New Zealand Police Communications Centres Service Centre

Independent External Review

“Titiro Whanui”

Final Report
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## Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 5  
Introduction to the Review ................................................................................................. 5  
Review Objective and Terms of Reference ......................................................................... 5  
The Review Approach .......................................................................................................... 5  
Overview of Key Findings ................................................................................................. 5  
Key Findings ......................................................................................................................... 6  
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 9  
MANDATE ............................................................................................................................. 15  
Mission ................................................................................................................................. 15  
Role ..................................................................................................................................... 15  
Responsibilities .................................................................................................................. 15  
Activities ............................................................................................................................... 16  
CURRENT DEMAND ON COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES ............................................. 17  
Call Volume .......................................................................................................................... 17  
Call Answering ..................................................................................................................... 18  
Communications/Contact Strategy ..................................................................................... 19  
Alternative Contact Options ............................................................................................... 20  
Future Demand .................................................................................................................... 21  
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 23  
GOVERNANCE .................................................................................................................... 24  
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 24  
Incorporation of Communications into New Zealand Police Strategic Planning ............. 24  
The CCSC Purpose ............................................................................................................. 24  
Unit and National Structure ............................................................................................... 25  
Governance, Command and Management ....................................................................... 28  
CCSC Policy and Procedures ............................................................................................. 28  
Risk Management .............................................................................................................. 28  
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 29  
CCSC LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT ...................................................................... 30  
Command versus Management .......................................................................................... 31  
Internal Communications .................................................................................................... 31  
Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 32  
RESOURCES/CURRENT CAPABILITY (EX PEOPLE) ...................................................... 33  
Facilities and Equipment ....................................................................................................... 33  
Location ................................................................................................................................ 33  
Buildings ............................................................................................................................... 33
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction to the Review

1. The operational effectiveness and efficiency of the New Zealand Police Communications Centres Service Centre (CCSC) have been questioned following a number of high profile incidents.

2. As a result of incidents in late 2004, the Commissioner of Police decided to assemble an independent, external Review Panel.

3. The Panel was composed of senior police communications experts from Australia, Wales and Canada, and an organisational psychologist from New Zealand.

Review Objective and Terms of Reference

4. The Panel was directed to make recommendations to ensure the CCSC continues to meet public, staff and Police expectations for public and staff safety, public confidence, and policing effectiveness.

5. The full Terms of Reference may be found at Appendix One.

The Review Approach

6. In completing its Review, the Panel:

   • sought written submissions from the public and Police staff;
   • met with selected individuals and groups who made submissions e.g. New Zealand Police Association, Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc.);
   • interviewed Police Commanders;
   • spent time observing the CCSC operations; and
   • reviewed overseas practice and published research on emergency service response organisations.

Overview of Key Findings

7. Overall, the Review Panel does not believe the CCSC is providing an adequate level of service. New Zealand Police call timeliness performance criteria are not being met nor does the Panel believe they will ever be met under the current circumstances. Key internal and external stakeholders have lost confidence in the CCSC’s ability to effectively and efficiently respond to emergencies.

8. The Panel is very concerned about the potential risks to the safety of the public, front-line police and CCSC staff and the potential for any loss of confidence in the New Zealand Police. The Panel believes that unless New Zealand Police makes urgent changes to how the CCSC operates, further incidents will occur
with the attendant risk of further erosion of public confidence in the ‘111’ system, and New Zealand Police. Of positive note is that the Police Executive has already initiated remedial action to address some of the issues rather than delay actions pending the delivery of this report.

9. Despite the Panel’s concerns, two impressive aspects of the CCSC were identified:
   
   - the dedication of the CCSC management and staff to the work they do, and their desire to improve their performance; and
   - the communications technology used by New Zealand Police which is world class. The current IT capability is not being fully exploited however. Improvements do need to be made to enhance the technological capability and while investment will be required to achieve significant progress there are several options which will be neither extensive nor expensive.

10. The Panel is of the view that despite the criticality of the problems in the CCSC, they are all readily fixable. Some overseas police forces have had similar performance issues with their communications and emergency response operations.

11. The Panel believes that if the necessary improvements are made, New Zealand Police can develop a leading practice, high performing operational communications capability that will better support the New Zealand Police strategic goals of Crime and Crash Reduction; and Community Safety.¹

Key Findings

12. The key findings discussed in the report are:

i. New Zealand Police lacks a communications or contact strategy to underpin the integration of communications and the CCSC with the policing strategy, District operations, crime and crash intelligence, public liaison and integration with other government departments who have emergency management/response roles.

ii. There is a lack of understanding throughout the New Zealand Police, and disturbingly within the CCSC, on what the purpose and business of the CCSC is.

iii. There is a lack of buy-in by Districts that can be detrimental to the progress of the CCSC.

iv. Governance (sponsorship, strategy and direction) of communications and the CCSC is deficient and needs urgent attention from strategic and operational perspectives.

v. The current National Management Group structure is essentially defunct given the lack of staff in the national roles. The Acting National Manager therefore has few resources at his disposal and is dragged into managing operations.

operational issues particularly in the Northern Communications Centre. As a result, the three Centres operate fairly independently of each other.

vi. The Panel conducted this review from a command and control perspective rather than seeing the CCSC as a call centre, in trying to identify the appropriate overarching framework. Police needs to shift to the view that regards the CCSC primarily as a command centre.

vii. The organisational structure of the CCSC needs to be improved so that the three Centres operate in a more coordinated and integrated manner under a fully resourced national command and management team. The new structure needs to clarify the different responsibilities for command and control of critical incidents, and call centre management.

viii. Non-urgent calls through the ‘111’ queue into the Police CCSC are compromising ‘111’ response timeliness. There is a clear need for a non-urgent national contact number to be established. Once established, the public need to be educated on its use as well as use of the ‘111’ line. An astonishing 68% of all incoming ‘111’ calls are rejected by Telecom as false or bogus calls. Police advises that the number 0800 311 311 has been reserved for the purpose of establishing a non-urgent reporting line at some point in the future.

ix. The Centres do not consistently achieve the performance standards of 90% of emergency ‘111’ calls answered within 10 seconds of the call being presented, and 80% of non-emergency calls answered within 30 seconds of the call being presented. Furthermore, Centre performance on self imposed call handling time targets is poor. No performance framework within each Centre was evident and managers and staff do not know what they are working towards.

x. The statistical analysis of the CCSC performance lacks accuracy and does not take into account calls that Telecom presents to an alternative Centre if the first Centre is busy. The statistics only record calls once they are presented (accepted in a call queue) by a Centre. Once presented, between 3 and 6% of calls will wait for longer than 75 seconds. After 75 seconds, the Telecom operator will manually retrieve the call and re-present or ‘bounce’ the call to another Centre.

xi. The number of calls being ‘bounced’ between the Centres before being answered, and the time taken to answer these calls, is too high. Consideration needs to be given to the introduction of a Networked Automatic Call Distributor (NACD) to cease the occurrence of ‘bounced’ calls. The introduction of such a system will need to be supported by better data sharing and dispatch systems across the three Centres.

xii. Technological tools such as Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL), Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) and National Intelligence Application (NIA) automated search, would greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the communications processes. While Police is currently evaluating or considering this technology, the Panel advises caution with these applications to firstly ensure Police is truly prepared for such technology.

