neighbourhood Policing Teams

4.2 Between 2010 – 2013, Police established 34 Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) in priority locations throughout New Zealand. NPTs primarily focus on reducing crime, preventing victimisation, improving perceptions of safety, and increasing trust and confidence in police.

4.3 NPTs specifically target the underlying causes of crime and safety issues where possible, utilising and leveraging community and partner agency resources.

4.4 NPTs primarily tackle problems of such a magnitude that they cannot be readily addressed through business as usual policing activities. NPTs work on the problems and issues until they are either eliminated or able to be handed back to the community to manage themselves, without the need for further police intervention.

4.5 NPTs are generally made up of between four and six constables and one sergeant. The operating locations for NPTs were identified using a combination of statistical data, local knowledge and intelligence products. The latter included use of a specifically designed and innovative priority locations index developed by the Police National Intelligence Centre, drawing on international good practice.

4.6 NPTs are focused on long-term, sustainable, victim-centric prevention activities. They are equipped with iPhones which enable them to spend more time in the community engaging with people face-to-face both to do their job, and maintain trust and rapport.

4.7 NPTs operate in their dedicated locations for up to five years.

NPT tactics

4.8 Tactics employed by NPTs include:
- Maintaining an active and visible (face-to-face) uniformed presence within their neighbourhood.
- Community engagement and participation in setting agreed local priorities that align with police priorities i.e. tackling the drivers of crime with a focus on addressing the underlying causes of crime and safety problems.
- A multi-disciplinary approach leveraging off the collective capabilities of partner agencies, local service providers, iwi, ethnic and other community groups (e.g. Neighbourhood Support, Victim Support, Community Patrons).
» The use of problem-solving methodology (e.g. SARA – Scan, Analyse, Respond, Assess).

» Intelligence-informed decision making.

» Focusing on vulnerable members of the neighbourhood, including the young and the elderly.

» Operating to an agreed Prevention (Operational) Plan.

4.9 NPTs also effectively support frontline units; provide a ready response to non-emergency calls for service; and work rosters that best meet the needs of the neighbourhood and its specific problem/s.

Figure 11: NPT support to police workgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORKGROUP SUPPORTED</th>
<th>NPT SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>NPTs provide information about crime hotspots and persons of interest or relevant activities (to help prevent or reduce the impact of issues that drive demand for Response Teams). Response Teams provide information to NPTs about specific issues and provide tactical assistance where relevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Policing</td>
<td>NPTs provide information to road policing groups about speed or crash-promoting activities or hotspots. They also carry out road policing activity within their sector. Road Policing assists NPTs through provision of enforcement/tactical assistance or advice to address identified problems/issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Investigation Branch</td>
<td>NPTs provide information, local knowledge to district/area or station CIB about criminal activity including property, drugs, organised crime, gangs, problem youth and family violence. NPTs reassure their community following any major crime or series of crimes within their sector. CIB liaise with NPTs about criminal activity in a NPT area i.e. NPTs are viewed as an information resource to be considered and consulted in appropriate circumstances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>NPTs provide information to inform strategic and tactical assessments. NPTs receive taskings in support of targeted collection plans, particularly in relation to any issues within their sector. Intelligence Section ensures NPTs are tasked within the district/area T&amp;C regime. Intelligence Section provides NPTs with analytical capability (specific to problem identification and resolution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Policing &amp; Community Groups</td>
<td>NPTs ensure area/station staff are briefed and kept up-to-date on their problems/activities (e.g. attend line-up). NPTs engage with diverse communities and, as appropriate, work with Police staff from Māori, Pacific and Ethnic Services (MPES). NPTs provide MPES with information and monitor any activities that may escalate. NPTs engage with schools, businesses and NGOs within their sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NPT desired outcomes

4.10 A combination of the following criteria are used to determine the success of a neighbourhood policing initiative:

» Reduction and prevention of crime.
» Reduction and prevention of crashes.
» Increased feelings of safety in the community.
» Sustainable crime prevention in the community.

NPT success measures include:

» Has crime reduced?
» Have crashes reduced?
» Has victimisation reduced?
» Has trust and confidence increased?
» Has satisfaction with police services increased?
» Does the community feel safer?

NPT impact

4.11 Since implementation, the majority of NPTs have been assessed as having a positive impact on levels of recorded crime; achieved a reduction in the monthly average for total offending; and significantly increased the number of prevention tasks.

4.12 For example, in 2011, the Phillipstown NPT (Canterbury) identified an active drug trade as driving crime, particularly burglary. With intelligence support the NPT shut down drug dealing houses and worked with landlords to evict the organised criminals. The NPT also engaged members of the community to transform the area. Over a 14-month period, 16 warrants were executed at 15 addresses and 22 people charged. Large quantities of stolen property were recovered. Crime in Phillipstown fell 28% since 2010, including a 41% fall in burglary. The project, called ‘Not in our Community’, won the 2014 New Zealand Police national Problem-Orientated Policing (POP) Award.

4.13 NPTs are subject to ongoing assessment to determine impact on crime and crash categories and to inform any decisions about potential NPT redeployment.

10 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kG7bL_ajKE&list=UUJgy7TM18hgeYc2k3PL5_dQA
“There’s been a big drop in family violence since the NPT has been in operation in this area. We used to be seeing the same families having incidents week after week after week. The incidents would escalate in frequency and seriousness but now we are seeing a turnaround. Prevention is a huge part of what the police are doing now, and it is working. Most people were used to seeing the police after an incident had happened, and they do not usually react well to the police at the door. But they are now used to seeing the police coming around and seeing them in a different light; it makes a huge difference.”

VICTIM SUPPORT COORDINATOR, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT

“...I can say with confidence that by empowering the local community we’ve been able to make a real difference in what was Christchurch’s second worst area for burglary. The biggest factor in reducing burglaries is community involvement. Basically the community will prevent burglaries themselves.”

SERGEANT, CANTERBURY DISTRICT

NPT withdrawal considerations

4.14 A number of factors are taken into account when considering the withdrawal of a NPT, as determined in a Transition Strategy.11

4.15 A Transition Strategy should include the following considerations:

» Transition is gradual, using a flexible, phased approach.
» Use of a phase-over or out approach depends on the agreed priorities to be sustained and the communities’ capacity and capability.

4.16 Underpinning the process for transition is the assumption that NPTs are working in a collaborative partnership with the selected communities (as defined in Litmus 2011). The strategies to enable sustained benefits after transition are:

» Transparency that the NPT is time-limited and will therefore withdraw. Planning for withdrawal is an explicit component of the NPTs Tactical Prevention Plan.
» Agreement and monitoring of exit benchmarks to move through a gradual withdrawal process. Building capacity and capability in the community to have both ownership and the ability to sustain benefits after withdrawal.

11 Withdrawal options sourced from Litmus Research commissioned in 2011 by Evaluation Services, Police National Headquarters (PNHQ).
Part 5 Mobility – mobilising the workforce

5.1 Part 5 outlines:
   » Changing the way officers work
   » Increased efficiency and productivity
   » Mobility project success factors
   » Future mobility developments

Changing the way officers work

5.2 Mobility has fundamentally changed the way officers work and greatly increased their productivity. Greater mobility has enabled officers to carry out a wide range of functions that, in the past, would have necessitated returning to a police station, or reliance on other workgroups to complete.

5.3 The use of mobile devices is now business as usual. The Mobility Project within PE was completed on time and within budget delivering, as promised, 520,913\(^{12}\) hours of productivity savings (freed-up time) per annum. These hours have been reinvested into prevention-focused activities.

5.4 Mobile devices have been issued to frontline officers and other identified police employees\(^{13}\), establishing a solid platform for a more integrated mobile environment.

“Yesterday afternoon I picked up a confused elderly lady from a bus stop in Shirley. The bus driver first noticed her in Halswell and she had stayed on the bus almost completing a circuit of the whole city. She knew her name, but unfortunately had no idea where she lived. I found a bus ticket in her purse which gave me a starting point. Using maps I determined the bus stop location. A quick internet search of rest homes in the area produced the most likely home. I gave them a call and they confirmed she was a resident. Home in time for afternoon tea! The iPad and iPhone saved a lot of time without having to explain to Comms what I wanted and wait for them to do the searching.”