2 Source: Telecom New Zealand Ltd. 2004 Call Data.
AVL, for example is not a panacea for inadequate supervision or adherence to standards.

xiii. Radio dispatch channel management needs improvement. Despite Police having many spare channels for use, the CCSC retains the same number of channels. Some channels e.g. Auckland 1, have high levels of radio traffic which can compromise front-line staff safety and reduce response times. Channel linking is another practice which is not recommended except under certain limited circumstances and should not occur during multiple incident scenarios or very active/high volume operational periods.

xiv. The Panel found clear evidence that available units within Districts are either not logging on or not making themselves available for jobs.

xv. Call taking behaviour by communicators needs significant improvement. The Panel is firmly of the view that improvements to call quality can be achieved through training, supervision and structured call taking. As well, employing sworn and non-sworn staff who are capable and competent for the assigned tasks is important.

xvi. Prior to this review being announced, the CCSC had engaged an external call centre consultancy firm, Mi-Quality. The analysis of staffing levels determined a total increase of 21 staff across the three Centres including both communicators and dispatchers in order to meet the required service levels.

xvii. While extra staff was frequently raised as a solution, and sometimes the only solution to the CCSC problems, the Panel does not believe staff numbers (capacity) to be the only issue. There is inherent capability potential in the existing staff base and developing this potential needs to be a primary focus.

xviii. People capability is under-utilised currently through:

- having separate call taker (communicator) and dispatch roles which limits flexible resourcing during high workload situations, and limits career opportunities within the Centres
- recruitment focused solely on call taking rather than incorporating dispatch competencies
- a recent preference for part-time recruits which makes rostering difficult
- locally developed rostering systems which do not optimally match staff with call demand cycles despite the best efforts of the Centre Workforce Coordinators
- lack of a comprehensive training programme and failure to maintain performance standards
- historically high rates of absenteeism for sick leave
- very little on the job training, supervision and mentoring, particularly for sworn members
- lack of debriefing following critical incidents with attendant risks of stress, fatigue and illness
- lack of clarity around procedures for reviewing poor calls with staff
• reluctance of sworn staff to work in the CCSC, the lack of selection criteria and training for them, and the short time many sworn staff spend in the CCSC
• lack of a career structure for both sworn and non-sworn staff within the CCSC
• evidence of a blame culture and absence of positive reinforcement or a recognition programme
• frustration and low morale of many senior sworn staff within the CCSC leadership and management positions
• general lack of morale within the CCSC.

Recommendations

13. The following is a summary of recommendations that appear throughout the report. These recommendations follow the natural order of the report and are not listed here in any particular order. As part of the consideration of the report, it is anticipated that New Zealand Police will want to afford varying priority to the recommendations as it moves into the implementation stage.

Current Demand on Communications Centres

Recommendation 1. Establish a citizen focus panel comprised of key public stakeholders. This should meet quarterly to link into and improve CCSC service.

Recommendation 2. Enhance the Police website as a self-service source of information in the short term by adding a ‘frequently asked questions’ section.

Recommendation 3. Consider the development of a self-service model, linked to an e-policing strategy as a mid to long term initiative.

Recommendation 4. Consideration needs to be given to the introduction of a Networked Automatic Call Distributor (NACD) to cease the occurrence of ‘bounced’ calls.

Recommendation 5. The feasibility of overcoming capacity restrictions to enable national real-time data sharing should be explored with immediacy.

Recommendation 6. The CCSC should establish its own intelligence capability and be considered part of District and national intel data collection plans.

Recommendation 7. Communications should feature more strongly as part of overall Police strategic and business planning processes, including District planning.

Recommendation 8. Establish a rural liaison officer to provide a link with rural communities and organisations and feedback information into CCSC management.
**Recommendation 9.** As part of the Communications Strategy, consideration should be given to the future establishment of a Single Non-Emergency Number (SNEN).

**Governance**

**Recommendation 10.** As a matter of urgency, a National Communications Board (NCB) or similarly named group, be established, and

1. be composed of:
   a. the Commissioner as chairperson
   b. selected District Commanders
   c. the National Policing Development Manager
   d. the National IT Manager
   e. the National Manager CCSC
   f. any other representatives that the Commissioner considers appropriate.

2. be made responsible for:
   a. defining the contact and communications expectations of the New Zealand public, and police officers
   b. developing a communications/contact strategy, and resulting policies and practices
   c. ensuring that the communications strategy is integrated into the broader policing strategy and plans
   d. clarifying the purpose and role of CCSC, and the senior management roles within it, in line with the communications strategy
   e. providing direction to the National Manager and management group
   f. ensuring effective operational integration of districts and CCSC
   g. setting performance principles and objectives for CCSC
   h. overseeing the risk management framework
   i. establishing effective working relationships with emergency service partners and the IT Advisory Group (ITAG)
   j. providing direction and sanction for future expenditure on IT and high cost items/initiatives to support the CCSC.

**CCSC Leadership and Management**

**Recommendation 11.** The NCB should act quickly to take initial management control of the CCSC and then:

- once the communications strategy is agreed, confirm the CCSC organisational structure and positions;
- appoint permanent, qualified staff to these positions; and
- provide initial management direction and then ongoing support to the National Manager, the NMG, and Centre Managers.

**Recommendation 12.** The NCB should then task the National Manager and the NMG, with preparing a revised business plan which reviews the CCSC vision, mission and objectives in light of the communications strategy.
**Recommendation 13.** The NCB should appoint a mentor to the National Manager, ideally from outside of New Zealand Police.

**Recommendation 14.** The NCB should consider appointing a change manager to assist the National Manager with the implementation of initial changes.

**Recommendation 15.** The CCSC management should receive training in managing communications centres. This will be an ongoing exercise and should also include other ranks within the CCSC to develop a level of expertise from the bottom up and across the levels of supervision and management.

**Recommendation 16.** The NCB should investigate the utility of splitting the critical incident command roles from the Communications Centre management roles.

**Recommendation 17.** Consideration should be given to reducing the high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1).

**Recommendation 18.** An agreed internal communications strategy including staff focus groups should be developed in consultation with staff and include performance targets.

**Recommendation 19.** Consideration should be given to creating a dedicated Comms column in the Police Ten-One publication.

**Resources/Current Capability (ex People)**

**Recommendation 20.** The National Manager should continue to address business continuity and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place, managers and staff are familiar with them and plans are tested quarterly.

**Recommendation 21.** A risk assessment of the vulnerabilities of the Northern Communications Centre in a variety of scenarios should be undertaken and reviewed regularly.

**Recommendation 22.** Once the pilot Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) programme is completed and evaluated, AVL should also be trialled in a predominately rural District before being rolled out nationally.

**Recommendation 23.** A pilot programme for the use of Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) should be initiated with the future aim of providing MDTs in all operational police vehicles nationally.

**Recommendation 24.** An ergonomics consultant should be engaged to review the layout and design of each Centre with the intention of providing optimal working conditions for staff.
**Recommendation 25.** The smoking policy should be fully communicated to all current and potential staff and monitored to ensure compliance.

**Recommendation 26.** A Workplace Wellness Committee should operate to identify and deal with appropriate issues raised by staff.

**People**

**Recommendation 27.** A workforce planning tool should be purchased for use by the workforce coordinators.

**Recommendation 28.** An absenteeism strategy should be developed and absenteeism incorporated into the performance framework of supervisors and managers.

**Recommendation 29.** The CCSC should critically examine how to create more flexibility into its rostering to meet call demand forecasts.

**Recommendation 30.** Administrative processes and activities should be tidied up to ensure expediency, for example processing leave requests and overtime payments.

**Recommendation 31.** The CCSC should move to ‘dual role’ staff in call taking and dispatch so that staff can be moved between roles as demands change.

**Recommendation 32.** The competency profiles need to be integrated into recruitment, training and performance management processes.

**Recommendation 33.** A training plan based around the competency profiles and a thorough training needs analysis needs to be produced once position roles and responsibilities are fully determined.

**Recommendation 34.** Training in call management should assume prominence in initial and refresher training.

**Recommendation 35.** New managers to the CCSC require a management development training programme. This must include all aspects of critical incident command as identified in this report.

**Recommendation 36.** Performance coaching needs to become a regular feature of the CCSC operating culture.

**Recommendation 37.** A mentoring role similar to that of the Field Training Officer (FTO) operating in Districts should be established.

**Recommendation 38.** Quality assurance checks must be carried out and documented for use in the performance review process.
Recommendation 39. Debriefings following critical incidents, or mishandled situations, need to be re-instigated and should be fully documented.

Recommendation 40. A career structure for non-sworn staff needs to be designed following confirmation of revised organisational structure and roles.

Recommendation 41. Time spent in the Communications Centres as an observer, should become a standard element of every probationary constable’s orientation programme.

Recommendation 42. After probation, sworn constables transferred to the CCSC should stay for a minimum of six months.

Recommendation 43. All sworn staff applying or directed to work in the CCSC should complete a comparable assessment to non-sworn staff, and complete comparable training courses.

Recommendation 44. Further analysis of staffing requirements should be undertaken in three and six months time as the determination of services and standards; other initiatives implemented in the meantime will affect the required staffing levels.

Processes and Systems

Recommendation 45. The call management skills of communicators should be improved as a priority through initial and refresher training, and on the job supervision.

Recommendation 46. A structured call taking approach should be adopted and included in communicator training.

Recommendation 47. More radio channels need to be allocated to metropolitan areas to ease channel loadings, particularly during critical incidents and periods of predicted high radio traffic.

Recommendation 48. Rural Rapid Numbering Systems or GPS coordinate data, should be investigated for inclusion in mapping resources.

Recommendation 49. CCSC MSOPs (Master Standard Operating Procedures) should be completed as soon as is practicable and updated on a regular basis.

Recommendation 50. In consultation with the Organisational Performance Group, a full suite of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be designed to enable managers to accurately monitor the performance of each Centre, shift manager and team leader.
Operations

**Recommendation 51.** Operational planning needs to become a critical part of the CCSC business. All operational plans must have the CCSC management buy-in at some level.

**Recommendation 52.** Consultation with the CCSC should appear as a mandatory requirement for operational orders.

**Recommendation 53.** Documentation of each critical incident including the debrief process undertaken should be recorded.

**Recommendation 54.** Clear business rules regarding channel linking need to be established in consultation with District Commanders and the agreed practice communicated to all staff. The practice should continue to be monitored to ensure that rules surrounding safe radio use are adhered to.

**Recommendation 55.** Supervisors and managers in both the CCSC and Districts need to ensure all business rules surrounding night switching are understood and adhered to. Staff not operating in line with standard business rules must be identified and held accountable.

**Recommendation 56.** Management must make policy compliance and consistency an issue of accountability and performance management.

Relationships

**Recommendation 57.** The CCSC and Districts should seek ways to improve their formal and informal relationships.

**Recommendation 58.** The form and content of Service Level Agreements should be reviewed by the ‘National Communications Board’ so that their utility and value to Districts and the CCSC are enhanced.

**Recommendation 59.** Community group liaison by the CCSC should continue through the relevant District Liaison Officers (i.e. Iwi, Pacific or Ethnic Liaison Officers).

**Recommendation 60.** Public expectations on contact responsiveness by Police should be regularly measured so that these can be used to set performance targets, and shape the content of public education campaigns.

**Recommendation 61.** Working relationships between the CCSC and emergency response agencies should be deepened.
14. On October 28 2004, Police Commissioner Rob Robinson announced an external review of New Zealand Police Communications Centres and the handling of emergency or ‘111’ calls for police assistance. This review was prompted by several high profile cases alleging poor performance on the part of police in dealing with these incidents. The Commissioner sought assistance from overseas policing jurisdictions and a panel of international policing communications experts was identified.

15. The Panel was chaired by Chief Superintendent Michael Corboy of New South Wales Police, Australia. Acting Deputy Chief Emory Gilbert of Toronto Police, Canada and Superintendent Ruth Purdie of North Wales Police were also nominated to join the review team by their respective Chief and Commissioner. All three individuals are highly experienced in police communications and emergency call handling each successfully having held or in current command of equivalent Communications Centres in their own jurisdictions.

16. The Panel was completed by organisational psychologist Kevin McKenna, Director of Human Resources Services at PricewaterhouseCoopers in New Zealand. Biographical details of each of the Panel members appear in Appendix Two.

17. The scope of the review was determined by the Terms of Reference (Appendix One) which were set in consultation with New Zealand Police service organisations, namely the New Zealand Police Association and the Police Managers’ Guild.

18. Although the undertaking of this review came about due to alleged inadequate response to a number of specific cases, these cases were not investigated by the Review Panel. They were considered by the Panel but the investigation of those cases remains correctly within the scope of the Police Complaints Authority.

19. The victims or their families of these cases were, however, contacted by the Chair and provided with the opportunity to discuss their concerns with Panel members directly. Some, but not all of those concerned, took this opportunity.

20. The Panel undertook the review in accordance with the Terms of Reference including the requirement to make recommendations and provide a report to the Commissioner, New Zealand Police.