CONSTABLE, CANTERBURY DISTRICT

Increased efficiency and productivity

5.5 Frontline officers are now more mobile and visible, using their devices to complete job-critical tasks while out in their communities, rather than returning to police stations to complete paperwork.

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\(^{12}\) The deployment of mobility devices has saved each frontline officer 30 minutes of productivity per shift. This equates to approximately 520,000 hours per year.

\(^{13}\) Smart-phones issued to frontline response, investigation and community police; and tablets to those frontline staff with the greatest data entry requirements (such as the General Duties Branch).
5.6 Mobility enables frontline staff to more readily access police-specific applications that provide core information relating to people, vehicles, locations, items and organisations. Officers can perform important tasks on the go at a crime scene or in a vehicle, including looking up victim/offender/location information; assigning themselves tasks; taking photos; txt messaging; using email; reading and sharing documents; and dictating information for later data-entry.

5.7 Officers can call a dedicated local police number and dictate information relevant to an incident (e.g. details relating to a crime scene). The dictated information is stored online and retrieved by administrative support staff who transcribe the data into the relevant police systems and databases on the officer’s behalf. This process saves frontline staff considerable paperwork and data-entry time.

5.8 Use of mobile devices has reduced demand on radio communications as information traditionally sought via radio through a Communication Centre is now obtained via an iPhone or iPad.

5.9 Further benefits of mobility include:

» Improved decision-making through better, faster access to the right information.

» Increased officer safety through improved situational awareness and tactical management.

» Better matching of resources to demand.

“\nThis is one of the largest mobile fleets in the world and it’s making a huge difference to how our staff work. Mobility is aimed at maximising the safety of our officers; making them more visible, accessible and productive by using mobile technology to complete job-critical tasks wherever they are. Our absolute focus is to enhance the capability mobility provides for our staff.”

INSPECTOR, PNHQ

5.10 The anticipated cost savings from the reduction of desktop computers and telephones – and a new mobile provider partnership – are on track to deliver further productivity savings and benefits.

5.11 Other device enhancements that support frontline users include access to the multi-language Bill of Rights; Road Policing Guide; Family Violence Aide Memoir; and the Search and Surveillance Guide.

Mobility project success factors

5.12 The success of the mobility project can be attributed to a number of factors:

» Strong support from the Police Executive and wider leadership.

» Active involvement of constabulary staff in the leadership and delivery of the project.

» A strong partnership model between NZ Police and Vodafone, enabling the large-scale rollout to be achieved in a compressed timeframe.
A robust project management framework adopted by the three partners: The mobility workstream; the Police ICT Group; and Vodafone – enabling flexibility and good risk management in delivering to tight timeframes.

5.13 An independent Post-Implementation Review of the Mobility Programme was undertaken by Azimuth Consulting Limited. The final report was delivered in January, 2014.

“The Mobility Rollout is viewed as a hugely successful project both inside and outside NZ Police. It delivered, in compressed timeframes and within budget, a world leading mobile capability to frontline staff based on a scalable, sustainable and supportable technology platform which is now the base for future enhancement and development.”

5.14 The Post-Implementation Review noted the mobility business case benefits would be achieved. Frontline staff anticipate time savings in excess of 30 minutes per shift, alongside much more productive time spent on shift.

“In eight months we have essentially mobilised New Zealand Police with the latest technology, enabling our staff to be more mobile, accessible and productive. We are constantly looking for ways to refine the mobility solution to better fit the needs of New Zealand Police.”

SUPERINTENDENT, PNHQ

Future mobility developments

5.15 While outside the timeframe of this PE Closure Report, it is worth noting further benefits can be gained through mobility, including:

» The Prevention First Mobility Strategy for 2014 – 2016 is supported by a roadmap to guide all future mobility initiatives. The Strategy focuses on police using mobility devices and applications, amongst other tools and strategies, as a means of being prepared and flexible to mobilise resources pre-emptively and quickly to stay on top of increasing demand for services.

» New mobility initiatives include the development of a tasking tool that will connect the NCCC and DCC to staff. This will allow the allocation and management of strategic and operational level tasks directly to staff through their mobility devices.

» Police will continue to work with the Government Chief Information Officer to identify opportunities for re-use of the mobility security architecture and solutions, and ensure ongoing alignment of operational assurance.

» Integration with PhonePlus, Enterprise Services, SMART, iOS7, iOS8 and RIOD.

“It’s also apparent, after talking to a number of European police jurisdictions, how advanced New Zealand Police is in the technology space. We’re really leading the world in this.”

SUPERINTENDENT, PNHQ

Figure 12: Mobilising the Workforce

Frontline officers are now more mobile and visible, using their devices to complete job-critical tasks while out in their communities.
Part 6 Alternative Resolutions – expanding the resolution options

6.1 Part 6 outlines:
Alternative Resolutions
» Pre-charge Warnings
» Written Traffic Warnings
» Community Justice Panels

Alternative Resolutions

6.2 Catching offenders, making arrests, laying charges and preparing prosecutions have long been the life-blood of policing. While these activities remain a central part of an officer’s core duties, alternative resolutions provide frontline staff with a wider range of resolution options – particularly when responding to low-level offending – and without the need for a court intervention.

6.3 Alternative resolutions enable officers to use formalised warnings and greater discretion when holding offenders accountable for their actions.

6.4 The PE Alternative Resolutions workstream comprised of:
1. Pre-Charge Warnings (PCW)
2. Written Traffic Warnings (WTW)
3. Community Justice Panels (CJP)

6.5 PCW, WTW and CJP serve to keep low-level, often first-time offenders out of the justice system (courts in particular) while ensuring crime is addressed and victims have redress.

Pre-charge Warnings (PCWs)

6.6 A range of factors are taken into account when considering alternative resolutions. These factors include the level of the offence; offenders’ response (acceptance of responsibility); the type and currency of any prior offending; and victim considerations.

6.7 Nationally, police have used PCWs since September 2010. PCWs enable officers to arrest a person, take them to a station for processing and then issue the warning as an alternative to prosecution. PCWs can be used for people 17-years-old and above and for low-level offences with a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment (excluding family violence offences or methamphetamine-related offences).

6.8 From 1 September 2010 to 30 June 2014, 74,264 PCWs were issued.

6.9 More than half the offences resolved with a PCW were generally for Disorder or Breach of Liquor Ban offences.\(^1\)

6.10 Each PCW saves at least one hour in file preparation time (and even more time if court attendance is factored in).

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\(^1\) Breach of Liquor Ban offences are dealt with using Alcohol Infringement Notices (A-IONs) rather than PCWs. This change came into effect on 18 December 2013.
6.11 To 30 June 2014, the total number of non-traffic prosecutions (recorded apprehensions resolved as prosecutions) was down by 41.3% in comparison to the 2008/09 baseline, as indicated in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Non-traffic prosecution volume

“...A mother with five children received a Pre-charge Warning for shoplifting $50 worth of groceries to feed her children. Her offending was driven by desperation and she was remorseful. All the groceries were recovered. She had a prior offence back in the 1980s. She was reported as being grateful to have received a Pre-charge Warning rather than being sent to court, as apart from the likelihood of receiving a conviction, the subsequent court costs would have exacerbated her financial stress.”

CUSTODY SUPERVISOR

Written Traffic Warnings (WTWs)

6.12 On our roads, careless or inconsiderate drivers can now receive a WTW as an alternative to a verbal warning or issuing an Infringement Offence Notice (ION) or Traffic Offence Notice (TON). WTWs allow officers to exercise discretion within more clearly defined parameters. However, WTWs can’t be given for traffic offences punishable by imprisonment such as drink and drugged driving; reckless or dangerous driving; careless driving causing injury; and driving while disqualified.

6.13 The main aim of the WTW approach is to allow officer discretion when responding to low-level traffic offending, guided by more transparent criteria. The WTW process also enables inclusion of victim considerations in decision-making, where appropriate.
6.14 WTWs were first piloted in Wellington District and the three Auckland districts. Between 1 May 2010 to 30 June 2014, 54,137 Traffic Warnings were issued throughout New Zealand – mostly in Auckland and Wellington districts. The majority of these were Written Traffic Warnings with a very small proportion being verbal warnings.

6.15 In April 2013, the Police Executive made a decision to endorse the use of WTWs pending the development of guidelines on their use. These guidelines are now in place.

6.16 Over time, it is expected there will be a reduction in the number of low-level careless driving and inconsiderate driving offences proceeding to court.

6.17 Further benefits of the WTW approach:

» A formal written warning issued on the spot is a more powerful, tangible sanction than a verbal warning.

» TON offences resolved with a WTW save court file preparation time. This freed-up time can be reinvested into frontline policing and crime prevention.

» Counteracts the negative perception that road policing is motivated by revenue gathering. WTWs are a consequence of current traffic offending and a deterrent for subsequent offending.

“Before WTWs were introduced, I had a very black and white attitude to traffic offending... usually resulting in a live notice being issued. WTWs are a fantastic tool to use for minor traffic offending, usually by people who rarely have any interaction with Police in their normal lives and promotes road safety without alienating people who generally support Police.”

CONSTABLE, AUCKLAND CITY DISTRICT

Community Justice Panels (CJP)

6.18 In 2012, the Community Justice Panel (CJP) component of Alternative Resolutions was piloted in Christchurch. This involved a partnership between police, the community and government agencies.

6.19 The CJP provides a forum where offenders are held accountable for their offending and helped to address the behaviour that caused them to offend by a panel of vetted and trained community representatives.

6.20 Offenders seen by the CJP during the 2012 trial had a 31% lower risk-adjusted re-offending rate within 12 months.
6.21 The CJP set conditions to help reduce or repair the damage or harm caused by the offending within a community setting. The formal 2012 independent evaluation of the Christchurch CJP pilot included the following statement:

“The Community Justice Panel (CJP) in Christchurch is an effective alternative resolution that contributes to reducing the number of prosecutions for low-level offending. The CJP initiative saves Police case processing time, has a reasonable level of offender compliance, and strong community involvement.”

6.22 The evaluation concluded CJPs are an effective alternative resolution contributing to:

» Reduced prosecutions for low-level offending.
» Savings in police case processing time.
» Reasonable offender compliance.
» Strong community involvement.
» Reduced re-offending for those who go through the process.
» Most victims reporting being satisfied with the process.

6.23 The decision to establish a CJP is now at the discretion of individual communities/iwi and police districts.

“From my 28 years in Police this is one of the most worthwhile things I’ve been involved in. Time and time again, I’m amazed by what’s disclosed. The honesty that’s displayed is one reason for the panels’ success. The possible sanctions are unlimited. They’re all geared around the driver of that person’s crime and what will stop it happening again. What I like about it is there’s a real opportunity to change lives. It’s driven by people who want to make their communities better by making sustainable change.”

SENIOR SERGEANT, CANTERBURY DISTRICT

17 The Ministry of Justice has funded the operation of the Christchurch CJP for a further three years; and a 12-month pilot of three iwi panels (similar to a CJP) in Lower Hutt, Gisborne and Counties Manukau.
Part 7 Case Management and the Crime Reporting Line – streamlining systems and services

7.1 Part 7 outlines:
Case Management drivers for change
» Case Management components
» File Management Centres
» Investigation Support Units
» Criminal Justice Support Units
» Improved NIA Functionality
Crime Reporting Line – improving customer service
» National coverage
» Links to Case Management

Case Management drivers for change

7.2 Before the introduction of the Case Management (CM) workstream there was no agreed CM strategy. Models for managing cases evolved in isolation and without alignment to clearly defined and understood end goals. These shortcomings were highlighted following some well-publicised case failures in the early 2000s.

7.3 In July 2007, a number of enhancements were made to the National Intelligence Application (NIA) computer system to enable better tracking and linking of cases. These provided a technical solution for increased CM measurement and tracking, but were not supported by consistent end-to-end business processes.

7.4 Checklists and processes were used in some districts to screen cases against ‘solvability’ and priority factors. This helped determine progression of cases based on pre-defined criteria. Nationally, there was no case screening or prioritisation process applied consistently across the CM process. This resulted in cases lacking in ‘solvability’ remaining open, despite a low likelihood of resolution (often at the expense of other cases that were more likely to be solved). In turn, this resulted in wasted investigative effort. Furthermore, cases being filed (closed) or inactivated (suspended) inconsistently throughout New Zealand resulted in a loss of public confidence by failing to meet expectations.

7.5 The new CM process provides approximately 450,000 hours of freed-up productivity per annum and delivers on three vital components of PE:
1. Providing a better service to victims;
2. Reducing paperwork and caseload for frontline staff; and
3. Ensuring officers are effectively deployed and have more time to investigate cases more likely to be resolved (i.e. they have positive lines of inquiry).
Case Management components

7.6 CM is the end-to-end management of interrelated investigative functions from receipt of the first call for service (access to police) through to final disposition (case closure).

7.7 There are two primary CM components:
   i. The CM (10 step) process – which includes the end-to-end decision-making model supported by the Crime Reporting Line (CRL), File Management Centres (FMCs), Investigation Support Units (ISUs) and Criminal Justice Support Units (CJSUs).
   ii. Improved NIA case management functionality, enabling cases and workload to be better tracked and managed.

Figure 14: The Case Management 10-step process
More than 350,000 crimes are reported to police annually. About 42% are resolved (cleared) via prosecution or alternative means. A large number of tasks and incidents also contribute to investigative demand.

Demand arises from a number of access channels. Primary access is via a Communication Centre (111, Crime Reporting Line) or direct reports through police station public counters and email.

Secondary demand arises through reports from other agencies, e.g. child abuse is reported via Child, Youth and Family; warrants to arrest are referred from the Department for Courts; High Risk Offender (HRX) notifications are referred from the Community Probation Service; and concerns arising from people suffering mental health issues. Demand also arises as a result of intelligence assessments or from police officer self-initiated activities.

The product of demand is a case – a ‘file’ which invariably consists of a victim informant; witnesses; a scene and exhibits; and a suspect or identified offender. Each component of a file has a particular statutory, policy or practice requirement that must be met and managed.

The investigation process starts when a decision is made to accept a case and refer it for investigation. Once accepted, a case is assessed, screened for solvability factors using Early Case Closure (ECC) criteria and categorised/prioritised.

Assigned cases are either inactivated or closed once resolved, or all reasonable avenues of inquiry have been considered, explored and exhausted.

File Management Centres

Each district-based FMC receives and progresses all new electronic and paper-based files. Cases are primarily generated through the Crime Reporting Line (CRL), from public counters at police stations and through staff attending incidents. FMC staff assess the quality of the case files and screen them.

All volume crimes (such as burglary or car theft) undergo an Initial File Assessment (IFA) and, if those cases fall below the IFA threshold, are subject to Early Case Closure (ECC). ECC is applied to those cases with limited solvability factors and are unlikely to be resolved through continued investigation.

FMC staff provide updates to victims regarding the status of their case – including whether the case is filed. They also assign all cases requiring further investigation to the appropriate police workgroup and undertake a wide range of case management administrative functions.

"The FMC, in conjunction with the introduction of mobility devices, have freed-up thousands of frontline hours and bought us a lot more visibility. Proactive tasks have leapt by 20 percent, because our tactical coordinators are deploying freed-up time into high-risk victims, offenders and locations. We’ve seen a drop in crime as proactivity increases. People tell us there seems to be more of us – there isn’t, we’ve just organised ourselves better."

DISTRICT COMMANDER
Investigation Support Units

7.17 Staff in each district ISU receive volume cases assigned to them by the FMC (including those with CCTV footage) and other cases as directed by the district. Initial follow-up enquiries are conducted on volume cases and other cases where there is a nominated suspect. ISUs also receive, collate and forward all forensic evidence and DNA samples for suspect follow-up.

7.18 ISU staff add further value by ensuring victims receive regular updates on progress with their case. ISUs determine whether a case will be inactivated (pending further information coming to hand), filed or referred on to area-based investigation units.

“Having ISU manage property crime files has allowed my team to focus on other crime types including violence and behaviour offences, deal with missing person matters and other workload demands, secure in the knowledge theft and car crime files aren’t likely to build up as they have done previously.”