21. This final report discloses the findings of the review, recommendations of the Review Panel and the evidence or rationale upon which the recommendations
are based. It is intended that the implementation of recommendations, along with other opportunities identified within the review, be in line with a strategic vision of the development of New Zealand Police communications over the next five to ten years.

22. The theme of this report is Tiriti Whanui, to look beyond the horizon.

**Activities**

23. The Panel Chair, Chief Superintendent Michael Corboy made two visits to New Zealand prior to the full Panel convening in New Zealand. The first visit was made in November 2004. On this occasion, the Terms of Reference were determined. Visits were made to all three Communications Centres to interact with staff and, in addition, initial meetings were held with Communications Centre managers and members of the Police Executive. At the conclusion of this visit the Chair called for public submissions.

24. The opportunity for making a submission was conveyed to all Police staff including all staff working in Communications Centres, by way of internal Police communications. The request for submissions was advertised in national print media, both mid-week and weekend editions and on the New Zealand Police website.

25. In total 121 written submissions were presented to the Panel from Police staff, external organisations and private individuals. A list of those who contributed is included in Appendix Three. A total of four contributors wished their submission to be in confidence and these names are withheld in accordance with those wishes.

26. Chief Superintendent Corboy made a second visit to New Zealand in December 2004, on this occasion accompanied by Panel member Kevin McKenna. Once again visits to all three Centres were undertaken along with meetings with all District Commanders and other stakeholders. Details of those consulted during the course of the review appear in Appendix Four.

27. Prior to this review being announced, the CCSC had engaged an external call centre consultancy firm, Mi-Quality, to conduct a review of the Centres and analysis of call volume and staffing levels. The Panel met with the consultants on several occasions and was presented with their report.

28. The full Panel convened in New Zealand for two weeks from the end of January 2005. All members visited each Communications Centre at least once. Chief Superintendent Corboy and Kevin McKenna undertook multiple visits to some of the Centres to observe operations and have discussions with staff. Visits were planned and conducted on variable days of the week and at different times of day/night to gain a full appreciation of differing working conditions depending on the volume of calls for service which varies depending on the time and day of the week.

29. Panel members also drew on their own experience, research and documentation relevant to their own jurisdictions, as well as internationally recognised best practice.
CURRENT DEMAND ON COMMUNICATIONS CENTRES

Call Volume

30. Currently, New Zealand Police Communications Centres receive around 1.6 million calls each year, of which in 2004, 466,000 came through the national emergency ‘111’ number.\(^3\) This represents 60% of the genuine ‘111’ calls handled by Telecom New Zealand Ltd. (Telecom) with 29% of calls for Ambulance and 11% of calls for service from New Zealand Fire. (Telecom rejects around 68% of all incoming ‘111’ calls as false or bogus).

31. Of the ‘111’ calls received, the CCSC reports approximately 12% are deemed to be Priority One (P1) events, requiring immediate police response (0 – 10 minutes) and approximately 77% are assessed as Priority Two (P2) events requiring timely response dispatch (0 – 30 minutes).\(^4\)

32. These reported figures are contrary to the perception of Panel members, (based on submissions received, discussions with staff and observation of call taking,) that there is a slightly lower percentage of actual P1 events and a much lower percentage of P2 events as reported. It is also possible that too many incidents are being entered as P1 or P2 due to the fear created by recent events.

33. These figures also indicate that only 11% of calls are considered non-emergency situations, not requiring urgent or timely response. This is clearly in conflict with the notion that the ‘111’ line is regularly used for non-emergency situations. The priority criteria should be marketed throughout New Zealand Police and consistently adhered to (refer to Appendix Five).

34. The CCSC also receives all non-emergency calls through the *555 system, which was established to allow members of the public to contact police to report non-urgent traffic incidents, poor driving behaviour or hazards affecting traffic safety. The Centres receive around 360,000 *555 calls annually.

35. Other calls into the Communications Centres make up a further 850,000 annually and include the general queue, operational interactions between staff and diverted calls from Districts including those due to the practice of ‘night-switching’; and the Allied Emergency Service (AES) queue (30,000).

36. The whole area of assessing demands (volume, answering and strategy) needs to be addressed. Although the largest volume of calls is not ‘111’ (the most time sensitive) New Zealand Police must determine how it wants to handle all phone traffic. Police needs to confirm the assessment of volume and develop a reasoned approach that effectively and efficiently serves the needs of all stakeholders.

37. The concept of a Single Non-Emergency Number (SNEN) is discussed throughout this report.

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\(^3\) Source: Telecom New Zealand Ltd. 2004 Call Data.
Call Answering

38. The CCSC has performance standards for call answering times, for ‘111’ calls, 90% within 10 seconds of the call being presented and for all other calls, 80% answered within 30 seconds of presentation. Although in line with international best practice, these standards are not set in consultation with the public so there can be no comparison drawn with meeting public expectations. Consultation should be undertaken with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible before negotiating service standards with Government. Though it might not be possible to solicit a consensus from the community and those stakeholders, particularly in the trade-off between standards and cost, Police needs to communicate clearly what is achievable within the available resources and thus create realistically achievable standards.

39. The self-set standards are not currently being met, nor have they ever been met consistently for any sustained period of time. This leads Police to the position of failing to meet its own standards, regardless of public expectation.

40. With the current practice, relevant ‘111’ calls received by Telecom are presented to the ‘local’ centre covering either the upper North, lower North or South Island. If the call is not answered after 75 seconds, it is manually withdrawn by Telecom and presented at an alternative Centre, although has no priority over other calls being presented to that Centre. This practice of ‘bouncing’ calls at the time of the review affected around 3,000 calls a month.\(^5\)

41. Under the current conditions, the call answering time is calculated from the time the call is presented to the Centre at which it is answered and does not include the time a call has queued at another Centre. Of concern, is that this practice essentially invalidates the reported call answering time statistics and indicates that the actual performance is lower.

42. In the opinion of the Panel, the number of calls being 'bounced' between the Centres before being answered, and the time taken to answer these calls, is too high. Consideration needs to be given to the introduction of a Networked Automatic Call Distributor (NACD) to cease the occurrence of 'bounced' calls. Such a system is ideally suited to a centralised 'virtual' facility along with the implementation of other technology based tools discussed in this report.

43. Ideally, no calls should be bounced at all. It represents a self defeating, inefficient and risky activity. The installation of NACD requires qualification and discussion with the Police IT Service Centre and Telecom. However, improvements to call handling must precede such a move. Police advises acknowledgement that this is an issue that requires careful management and has commenced discussions with Telecom to identify options for the issue to be fixed.

44. The operation of NACD however requires national real-time data sharing for the purpose of dispatch, which the Panel understands is not possible due to the capacity of the current system. The feasibility of overcoming capacity

\(^5\) Source: Telecom New Zealand Ltd. 2004 Call Data.
restrictions should be explored with immediacy although the Panel is advised that Police is within two to three months of achieving a fix for this issue.