SERGEANT, AUCKLAND CITY DISTRICT

Criminal Justice Support Units

7.19 District-based CJSUs support the post-arrest phase by centrally preparing prosecution files. CJSU staff review files for quality and evidential sufficiency and prepare witness and officer evidential statements; exhibits; disclosure documents and case closure.

7.20 The CJSU is a liaison/contact point for Victim Court Advisors, lawyers, Police Prosecutors, the Crown, victims and witnesses.

7.21 CJSU staff also coach and mentor staff on prosecution case preparation and ensure the 10-step case management process is adhered to.

7.22 ISUs and CJSUs ease the administrative workload for frontline staff. This creates more time for officers to be out in their communities providing support to victims, apprehending known offenders and focusing on prevention.
“The disclosure being done by CJSU is starting to pay dividends for CIB staff. We recently locked up two main offenders and two accessories for a robbery of a tourist in Paihia. This was a squad operation so four different interviewers and arresting officers, six persons interviewed on DVD, four different lawyers and a fairly large and detailed file by the time we got to lock everyone up. The CJSU handled all the disclosure for us to the different lawyers; this has saved the O/C a good day and a half’s work – approx 12 hours of investigative time freed-up.”

DETECTIVE SENIOR SERGEANT, NORTHLAND DISTRICT

“The new support units have freed me up from paperwork to spend more time patrolling the streets. Details of an occurrence or charge can now go directly to those units to deal with. I used to spend a few hours every day on job sheets, first call files, offence reports and evidential statements, but now I can get out and be on the streets more.”

CONSTABLE, EASTERN DISTRICT

Improved NIA functionality

7.23 NIA is used by police staff to access and enter a wide range of intelligence information (e.g. criminal histories).

7.24 NIA was enhanced to better support the 10-step case management business model, with a number of NIA-based tools developed to help manage individual and unit/group workload. The primary tool is NIA Case Workload Manager (CWM).

7.25 CWM enables a workgroup manager to obtain an overview of workload and make an assessment on the status of each file.

Crime Reporting Line – improving customer service

7.26 Before the Crime Reporting Line (CRL) was introduced, members of the public primarily had to go to a police station to report a historical crime (e.g. a burglary discovered upon return from a holiday). This approach, combined with other factors (e.g. increasing 111 call volumes to the Communication Centres) created an opportunity for improved phone-based customer service.

7.27 The CRL provides a professional victim-focused service to the public who want to report historical volume crime by phone. Nationwide, victims of historical crimes can provide full details by phone, rather than having to visit a police station in person.

7.28 The first version of CRL was piloted in Auckland and Bay of Plenty districts from late 2006. An enhanced version was tested in Counties Manukau District in 2009.
7.29 CRL was picked up as a PE workstream and rolled out to Canterbury and Eastern districts in 2012, and remaining districts by mid-2013. The Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS) was then introduced to reduce call-handling time and increase CRL productivity when processing reports from the public. CRIS reduces the average call-handling time from 20 minutes to 13 minutes.

Figure 15: Crime Reporting Line, Harlech House, South Auckland

7.30 In April 2013, a new, purpose-built 43 desk CRL call centre was established at Harlech House in South Auckland to support the national CRL expansion. This new centre, combined with the original CRL call centre at the Northern Communication Centre, operates with 123 full-time-equivalent staff.

National coverage

7.31 CRL communicators receive calls from throughout New Zealand and input all the details relating to the complaint. Victims can also send supporting evidence (photographs, documents) to the CRL via a web portal. CRL staff provide the victim with a Complaint Acknowledgement Form and Victim Support Referral where appropriate. Collectively, the information received into the CRL provides police with good and timely intelligence about crime patterns and trends.

7.32 CRL staff record and assign offence/incident reports to district FMCs for assessment and follow up. A number of CRL staff are also trained to take 111 calls in the event of a spike in emergency calls.

7.33 CRL takes 60% of all volume crime reports, compared with the original forecast of 45%. In the first quarter of 2014, the CRL answered 160,391 calls. Projected out, this indicates the CRL will answer around 500,000 calls annually. CRL staff answered 95.84% of all calls presented to them.
7.34 CRL handles other streams of work, accounting for a further 11,559 service requests in the first quarter of 2014. These service requests came from Crimestoppers, Parole Recall Warrants, CyF Reports of Concern, Police Safety Orders, Lost Property Reports and Previously Reported Events via the CRL web portal.

7.35 CRL also creates events for district forensic teams, primarily as a result of burglary reports. CRL collect relevant information to help forensic teams assess opportunities for gathering forensic evidence such as DNA or fingerprints.

Links to Case Management

7.36 CRL is also part of the Case Management (CM) business model, alongside FMCs, ISUs and CJSUs.

7.37 The deployment of frontline staff to historical events for the purpose of taking a report has dropped by up to 95%. That equates to thousands of events officers haven’t had to attend in person (as the report is taken via phone), freeing them up to focus on proactive prevention.

7.38 The nationwide, 24/7 CRL significantly contributes to the PE goals of providing a better service to victims of crime; streamlining the management of cases and files; and freeing-up frontline officer time.

“The information we’re able to provide districts is of a better quality and delivered faster than ever before. The calls received into CRL provide districts with good intelligence about crime trends and patterns and are fundamental in helping the districts shape preventative policing through district command centres. In partnership with File Management Centres, CRL has freed-up significant time for prevention work, allowing staff to front foot offending in districts rather than playing catch-up – it’s Prevention First in action.”

INSPECTOR, CRL CENTRE MANAGER
Part 8 District Command Centres – deployment in action

8.1 Part 8 outlines:
   District Command Centres
   » Deployment
   » Command and Control
   » Communication Centres
   » National Command and Coordination Centre (NCCC)
   » Intelligence
   » Road Policing
   » Workforce Management (WFM)
   » Victim Focus Framework
   » Real Time Intelligence for Operational Deployment (RIOD)
   » Mobility

District Command Centres

8.2 The 24/7 DCCs are the ‘beating heart’ of the Deployment Model, providing the operational overview in the deployment mix. The decision to introduce DCCs was based on the need for a district-based delivery mechanism for deployment tasks and activities.

Deployment

8.3 The DCC provides the Deployment Manager with a real-time, big-picture overview of how best to deploy resources to beat demand and prevent crime happening in the first place throughout the district. Supervisors use victim/offender/location hotspot data, their Demand Profile, their District Tactical Plan (which outlines the tactics to be used to combat the 5 drivers of crime) and other intelligence resources and strategic priorities to inform their CCI and T&C decision-making.
8.4 DCCs don’t change the existing situation where all district staff are under the command and control of the district commander.

8.5 For certain planned events and operations, the DCC may be utilised as the command centre by the operational commander. However, any disruption to the DCC’s business-as-usual activities must be minimal.

8.6 The DCC may also be utilised as the command centre for unplanned and significant events and operations.
Communication Centres

8.7 Communication Centres manage incoming calls to police and the response to Priority 1 and 2 events. The DCC ensures appropriate resources are available to meet demand. The DCC proactively monitors P1 and P2 events and deploys discretionary resources to beat this demand and prevent ongoing offending. The DCC uses real-time opportunities to reduce current calls for service. The Communication Centres are tasked with ensuring timely response to priority calls for service and help the DCCs achieve the district commander’s intent. As their names suggest: Communication Centres are a coordinating point for communications; DCCs are a coordinating point for the command of district resources.

National Command and Coordination Centre (NCCC)

8.8 A NCCC has been established at Police National Headquarters, Wellington. It enhances the approach to intelligence-informed policing and aligns with the DCCs. The NCCC provides the Police Executive and staff with instant, real-time information about national operational activities, highlighting demand and where resources are required (influencing strategic decision-making). The NCCC is fully interoperable with the DCCs (using RIOD as the common operating platform). This technology platform can be used for day-to-day business and coordination and command of a nationally-led planned operation or unexpected emergency/incident.

8.9 The NCCC’s role in any operation or emergency is at the direction of the Police Executive and the level of response is scalable to the situation.