45. Any move towards a ‘virtual centre’ would of course carry significant associated costs as well as requiring the removal or mitigation of a variety of technical and business risks. This issue should remain as a long term consideration for Police.

**Communications/Contact Strategy**

46. One of the core functions of Police is to assist members of the public when they call for Police services. The CCSC has a critical role to play in facilitating that response. There are a number of means by which calls are currently received and responded to by the Communications Centres.

![Diagram of call intake and response options](Figure 1. Call intake and response options (Priority definitions appear in Appendix Five))

47. The opportunity to divest the current volume of calls from the CCSC is discussed later in this report.

48. New Zealand Police operates a ‘whole of policing’ approach to crime and crash reduction and public safety. This requires all Districts and Service Centres to work together to achieve the Police vision of “Safer Communities Together”. One of the ways in which Police is currently achieving a reduction in reported crime is through enhanced intelligence and problem solving techniques.

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6 New Zealand Police Strategic Plan to 2006.
49. One of the unique identifiers of the policing environment, as opposed to a commercial contact centre operation, is the value of information analysed and evaluated as intelligence to better inform Police actions both tactically and strategically.

50. However, there is no evidence of a coordinated ‘intel’ strategy within the CCSC. As well as being an indicator for present or future demand, analysis of and intelligence gathered from incoming call data will potentially identify patterns and repeat calls for service. These patterns may not otherwise be identified by Districts due to the nature of the call, but could be addressed by adopting problem solving techniques and a proactive approach. Equally, there is no indication from Districts that these data are being sought as an information source and for use by operational or intel units. This observation also applies to national intelligence units.

**Alternative Contact Options**

51. New Zealand Police offers a range of alternative options to receive calls for service or information. The public has the option to contact police at around 430 stations and ‘storefront’ facilities nationwide, either in person or by telephone; or by the internet via the Police web site. In addition, New Zealand Police uses news media, television and the internet to provide information to the public on a variety of issues.

52. Although this range of options exists, New Zealand Police has no over-arching communications or contact strategy, to determine ways in which information can be provided to or sought from the organisation. A starting point for developing such a strategy would be to carry out public consultation to determine contact preferences of the wider community. While this issue is not specific to the Communications Centres, as a principal point of contact, it is likely to impact on the CCSC in terms of the volume of calls received which in turn will depend on the outcome of public expectation and the range and efficiency of alternative services offered.

53. The Police website could be improved as a self-service source of information for the public by adding a ‘frequently asked questions’ section.

54. The New Zealand public will undoubtedly have differing expectations of what constitutes an emergency compared with how an emergency is defined by Police. With increasing attention on delivery of quality customer service by both private and public providers, it will be important to the future reputation of New Zealand Police to also maintain a customer focus. This aspect must be considered when developing a communications or contact strategy.

55. New Zealand Police participates in a weekly television programme entitled “Police Ten 7”, which calls for public assistance with recent crimes and identifying or locating offenders. Around four to six cases are included each week and a freephone 0800 number is provided for viewers to call.

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56. The receipt of these calls however is deficient. Callers specify which case number they are calling in regard to using touch-tone technology and are then automatically diverted to the cell phone of the officer in charge of the case. Obviously the officer concerned can only take one call at a time so other calls are diverted to voicemail. Due to the nature of the information sought, many callers who wish anonymity may not want to disclose their name or contact number and so the information they have might not be passed on.

57. Currently, separate 0800 numbers are regularly established on an individual basis when police seek information from the public pertaining to a particular crime, most regularly for a homicide or other high profile incident.

58. Some international jurisdictions operate a ‘Crimestoppers’ programme which is a much more comprehensive arrangement. It is not recommended that New Zealand Police implement such a scheme at this time, but this sort of crime reporting and ‘tip off’ option must be considered in the overall communications strategy. This initiative, along with the concept of centralised telephone reporting, has been previously identified by Police in the Auckland Report.¹⁰

**Future Demand**

59. There is a variety of factors that will impact on the future of Police communications. These include trends in actual crime, public confidence/apathy, technological advances and social and environmental change. In the future there will be:

- changes in volume;
- changes in type of demand;
- changes in expectations; and
- changes in technology (i.e. increasing use of mobile telephony)/call intake or contact options (i.e. e-reporting).

60. This is a great opportunity for New Zealand Police to start looking ahead at how to continue to move police communications into the future. Police is going to have to address the following questions:

- What do members of the public/Districts/stakeholders need the CCSC to do?
- What is a reasonable (acceptable to all parties) service to deliver within the ability and responsibility of CCSC?
- How will Police successfully communicate their decisions (Public education, managing relationships, MoUs/SLAs)?
- How will Police implement/achieve what it sets out to do?
- How will Police know it’s achieved/continues to achieve stated delivery?

61. The responses to these questions will have various implications across the whole of policing. The Police Strategic Plan to 2006 identifies a range of indicators to measure its effectiveness. All of these indicators are directly affected by actual and perceived performance of the CCSC. The future of

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police communications is also vital to developing Police capability and should continue to be a focus of overall Police strategic and business planning.

62. The National Manager CCSC should identify all key stakeholder groups. This will ensure that effective communication links are established and maintained. It is important that an ‘Outside-In’ approach is developed rather than assuming the service being delivered is effective and addresses the communication challenges of differing geographical areas, minority groups and those groups who may have special needs within the community.

63. Having had the opportunity to discuss some of the concerns of the rural community, it is clear that Police needs to establish and maintain closer links with those communities that will better inform and communicate the Police position. The Panel acknowledges that since this review commenced, the Commissioner has appointed an Executive member to the position of Rural Liaison Officer.

64. One option for changing the way New Zealand Police will operate in the future is the introduction of Single Non-Emergency Number (SNEN), such as the Police Assistance Line (PAL) model operated in New South Wales and other jurisdictions. Such a system allows for members of the public to seek or provide information via a single point of entry such as a freephone 0800 number or another easily remembered number i.e. NZP or *697 as an alternative to ‘111’.

65. Police advises that the number 0800 311 311 has been reserved for the purpose of establishing a non-urgent reporting line at some point in the future.

66. Such a system can operate as a ‘one stop shop’ using interactive voice messaging to put the caller in contact with the appropriate service and potentially could also offer a Te Reo Maori contact option.

67. A self-service model, linked to an e-policing strategy should also be developed as a mid to long term initiative. This would provide New Zealand citizens and overseas jurisdictions with a choice of how to gain access to information and report crime or provide information on criminal activity affecting New Zealand.

68. The New Zealand Government in conjunction with the community and major stakeholders should consider a long term (10 - 15 year) move away from the emergency number ‘111’ due to misuse of repeat dial numbers and worldwide trends toward a common emergency number.