Figure 17: The NCCC at Police National Headquarters, Wellington
Intelligence

8.10 Intelligence supports DCCs in two key areas. Firstly: providing contextual information/situational awareness to inform decision-making and formulation of the district leadership team’s intent (within which the DCC operates). This ‘common operating picture’ includes intelligence support to longer-term problem solving for sustainable crime reduction. Secondly: intelligence supports DCC decision-makers in real-time, dynamic situations utilising new and emerging technology.

Road Policing

8.11 Road policing staff are deployed according to the district/area T&C processes. District and area leadership teams are responsible for achieving strategic road policing productivity goals.

Workforce Management (WFM)

8.12 WFM balances the needs of the individual with their group and the wider organisation (e.g. by managing training, court-time and leave). WFM ensures that capacity and capability exists at all times to meet the needs of the district to answer calls for service and to carry out prevention activity. WFM enables DCCs to have visibility of the available resources so it can deploy to beat real-time demand.

8.13 As much as possible, resources are deployed into preventative tasks, balanced against the need to act with urgency in response to life and death situations and other priority incidents.

8.14 Data from a district’s WFM group feeds into the DCC, providing supervisors with a clear picture of the number of staff available to be deployed to the right place at the right time for every shift and for future significant operations (e.g. Rugby Sevens or VIP visitors).

8.15 Critical in mapping and managing rosters for round-the-clock, shift-working staff, the WFM tool also ensures supervisors can strike a balance between having the right number of staff on duty at any one time and the need for staff to take leave, attend mandatory training and development days, or attend court.

Victim Focus Framework

8.16 DCCs play a generic role in support of the Victim Focus Framework. This is achieved by monitoring scheduled victim-related tasks and maintaining an overview of victim focus areas.
Real Time Intelligence for Operational Deployment (RIOD)

8.17 RIOD is a customised SharePoint site used for BAU prevention-focused deployment and emergency response. RIOD is based on the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) endorsed national emergency management system. It enables cross-agency interoperability in the event of a national emergency. The RIOD user base has grown to 8,000+ staff and districts are transitioning to RIOD from existing SharePoint sites or other business processes. RIOD allows events to be managed across multiple districts. It has been used to manage operations including the 2014 Royal Tour and will be used to manage future operations including the 2015 Cricket World Cup and FIFA U-20 World Cup. RIOD also supports:

» Enhanced situational awareness, planning, collaboration across police, complementing key applications such as Smart Client, Demand Profile and intelligence products.

» A centralised tasking and coordination process.

» Decision and event logs.

» Alerts and messaging to police and external partners (including community interest groups such as the security industry, Māori Wardens and neighbourhood patrols).

» A layered map view of critical infrastructure and the ability to store information behind other locations of interest to manage planned and unplanned events.

Mobility

8.18 DCCs and mobility (see page 34) are two significant and complementary technical advancements for NZ Police. Examples of the interface between DCCs and mobility include:

» Better matching of resources to demand.

» Improved decision-making through better, faster access to the right information.

» Increased officer safety through improved situational awareness and tactical management.

The Prevention First Mobility Strategy 2014–2016 focuses on the use of mobility devices and applications, amongst other tools and strategies, as a means of being prepared and flexible to mobilise resources pre-emptively and quickly to stay on top of increasing demand for services.

» New mobility initiatives include the development of a tasking tool connecting the NCCC and DCC to staff. This will allow the allocation and management of strategic and operational level tasks directly to staff through their mobile devices.
Part 9 Supporting & Enabling Workstreams

9.1 Part 9 provides an overview of the PE supporting and enabling workstreams:
  » Cost Recovery
  » Policing Act Opportunities
  » Support Services to the frontline – reviews of Finance and HR

Cost Recovery

9.2 The PE Cost Recovery workstream was established to explore options and opportunities to recover the costs of providing certain policing services. Police is seeking to amend the Policing Act 2008 to enable cost recovery.

9.3 Amending the Policing Act 2008 to enable cost recovery would help to:
  » Rationalise demand for certain services currently provided to users of the service on a no-charge basis.
  » Enable increased demand to be managed through self-funding.
  » Improve the efficiency with which services are provided by having to demonstrate value for money.
  » Address fiscal pressures and re-prioritise resources to focus on frontline, preventative services.

9.4 In December 2012, Cabinet agreed to release a public consultation paper on ‘Cost Recovery for Certain Police Services’. The consultation paper identified Police vetting, in the first instance, as a potential candidate for cost recovery. The consultation paper was released on 11 December, 2012 and closed for submissions on 5 March, 2013. 147 submissions were received.

9.5 Following an analysis of the submissions, further targeted consultation took place with submitters on fees being applied to vetting. A paper then went to the Cabinet Social Policy Committee (SOC) with proposals for a Policing (Cost Recovery) Amendment Bill.

9.6 The Bill was drafted and introduced to Parliament on 20 May, 2014.

9.7 While outside the timeframe of this closure report, the Bill is awaiting its First Reading and referral to select committee. It will require reinstatement by the new Parliament following the 2014 General Election.

Policing Act Opportunities

9.8 Changes to the Policing Act in 2008 enabled the use of Authorised Officers (AOs) for specific roles.

9.9 The Policing Act Opportunities workstream investigated the potential financial savings through AOs performing roles undertaken by fully sworn constabulary staff.
9.10 The Policing Act allows for a number of specific roles to utilise AOs i.e. Jailers and Escorts. However, three other roles were considered less workable in the short term for the following reasons:

» All Government House Guards are already AOs or Temp Sworn so there is no further potential for transition. However, in smaller districts it would make sense to also train Jailer/Escort AOs as Police Guards so they could work as Scene Guards if required;

» It is yet to be determined whether existing or future employees in specialist crime investigation roles require warrant powers;

» The powers granted under the Policing Act to the role of Transport Enforcement Officer are too wide and include sea, air and land. Traffic Alcohol Group (TAG) staff, for example, could be assisted by AOs warranted more appropriately under the Land Transport Act 1998.

9.11 While modest savings could potentially be realised, it was determined this was not substantive enough to warrant a national focus. The workstream was therefore transitioned to business as usual with districts making use of AOs as they see fit, on a case-by-case basis.

9.12 At 30 June 2014, NZ Police strength included 248 Authorised Officers.

Support Services to the frontline

9.13 Police support services include the Finance and Human Resource (HR) functions. As part of PE, these functions were reviewed and restructured resulting in more effective and efficient systems and processes, and a centralised structure.

9.14 Historically, support services were provided by a combination of resources based in PNHQ and in each of the districts. These resources largely operated independently of each other.

Finance Review

9.15 The key objectives of the Finance Review were to:

» Align to the police management and accountability structure;

» Enhance capability to deliver greater decision-making support, strategic advice and financial mentoring to senior budget owners;

» Align financial control by removing complexity and inconsistency;

» Ensure Finance functioned as efficiently as possible, providing value for money.

9.16 The scope of the Finance review included:

» A review of all services provided by Finance in PNHQ and districts;

» Design of a new operating model and associated structure for the provision of financial services;

» Review and, where appropriate, redesign and implement new financial processes and systems;

» Consult with all Finance staff on the proposed new structure and implement the final design.

HR Review

9.18 The key objectives of the HR Review were to:

» Position the HR function to support delivery of the Police Model;
» Improve the overall performance of the HR function by reducing duplication, complexity and cost, and increasing consistency.

9.19 A highly inclusive approach was taken in the development of the proposed HR structure. HR Managers and other key staff were involved in the development of the proposal and it was widely discussed with Assistant Commissioners and District Commanders before formal consultation commenced.

9.20 Professional Standards, Employment Relations and proposed changes to Recruitment formed the primary areas of focus.

9.21 Extensive feedback was received via a consultation phase which resulted in the functions of Professional Standards, Employment Relations and Recruitment being centralised.