69. International governments, particularly in Europe, are moving toward an international emergency number. At present, most mobile/cellular telephones have a built-in ‘112’ emergency number, reflecting the moves in Europe. The expanding use of key pad mobile/cellular phones having a single number repeated such as ‘111’ ‘000’ or ‘999’ greatly increases the chance of a misdial, tying up valuable time. This consideration needs to be achieved through constant monitoring of worldwide trends through organisations such as NENA (National Emergency Number Association) and ANZAPCO (Australia and New Zealand Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials).
Recommendations

70. Establish a citizen focus panel comprised of key public stakeholders. This should meet quarterly to link into and improve CCSC service.

71. Enhance the Police website as a self-service source of information in the short term by adding a ‘frequently asked questions’ section.

72. Consider the development of a self-service model, linked to an e-policing strategy as a mid to long term initiative.

73. Consideration needs to be given to the introduction of a Networked Automatic Call Distributor (NACD) to cease the occurrence of ‘bounced’ calls.

74. The feasibility of overcoming capacity restrictions to enable national real-time data sharing should be explored with immediacy.

75. The CCSC should establish its own intelligence capability and be considered part of District and national intel data collection plans.

76. Communications should feature more strongly as part of overall Police strategic and business planning processes, including District planning.

77. Establish a rural liaison officer to provide a link with rural communities and organisations and feedback information into CCSC management.

78. As part of the Communications Strategy, consideration should be given to the future establishment of a Single Non-Emergency Number (SNEN).
GOVERNANCE

Introduction

79. The Review Panel sees communications command as a core policing capability. How it is practised affects both command and management effectiveness, and relationships with the communities police serve.

80. As communication technologies advance, so does the need for police forces to utilise the technologies to detect, manage and reduce crime, as well as enhance their interactions internally with police; and with the public.

81. It is imperative to have a comprehensive communications strategy that underpins the broader policing strategy. Furthermore, strong command and governance structures need to be put in place for any communications function because of communications’ critical operational and public relations role.

Incorporation of Communications into New Zealand Police Strategic Planning

82. The Review panel considers that Police has not sufficiently developed an integrated and coherent communications strategy. Communications is not prominent in strategic planning processes and as a result, does not feature strongly enough in the Statement of Intent 2004/05 or Police Strategic Plan to 2006.

83. Disturbingly, as a first point of contact with police for many New Zealanders, the CCSC appears to be relegated to an operational support role rather than a core business operational function. The CCSC is not tied into the Crime and Crash Reduction Strategy; neither are considerations of the CCSC as a primary source of crime and crash intelligence.

84. From a public relations perspective, there is no apparent Police communications or contact strategy. As a result there are confused messages given by Police to the public on how they can be contacted.

85. The Review Panel believes that Police is currently missing a tremendous opportunity to use the CCSC in a more strategic way. From discussions with staff and a number of submissions received, the CCSC does not appear to be regarded as, or fully connected to, front line operations. Communications is not recognised for its value and potential and some staff perceive it as a secondary function, much maligned and not understood for its criticality.

The CCSC Purpose

86. There is a lack of clarity within Police on what the role and purpose of the CCSC is now and should be in the future. This is not unexpected given the fore-mentioned lack of strategic consideration the role communications has in Police strategic and operations planning.
Unit and National Structure

87. The current national structure of the CCSC as identified in the 2004/2005 Business Plan is outlined below.
* HR Competency Framework Manager position is funded out of National HR Group.
Governance, Command and Management

88. In theory, the CCSC is managed by a National Management Group (NMG) with the National Manager, (who leads the NMG,) reporting to the Deputy Commissioner: Operations.

89. The role of the NMG is purely focused on the operational management of the CCSC. It does not have a strategic role in guiding the direction of communications strategy and policy albeit might do this indirectly through the general advice it provides on CCSC policy and practice.

90. The NMG structure is, however, all but defunct since nine of its 18 positions are unfilled. The National Manager is also in an acting role. The role has become quite operationally focused for a number of reasons.

91. There is therefore no role or group, except for the Deputy Commissioner: Operations, charged with developing Communications strategically.

92. The Review Panel believes that a governance/command group needs to be urgently established to provide the strategic and operational direction for Police Communications of which the CCSC would be an important focus.

93. The current lack of leadership and management strength within the NMG also needs to be addressed as a priority. One of the first tasks of the new governing body should be to ratify the NMG structure and roles, and then seek to permanently fill those roles as soon as possible.

94. Consideration needs to be given to elevating the CCSC and communications generally, to a higher command level within Police.

95. There is a need to cultivate better relationships between Telecom, Police IT, Districts and the CCSC to develop shared skills and a multi discipline mindset in identifying needs and solving challenges to the benefit of Police and its mission. The skill sets must not work in isolation and this should help ensure a mutually beneficial working collaboration.

CCSC Policy and Procedures

96. With the lack of NMG staff and the ongoing issues and problems within the CCSC, the development of CCSC policies and procedures has become laboured. There is a lack of consistency in policy and practice across the three Centres.

97. From discussions with staff at each of the Centres, of even more concern to the Review Panel is the CCSC staff’s confusion on what their call handling performance targets are.

Risk Management

98. The CCSC has completed the standard risk assessment framework designed for New Zealand Police by AON Ltd. The methodology used is consistent with the joint Australian and New Zealand Standard AS/NZ 4360:1999. However, the last full assessment was undertaken in September 2003 even though it is
recommended that this be undertaken annually. This should not merely be an administrative function but should be about how Police approaches all activities with the intent of identifying levels of risk to reputation, service delivery and public trust and confidence. This has both operational and strategic perspectives not merely a contingency based focus.

99. Significantly, although quarterly updates continue to be provided, these concentrate only on the top four residual risks identified in September 2003 and have not identified any emerging risks since. As just one example, depleted capability in the area of training has contributed to current performance levels and service failures, which led to this review being called.

100. Clearly, the process has not been identifying risks as is its intended purpose. The absence of risks that are clearly identified in this review report, having been identified and reported via the CCSC risk management process, has meant that they have not been dealt with at the appropriate governance level.

**Recommendations**

101. As a matter of urgency, a National Communications Board or similarly named group, be established, and

1. be composed of:

   a. the Commissioner as chairperson
   b. selected District Commanders
   c. the National Policing Development Manager
   d. the National IT Manager
   e. the National Manager CCSC
   f. any other representatives that the Commissioner considers appropriate.

2. be made responsible for:

   a. defining the contact and communications expectations of the New Zealand public, and police officers
   b. developing a communications/contact strategy, and resulting policies and practices
   c. ensuring that the communications strategy is integrated into the broader policing strategy and plans
   d. clarifying the purpose and role of CCSC, and the senior management roles within it, in line with the communications strategy
   e. providing direction to the National Manager and management group
   f. ensuring effective operational integration of districts and CCSC
   g. setting performance principles and objectives for CCSC
   h. overseeing the risk management framework
   i. establishing effective working relationships with emergency service partners and the IT Advisory Group (ITAG)
   j. providing direction and sanction for future expenditure on IT and high cost items/initiatives to support the CCSC.
102. The people in leadership and management roles within CCSC possess diverse professional and operational policing experience. The Panel has been impressed with the commitment to their work, and the desire to improve the CCSC’s performance and credibility with police officers and the public.