9.22 The new HR structure commenced operating in February, 2013.

9.23 Together, the revised service delivery model for the HR and Finance functions resulted in a productivity gain of 11 FTE staff reallocated into prevention-focused activities (equating to 16,900 hours per year).
Part 10 Implementation

10.1 Part 10 outlines:
   » Implementation
   » Governance
   » Setting up for success – portfolio approach
   » Portfolio management
   » Benefit management
   » Benefit realisation and reinvestment
   » Communications
     » Internal communications
     » External communications

Implementation

10.2 National rollout of the PE programme was implemented in four stages:
   1. Programme Initiation – (2009/10). Each of the workstreams separately developed an outline plan and stage 1 business case relating to their specific PE initiative.
   2. Programme Design and Build – (2010/11). Each of the workstreams developed specifications for their initiative and, where necessary, completed a pilot and evaluation. This resulted in the development of stage 2 business cases and other supporting artefacts.
   3. Programme Implementation/Execution – (2011/12/13). Each of the workstreams developed charters/implementation plans and initiatives began implementation.
      [NB: At each stage of the programme life-cycle, and particularly during implementation, the anticipated benefits were reviewed to ensure they were being appropriately accrued, reallocated and having the desired effect (i.e. achievement of 4%, 13% and 19% targets)].
   4. Embedding and Benefit Realisation – (2013/14/15). Transition to the business (embedding) and benefits realised.

10.3 Wherever possible, a progressive, iterative implementation approach was taken. However, at the height of implementation, multiple workstreams were being rolled out at once. This tested the entire organisation’s resolve and ability to absorb change.

10.4 Implementation success factors include:
   » Active governance.
   » Executive leadership, direction and participation.
   » Simple, clear targets.
   » Clearly defined roles and responsibilities, including dedicated workstream owners and leads.
District leads were appointed to manage district level impacts and act as a conduit with the Portfolio office.

Centralised change/portfolio engine room.

A robust approach to benefit management.

Comprehensive internal and external communications.

Regular publication of dashboards outlining workstream progress against targets and timeframes.

**Governance**

10.5 Two specific PE governance steering committees (‘Frontline’ and ‘Enablers’) were introduced, allowing for more focused Executive input to each forum.

10.6 The Frontline Steering Committee (PE FLSC) and Enabler Steering Committee (PE ESC) were each chaired by a Deputy Commissioner.

10.7 The PE FLSC was responsible for: Police Model; Mobility; Alternative Resolutions; Case Management; and Crime Reporting Line.

10.8 The PE ESC was responsible for Policing Act Opportunities; Support Services to the Frontline; and Cost Recovery.

10.9 PEC was the overall strategic governance board. Issues were escalated to PEC only if they couldn’t be dealt with or resolved at steering committee level or specifically required the Commissioner’s approval.

10.10 An External Advisory Board (EAB) was also established to provide external oversight. This committee comprised the Police Commissioner (Chair); the two Police Deputy Commissioners; and senior officials representing their respective agencies, including: Ministry of Justice; Department of Corrections; State Services Commission; Treasury; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet; and an independent Police Commissioner’s Advisor.

**Setting up for success – portfolio approach**

10.11 PE was delivered on time and within budget – a direct result of robust portfolio management disciplines, a phased approach to change management and a structured and holistic approach to benefit realisation.

10.12 PE was initially established taking a business-led approach, assigning workstream ownership to district commanders. The structure was supported by a small Portfolio Management Office (PMO) function largely responsible for the management of project documentation and facilitating governance meetings. Programme governance was initially a standing agenda item on the monthly Police Executive Committee (PEC) meeting (which included the 12 district commanders).

10.13 The workload of some district commanders impacted their ability to deliver change. There was also some concern around the ability of district commanders to implement their workstreams and lead change in districts outside their sphere of command. The ability for PEC to provide the level of coverage to govern the PE programme of work therefore became increasingly difficult.
As a result, the PfMO was restructured into two clear components; the ‘what’ (business change) and the ‘how’ (portfolio management).

A Programme Lead was assigned to manage the ‘what’ component and a Portfolio Manager assigned to the ‘how’. These two roles co-led the change programme.

Business ownership of each workstream was clarified with more functional leads. These roles reported to the Programme Lead. (Some district commanders retained this function where work was well advanced).

Project Managers were assigned to each workstream but reported to the Portfolio Manager to ensure consistency of approach. The funnelling of work through specific roles generated tighter controls and enabled a more structured and holistic approach to change management.

Portfolio management

Portfolio management was underpinned by a specific focus on schedule management, risks and issue management, and benefit management.

Schedule management used a single, baselined master schedule of all key tasks and milestones. These were formally reviewed monthly with resultant action plans on late or at-risk milestones. A six week ‘look-ahead’ process provided assurance around achieving milestones. All project managers were held to account through this process.

A strong mitigation action management discipline was applied to risks and issues. All mitigations were assigned clear actions with due dates and formally tracked on a monthly basis.

The success of portfolio management rested on a pragmatic and outcome-focused approach. This ensured project management disciplines were prioritised with a clear purpose and positioned to support the achievement of end goals.

Benefit management

The premise of PE was to generate productivity gains; free-up frontline officer time; and purposefully reinvest this time into generating improved performance in prevention and victim focused activity.

Time savings were achieved through a suite of changes to existing work practices. Mobile devices enabled officers to spend more time in the field and less time in the station. The CRL and centralised case management saved time through officers not having to attend volume/historical crimes. Alternative Resolutions saved time on preparing charges for arrests in situations where formal warnings would now suffice.

PE delivered new initiatives and capability into districts freeing up more 1 million hours of time per annum. To ensure good management of this time, a comprehensive benefit management approach was developed.

PE benefits fell into two classes:

- Productivity – hours, FTE or finances freed for more productive use, enabling a 4% shift into prevention activities.
- Performance – a 13% reduction in recorded crime through a focus on: the ‘crime triangle’ (victims, offenders, locations); the 5 drivers of crime; and a 19% reduction in prosecutions.
Benefit realisation and reinvestment

10.26 District commanders formally ‘accepted’ the benefits from each of the PE workstreams relevant to their district. Benefits were communicated to districts by way of an ‘invoice/statement’ issued by the Deputy Commissioner: Operations.

10.27 The invoice formally recorded the opportunity for district commanders to free-up time through each workstream’s productivity improvements, and reinvest this time into prevention focused activities (in keeping with PE aims and objectives).

10.28 Reinvestment was formally recorded and approved in a Benefit Reinvestment Action Plan and aligned to the District Tactical Plan. The District Tactical Plan was, in turn, implemented through the Deployment Model in each district.

Communications

10.29 The PE communications strategy and specific workstream communications plans were a key component of implementation.

Internal communications

10.30 Internal communications was delivered through a range of channels to ensure comprehensive coverage, including:

» Structured district staff days led by district commanders and their leadership teams.
» Face-to-face interactions wherever possible.
» A monthly PE Communications Toolkit provided to districts.
» Fortnightly PE ‘Green’ email outlining progress and achievements.
» Regular articles in the Police magazine ‘Ten-One’.
» PE Intranet pages.
» Use of district/group/service centre newsletters (as appropriate).
» Electronic Bulletin Board notices.
» Commissioner’s Blog.
» General presentations.
» ‘Big Picture’ messaging.

10.31 The PE Communications Toolkit was refreshed on a monthly basis. It provided up-to-date information on PE progress, allowing senior managers to answer questions from staff and/or stakeholders. The toolkit included:
» The PE ‘Big Picture’ (and supporting narrative). A tool for managers at all levels to help with their conversations about PE: where have we come from and where are we going?
» Key messages/talking points;
» A ‘report card’ outlining the status of each of the PE workstreams;
» Stories emerging from frontline officers and/or stakeholders;
» Workstream media clippings; and
» A PE PowerPoint presentation for use in staff/stakeholder briefings (modified as appropriate).

10.32 The report card was posted on the home page of the intranet so it remained top of mind for all staff. The report card was also used to regularly update key stakeholders on the status of workstreams.

10.33 The internal police magazine Ten-One was a key internal communications channel to inform staff about what was happening (often from a frontline perspective) and for highlighting workstream successes.

10.34 As key activities and milestones were achieved, updates were posted on the electronic Bulletin Board and/or in the Commissioner’s Blog. District newsletters were used where possible to update staff and introduce the benefits of PE.

10.35 At all stages, the intranet was updated with PE information so staff could see how and when the changes were likely to impact them.

External communications

10.36 External communications was achieved using a range of channels.

10.37 At appropriate milestones throughout the programme, the Minister and key stakeholders were updated, allowing them to proactively release information highlighting the benefits of PE.

10.38 Proactive (and visual) media opportunities and speaking engagements were considered for members of the Executive to deliver PE messages as appropriate.

10.39 A greater level of detail around PE (rather than simply a ‘Report Card’ of progress) was posted on the Police website as key activities and milestones were achieved.

10.40 A PE Implementation overview document was produced to 30 June, 2013. The document marked a specific point in time in the PE journey and highlighted the progress and achievements from August 2010 to 30 June, 2013 – the conclusion of the set-up and implementation phase of PE. The document was made available to staff and provided to key external stakeholders at a series of Police-hosted events around New Zealand. The document was also posted to the Police website.
Figure 19: PE Implementation Overview to 30 June, 2013

[Image of the Policing Excellence Implementation overview to 30 June 2013]

Part 11 Embedding

11.1 Part 11 outlines:
» Embedding plan
» Embedding criteria
» Command assessments
» Active governance
» Performance monitoring
» Continued communication (objectives, activity, key messages)

11.2 Following successful PE implementation, the Police Executive wanted to ensure momentum was maintained. A small Embedding and Benefit Realisation team was established to manage and oversee the embedding of PE and ensure actual and anticipated benefits were delivered and used as intended.

Embedding plan

11.3 The team first developed an embedding framework, noting there was little literature or guidance in the public or private sector on embedding. The team engaged with police programme managers (currently leading or with recent experience in embedding) to apply lessons learned. This analysis was developed into the PE Embedding Plan. The Plan proved to be a highly successful and fit-for-purpose model for embedding a programme of the type and scale of PE. The basis of the Embedding Plan was ‘4Cs & AG’:
» Embedding Criteria: clear and unambiguous;
» Command Assessments Round 1 and 2 (CA R1 & R2);
» Active Governance;
» Continuous improvement; and
» Communication – ongoing.

Embedding criteria

11.4 As part of the Embedding Plan, business as usual (BAU) owners developed embedding criteria for their workstreams. The purpose of the embedding criteria was to: identify an embedded end-state for each workstream; identify measures; and set clear expectations for districts. This ensured the embedded end-state was clear. Each BAU owner was challenged to create embedding criteria that answered these questions:
» Is your change integrated into the work of the organisation?
» Have you created clear, measurable change goals that are:
  » Reported on frequently?
  » Meaningful to districts and staff?
  » Representative of progress toward the desired end-state and results?
Tied to district, group and individual performance?
Directly linked to the initiative?

11.5 Embedding criteria results were monitored through a monthly dashboard. During the PE embedding phase, BAU owners continued to refine and enhance the embedding criteria measures in consultation with district commanders, to add value and support districts.

Command Assessments (R1 & R2)

11.6 Command Assessments were a key component of the embedding framework and districts invested significant effort preparing for them.

11.7 Command Assessments provided the Executive, the PE Embedding and Realisation Committee (PE ERC), BAU owners, districts and external observers (e.g. DPMC) with assurance that PE was either embedded in districts or being actively progressed.

11.8 Command assessments were carried out twice in each district between August 2013 and June 2014.

11.9 The first Command Assessment Round 1 (CA R1) sought to gauge understanding and application of the Police Model: Prevention First within districts (down to area level) and was guided by the following objectives:

- To benchmark the current depth and breadth of PE understanding and uptake at area level.
- To identify opportunities to sustain the targets of 4%, 13% and 19%.
- To ensure PE remains visible and relevant at area level.

11.10 The second Command Assessment Round 2 (CA R2) sought to determine the extent to which districts had satisfactorily embedded PE enabled initiatives and the Police Model: Prevention First. This round was guided by the following objectives:

- To benchmark PE embedding across the whole district.
- To identify residual embedding activities.
- To identify opportunities to sustain the achievement of PE targets of 4%, 13% and 19%, beyond 30 June, 2014.

11.11 CA R1 was conducted by an assessment panel chaired by a Deputy Commissioner (or delegate) within each district over a 3–4 hour period.

11.12 CA R2 was also conducted by an assessment panel chaired by a Deputy Commissioner (or delegate). These were much broader and comprehensive, and run over two days. Panels for four assessments included external participants from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Office of the Auditor General and Police Assurance and Risk Committee.

11.13 CA R2 assessments were preceded by:

- Districts addressing opportunities outlined in the CA R1 assessment report.
- Districts completing a self-assessment embedding report. This was based on a combination of workstream embedding criteria and specific nationally set workstream standards, procedures or ‘other’ requirements.
11.14 The district self-assessments provided a valuable vehicle for district self-realisation of their progress in embedding PE. Districts gained a heightened level of awareness and knowledge of their business.

11.15 Preparation for the command assessment was variously described by lead participants as: ‘cathartic’; ‘energising’; ‘made us think about our business’; ‘an affirmation of how we are going’; ‘made us look at all areas of the business’; ‘exposed issues we needed to resolve’.

11.16 Command assessment participants commented favourably on the positive, collegial and collaborative discussions that ensued during CA R1 and CA R2. The open nature of the discussions meant districts could celebrate their success and work in conjunction with the panel to identify improvement opportunities.

“A lot of positive feedback from my District Leadership Team and other involved staff about the opportunity to critique where we are at as a District, acknowledge what we are doing well and challenge on things we could do better. A very constructive and positive couple of days.”

DISTRICT COMMANDER

“I thought the assessment was quite testing but it was also fair. I thought overall it was a good opportunity for me to get an independent view of where we are at but also for everyone in the room to get that understanding.”

DISTRICT COMMANDER

Active governance

11.17 A robust governance framework was established to oversee, direct and monitor all PE embedding activities.

11.18 PEC, chaired by the Police Commissioner, had the following primary functions, roles and responsibilities:

» Ensure Government expectations were met.

» Provide strategic guidance and advice to the PE sponsor and owner.

» Ensure that whole of business considerations were taken into account in PE embedding and that opportunities were fully realised and risks understood.

» Ensure all areas of New Zealand Police were engaged appropriately to embed the PE programme of work, and in the successful delivery of the outcomes and benefits.

» Support the PE sponsor and owner in embedding PE.
» Approve, endorse or resolve actions escalated from the Policing Excellence Embedding and Realisation Committee (PE ERC).

» Champion PE in their various areas of police and with external stakeholders and ensure appropriate follow-up and feedback was provided to all interested stakeholders.

11.19 Two ancillary governance groups operated in support of PEC: The PE Embedding and Realisation Committee (PE ERC) chaired by the Deputy Commissioner Operations; and the External Advisory Board (EAB) chaired by the Police Commissioner.

» PE ERC provided direct governance support to the BAU owners and district commanders with an ‘operational/tactical’ focus.

» The EAB provided external advisory support to the Commissioner. The board was not a decision making body, as such, but rather focused on the broad strategic intent of PE to ensure wider Justice Sector and central agency considerations were taken into account. The PE EAB promoted synergies between PE and other government departments through open and transparent communication and enabled any relevant risks or issues to be identified and discussed.

11.20 An additional forum, the monthly Policing Excellence District Review Meeting (PE DRM) was established to provide a conduit between PNHQ (Embedding Team) and districts.

11.21 Finally, the Deputy Commissioner: Operations held a weekly coordination meeting with the PE Embedding team to monitor results, address risks and issues and drive progress.

Performance monitoring

11.22 The PE embedding dashboard was the primary tool to motivate continuous improvement. Based on the workstream embedding criteria, the dashboard was produced monthly for the PE sponsor, PE ERC, districts and BAU owners.

11.23 Districts universally supported the dashboard as a simple, clear measure of progress in embedding PE. Containing four tables, the dashboard provided a valuable time-bound view of embedding progress in districts as well as national-level risks and issues:

» Table 1 identified accountabilities at BAU and district level.

» Table 2 focused PE ERC on risks and issues at the national BAU level.

» Table 3 measured any reduction in staffing in newly created PE positions in districts e.g. FMC, NPT, and WFM.

» Table 4 (the district league table) measured selected indicators on district progress in achieving the embedding criteria for each workstream.

Continued communication

11.24 A range of communication channels and tools were used to support embedding and benefit realisation.
11.25 Progress was communicated through established fora such as the five governance forums; the command assessments; regular formal and informal contact from the PE Embedding team to district commanders, district PE Embedding leads, BAU owners and SMEs (and vice versa). The production of monthly artefacts such as the dashboard were also used for continuing dialogue with stakeholders.