103. There are, however, a large number of factors adversely affecting leadership and management behaviours in the CCSC. These are:

- the number of key management staff including the National Manager in acting appointments;
- the number of vacancies at this level including within the National Management Group;
- an ongoing lack of effective change management since the inception of the current business model;
- a lack of clarity among staff and management about the CCSC mission, roles and performance targets, and how these relate to the Crime and Crash Reduction Strategy;
- lack of clarity of command;
- an operational focus on managing call volumes;
- the high staff to supervisor ratios;
- a lack of management training when people are appointed to management or supervisory roles; and
- no formal staff mentoring or coaching practices.

104. As a result, members of management are increasingly frustrated by their inability to solve the problems, given the operational demand pressures they face every day.

105. When looking to appoint managers to the CCSC, Police should be seeking applicants who can confidently engage their staff as influential leaders, problem solvers, change managers and team builders.

106. In the immediate future when determining the management structure, Police should consider two different leadership roles. One to undertake change and a longer term successor role to maintain the development of the CCSC after the initial changes are implemented.

107. Once a National Manager is appointed, the NCB will need to support this person as the CCSC is likely to remain in the public spotlight. One way to do this will be through the appointment of a mentor. It is not necessary for this role to be filled by a communications expert, but likely candidates should have strong leadership and change management experience, preferably from another government department or private organisation to provide an alternative perspective. The position will also be supported by ongoing peer review as indicated in the implementation section of this report.

108. The person appointed to the National Manager position will no doubt hold credibility but that individual will also have to withstand considerable police and public scrutiny and should be fully prepared to do so.

109. The high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1) impact on the level of supervision; and time and effort devoted to individual staff members.
Command versus Management

110. The CCSC management team is required to exercise operational command of critical incidents until local, on the ground command, can take control. The requirement for critical incident command has been reinforced recently in the Pursuits Policy wherein a senior sworn officer within the CCSC assumes control of any reported pursuit. In other less critical incidents, non-sworn dispatchers essentially exercise delegated command from the shift supervisor who is always a sworn police officer of Sergeant or Inspector rank.

111. The command requirement has been overlaid on the CCSC management structure so that shift supervisors are always commissioned officers. This means that senior, experienced and capable non-sworn staff, some of whom are former sworn officers, can never assume the shift supervisor or Centre manager roles. Incidences were also observed where inexperienced sworn members were required to make command decisions (as pursuit controller) while non-sworn experienced members were not permitted due to the current policy.

112. The Panel believes there are other alternatives to providing critical incident command than having commissioned officers in each Centre. These options include providing a national critical incident officer roster ‘24/7’. The CI Officer could be located in any of the Centres and lessen the need for the current numbers of commissioned officers rostered in each Centre. Such an arrangement could then open up shift supervisor and Centre manager roles to non-sworn staff.

113. There is a 24/7 Duty Officer role staffed by a Superintendent from the Office of the Commissioner, contactable by pager. No mention of this position was made as a command option throughout the time spent with staff. This is a command option that should be highlighted to staff and included in the protocols for escalating command decisions as incidents demand.

114. Supervisors and managers would benefit from receiving training in call centre management rather than sworn staff relying solely on policing experience.

115. A potential management structure illustrating the concept of separating command and management is attached at Appendix Six.

Internal Communications

116. As indicated elsewhere in this report, a number of concerns were raised by staff about communication, or lack of, between themselves and the management. This is an issue which should be easily solved and once resolved will have a positive impact on the morale of staff by helping to ensure that they feel valued.

117. An agreed internal communications strategy should be developed in consultation with staff and include performance targets.
118. Staff focus groups should be established as part of the internal communications strategy so staff can be canvassed on certain issues and feel they have a voice to raise issues without prejudice.

119. Focus groups could also be supported by an intranet site to facilitate a link between the three Centres and to make the information available to the rest of the organisation.

120. In the months following the Review, police across the country are likely to be interested in the ongoing outcomes and progress being made to address communications issues. News about the CCSC, recognising good work and providing progress reports, could be included in the Police Ten-One publication as a vehicle for accurate and informed messaging.

**Recommendations**

121. The NCB should act quickly to take initial management control of the CCSC and then:
   - once the communications strategy is agreed, confirm the CCSC organisational structure and positions;
   - appoint permanent, qualified staff to these positions; and
   - provide initial management direction and then ongoing support to the National Manager, the NMG, and Centre Managers.

122. The NCB should then task the National Manager and the NMG, with preparing a revised business plan which reviews the CCSC vision, mission and objectives in light of the communications strategy.

123. The NCB should appoint a mentor to the National Manager, ideally from outside of New Zealand Police.

124. The NCB should consider appointing a change manager to assist the National Manager with the implementation of initial changes.

125. The CCSC management should receive training in managing communications centres. This will be an ongoing exercise and should also include other ranks within the CCSC to develop a level of expertise from the bottom up and across the levels of supervision and management.

126. The NCB should investigate the utility of splitting the critical incident command roles from the Communications Centre management roles.

127. Consideration should be given to reducing the high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1).

128. An agreed internal communications strategy, including staff focus groups, should be developed in consultation with staff and include performance targets.

129. Consideration should be given to creating a dedicated Communications column in the Police Ten-One publication.
RESOURCES/CURRENT CAPABILITY (EX PEOPLE)

Facilities and Equipment

Location

130. In 1996, New Zealand Police moved from 29 District-based control rooms Computer Aided Dispatch [CAD] system to a centralised Communications and Resource Deployment (CARD) system. Three Communications Centres were established nationwide at the three main centres, namely Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch.

131. The establishment of three Centres allows for effective business continuity planning and provides access to a large proportion of the population for the purpose of recruiting and retaining staff.

132. The operation of three centres to deploy resources nationwide and the advances in technology being employed i.e. mapping systems and aerial photography; mean there is no longer a requirement for decentralised local dispatch. Use of other technology based tools such as Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and Mobile Data Terminals (MDT) will further enhance this model although there should feature more as future plans rather than immediate courses of action. District-based dispatch is discussed later on in this report.

133. The Panel believes AVL should be trialled in a rural area before any move towards national roll-out. Similarly, in the experience and opinion of the Panel members and given the more fundamental issues that have been identified and need to be addressed first, the use of mobile data solutions will not bring any immediate benefits and should be considered as a mid to long term objective.

Buildings

134. The Central and Southern Communications Centres are collocated with the main policing centre in Wellington and Christchurch respectively. The Northern Communications Centre in Auckland is housed in a separate building along with part of the IT Service Centre. Each Centre also accommodates New Zealand Fire Communications with varying relationships and levels of cooperation reported.