Communications objectives – internal and external

11.26 The overarching communications objectives were:

» To facilitate the embedding phase by providing information to managers and senior managers around the benefits achieved by PE initiatives.
» To provide staff with timely information where decisions, or benefits, were likely to impact them.
» To promote internal confidence in PE by demonstrating gains and benefits achieved through the PE initiatives.
» To fully inform the Police Executive throughout the life of the programme.
» To maintain and enhance external confidence in policing during the life of the programme.
» To highlight – using examples – how alternative approaches to police deployment can prevent crime and crash, and increase community safety.
» To maintain ‘no surprises’ relationships with key external stakeholders.
» To proactively use external communication as and when there was a robust story to tell.
» To work with the Minister’s office (where appropriate) to maximise opportunities to increase the visibility of PE.

Communications activity

11.27 Communications activity in the PE embedding phase built on the activities and channels utilised during the PE implementation phase (as outlined in Part 10).

Key messages

11.28 PE embedding communications was underpinned by the following primary messages:

» PE has introduced a new and improved model of policing – preventing crime before it happens and putting victims at the forefront of our thinking.
» The Prevention First operating strategy means our officers now provide better service – at all levels – to the people of New Zealand.
» We are now prevention and victim-focused, highly mobile and visible, intelligently deployed and partnered with our communities.
» Our officers are more efficient and effective, and doing the job they signed up for – in short, targeting the drivers of crime.
» As a direct result of PE, we are now amongst the most advanced and leading-edge police services in the world.
Part 12 Policing Now and Policing Excellence: the Future

12.1 Part 12 outlines:
   » PE benefits and successes
   » Policing Excellence: the Future (PEtF)

PE benefits and successes

12.2 In 2010, New Zealand Police embarked on an ambitious and challenging programme of change and improvement known as Policing Excellence (PE). In less than four years PE transformed policing in New Zealand.

12.3 Utilising the Police Model: Prevention First, a fundamental shift has occurred away from a reactive, offender-focused mindset to one where crime prevention and reduced crime is enabled by a specific focus on victims, offenders and locations, and the 5 drivers of crime.

12.4 A further 214 Police roles are prevention focused.

12.5 Frontline staff have been equipped with the tools, training and technology enabling them to spend less time behind a desk and more time in their communities where they can most effectively prevent crime and reduce the number of victims.

12.6 The reduction in recorded crime equates to approximately 98,000 fewer offences. Fewer people have become victims of crime.

12.7 At 30 June 2014, Police had well-surpassed the initial targets of a 4% shift in prevention activities; a 13% decrease in recorded crime; and a 19% decrease in (non-traffic) prosecutions (see Figure 1, page 7).

12.8 34 Neighbourhood Policing Teams operate in priority, vulnerable neighbourhoods (where residents are more likely to be the victim of a crime) to identify and resolve the underlying causes of crime.

12.9 Victims are at the centre of police thinking, resulting in a better service to victims and a commitment to work with them to reduce the likelihood of revictimisation.

12.10 Police are working more effectively with community groups, volunteers, iwi and other partners to develop and implement strategies in the justice, social, and transport sectors to reduce crime and victimisation and deliver better services for all New Zealanders.

12.11 Public trust and confidence in police sits at 78%, reflecting an overall upward trend during the past six financial years.

12.12 PE removed much of the administrative workload for frontline staff, with these tasks now in the hands of the Crime Reporting Line, File Management Centres and Investigation Support Units. The freed-up time this creates for frontline officers means they are more effective, accessible and visible.
12.13 The structured and purposeful use of alternative resolutions has provided a series of policy, procedural and system changes to enable officers to utilise discretion (such as Pre-charge Warnings and Written Traffic Warnings). This enables frontline officers to take the necessary and appropriate action on low-level offending, effectively holding offenders to account but without the need to charge them.

12.14 Improved case management has delivered nationally consistent, streamlined and transparent case management processes. This too has freed-up frontline officer time through better use of systems and tools to manage cases and centralised support functions into specialised teams (such as File Management Centres, Investigative Support Units and Criminal Justice Support Units).

12.15 Changes to the National Intelligence Application (NIA) for case management have ensured improved data quality, reduced unnecessary creation of paper files and enabled significantly improved tracking of case status.

12.16 The Crime Reporting Line (CRL) has enabled better management of volume and non-emergency (historical) crime. CRL means frontline officers can focus on critical response and prevention tasks while volume crime with low solvability factors are managed in the most efficient manner by specialised staff, delivering a professional, consistent and timely service to victims.

12.17 An improved CRL application has reduced the average call handling time in the Communication Centres, improving the service to callers and enabling improved reporting.

12.18 The deployment of 7,000 smartphones and 4,100 tablets has freed-up some 520,000 hours of frontline time for reinvestment into prevention-focused activities.

12.19 The introduction of mobile technology has provided frontline officers with significantly enhanced access to systems at the time and place they need them. Being able to complete tasks in the field on mobile devices negates the need to return to the police station or spend undue time on the radio system to obtain information from the Communication Centres as was the case in the past. Mobility has not only enhanced officer safety, it has also delivered significant productivity gains.

12.20 PE has had a positive impact on staff motivation and engagement. Staff engagement survey results show improvement in a number of key areas. Police score commendably high in the areas of camaraderie, pride and achievement in the positive impact of policing in the community.

12.21 District Command Centres operate 24/7 and spearhead the police deployment function. Utilising Critical Command Information, Tasking and Coordination, improved use of intelligence and improved Workforce Management, supervisors have a much clearer picture of what’s required to deploy to beat demand. Resource availability is now more transparent and can be assigned to best effect – not only to respond to critical incidents but also prevent crime happening in the first place.

12.22 Improved Workforce Management has also enabled better management of staff abstractions and leave in a more effective and equitable way. This has increased the number of productive hours frontline officers are available, and reduced TOIL and annual leave holdings.
12.23 Following a review of support staff functions, the HR and Finance groups have rationalised, centralised and standardised to ensure these services are provided on a more consistent, cost-effective basis.

12.24 Maximising opportunities to utilise Authorised Officers has freed-up time for constabulary staff to focus on policing functions which require their full powers.

12.25 Through the introduction of a continuous improvement framework, skills and capabilities are being developed to build a long-term culture of continuous improvement.

12.26 Work remains in progress on the implementation of an improved performance management framework. This will ensure district performance is clearly linked to strategic goals and provide an opportunity for districts to identify areas of high performance (for leverage) and under performance (for intervention).

12.27 Introducing PE into a national, 24/7 operational organisation has provided valuable insights and lessons learned for future change programmes.

12.28 Overall, a robust and sound approach was applied to target setting; implementation; internal and external governance; communications; benefit monitoring and realisation; and embedding. There were, of course, challenges, but these were overcome with the support, commitment and agility of all NZ Police staff (from the Executive to frontline staff) who saw the merits and benefits of making PE a reality.

12.29 Further PE successes and benefits can be found on pages 13–15.

Policing Excellence: the Future (PEtF)

12.30 Given the success of PE, Police want to maintain the momentum of the benefits achieved to date. Options are being explored to expand work programmes delivered during PE and introduce a new change programme known as Policing Excellence: the Future (PEtF).

12.31 PEtF will involve key justice, social and other strategic partners at all levels and stages of the programme – from design workshops, governance, advisory, and quality assurance. Frontline staff will also be actively involved in the design, development and delivery of the initiatives comprising this new change programme.

12.32 The work of PEtF will aim to:
   » further reduce the crime rate;
   » identify further productivity and efficiency gains;
   » identify options for reducing cost (allowing for greater investment in the prevention of crime and road trauma).

12.33 This approach will see a continued focus on Prevention First, improving outcomes for victims, targeting the drivers of crime, and improving community reassurance through deployment of the right staff, to the right place, at the right time.

12.34 A range of options will be developed for the Minister of Police in the first half of 2015. The intent is to receive the Government’s mandate for change (via PEtF), to further improve delivery of sustainable policing services and achieve better outcomes for New Zealanders.