135. There is however, no growth strategy and the trend of increasing resources being assigned to vote: Police by Government may have future implications and require the re-housing of one or more of the current Centres to allow for either Centre or District growth.

Business Continuity

136. The National Manager must ensure sufficient effort goes into addressing business continuity and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place. Centre Managers must take responsibility for testing contingency plans in
coordination with each other and make certain all staff are familiar with these plans and what action to take in the event of an emergency affecting their own Centre, or one of the other Centres.

137. Business continuity planning needs a full hazards approach in respect to contingency (i.e. staff, facility, natural events, pandemics, habitability etc.) and should encompass relevant risk management considerations including all aspects of service, staff, training and quality assurance.

Design

138. In the experience and opinion of the panel members, the layout of each Centre appears cramped and there is no indication of where areas of responsibility lie. A more suitable set up would require clear demarcation for team leaders and shift managers and ensure that they remain visible within each Centre.

139. Any redesign of the Centres should involve an ergonomics consultant, preferably one with experience in a call centre environment. Every effort should be made in reducing ambient noise for call takers and dispatchers which will aid concentration and reduce distractions. Headset design and the use of back screens at each workstation may assist but any move to change should be thoroughly consulted with and communicated to staff. Flexibility of design should also be a high consideration to allow the Centres to evolve in line with future demand.

140. Design is a risk management, occupational health and wellness and injury prevention issue that the CCSC must consider.

141. The design of each centre must ensure visible leadership and the need to instill command.

142. The provision of training/muster/breakout rooms was considered acceptable at the Southern Centre, however should be considered as part of any redesign of the Northern and Central Centres in the short to mid term. Discreet, private office space should be provided to allow staff to receive individual coaching, debriefs and give them the opportunity to conduct such meetings in confidence if necessary. However, offices should not be used for supervisors or managers to consistently retire to when they should be supporting and overseeing staff on the floor.

143. The lack of natural lighting and shuttered windows at the Northern Centre is not conducive to a positive atmosphere, both physically and in terms of moods and emotions of staff. Although a very minor issue in the scheme of things, changing the window coverings should be one of a range of solutions when determining any other redesign of the Centre.

144. Again, while not a major issue, one matter brought to the attention of the panel as being unsatisfactory for staff at the Northern Centre who smoke, was having no sheltered or undercover area to do so. Even though this is a morale issue for some staff, as a responsible employer and given the inherent fire risk, it is unlikely that Police would encourage the practice. However, in an effort to avoid staff dissatisfaction in the future and potentially eliminate unscheduled breaks, applicants should be made fully aware of the situation and acceptable practices prior to joining the Centre.
145. Some of the aforementioned are minor irritants but nonetheless significant to some members. These sorts of issues should be handled on a site by site basis in a process that includes a Workplace Wellness Committee involving management supervisors and staff. These and probably other issues will arise over time and should get a hearing and resolution based on their merit and available funding.

**Computer Hardware**

146. All hardware related to dispatch and call taking systems is replaced on a four year cycle, with the last upgrade completed in June 2004. Laptops provided for business continuity planning were replaced in March 2005. Other Enterprise terminals in the CCSC are due for upgrade by the end of July 2005 as part of the Computer Infrastructure Replacement (CIR) programme.

**Radio Channels**

147. The management of radio channels is a joint responsibility of CCSC and IT. If capacity exists and increased requirements or operational needs are recognised, then functionality must be provided by IT. Once operational activity or control is engaged, the channel assignments must be the responsibility of the CCSC on the basis of clearly understood and agreed practices.

148. Radio channels are not being exploited to support communications. The use of more channels will cause a need for redesign of the operational floor as more radio channels will require more dispatch posts.

149. A separate radio channel for Auckland airport should be in place to support a potential major incident.

**Recommendations**

150. The National Manager should continue to address business continuity and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place, managers and staff are familiar with them and plans are tested quarterly.

151. A risk assessment of the vulnerabilities of the Northern Communications Centre in a variety of scenarios should be undertaken and reviewed regularly.

152. Once the pilot AVL programme is completed and evaluated, AVL should also be trialled in a predominately rural District before being rolled out nationally.

153. A pilot programme for the use of MDTs should be initiated with the future aim of providing MDTs in all operational police vehicles nationally.

154. An ergonomics consultant should be engaged to review the layout and design of each Centre with the intention of providing optimal working conditions.

155. The smoking policy should be fully communicated to all current and potential staff and monitored to ensure compliance.

156. A Workplace Wellness Committee should operate to identify and deal with appropriate issues raised by staff.
PEOPLE

157. This section reviews the many issues pertaining to staffing and people management within the CCSC.

158. People and systems provide the core capability of the CCSC. The systems that the CCSC employs are world class, but the people capability is under-developed.

159. The Review Panel has been impressed by the dedication of the CCSC management and staff to the work they do, and their desire to improve the performance.

160. The CCSC needs to ensure a healthy environment for and rapport between sworn and non-sworn staff. In particular, ensuring that non-sworn staff have the opportunity to develop will be important as they are more likely to become long term assets.

Capacity versus Capability

161. Throughout this Review, the Panel has regularly heard that the CCSC’s performance problems could be simply cured by providing more staff. While the Panel accepts that extra staff are required, it does not believe that having more staff will fix all the problems.

162. From observation, discussion and reference to relevant CCSC documentation, the Panel believes there is sufficient evidence to identify that the first priority should be to properly organise, manage and develop the existing staff capabilities. Before determining capacity, Police needs to determine the current demand and call answering standards required.

163. Once those demands have been established, the CCSC will need to determine how best they might be achieved and maintained. Quality assurance will be a vital part of the performance improvement process and, with other management tools, will help support the platform from which the CCSC will develop, (which could not otherwise be provided by increased staff alone).

Determining Staffing Requirements

164. Over the past few years, the CCSC management has presented various business cases for additional staff. The adequacy of staffing levels has been a persistent issue of public and internal police commentary since the inception of the CCSC in 1996.

165. The business cases include detailed analyses supporting the staffing requirements. These analyses use the Erlang C formula for call taker roles but use a modified model for dispatch requirements. Although robust, the business cases analyse the workforce requirements of each centre separately i.e. they do not envisage a scenario wherein calls could be managed nationally as in an
The Panel believes that by employing the economies of scale of a single ‘virtual Centre’, workforce requirements would need to be recalculated if NACD was to be introduced in the future.

166. Erlang C is a good model for call taking but there is a need to develop a principled approach to designating channels, units per channel and dispatch positions.

167. It is clear that the workload experienced by the Central and Southern Centres is as a direct result of declining capability at the Northern Centre. In light of this, one of the first steps is to have each Centre working independently to manage their own business properly before making any move toward a national virtual centre.

168. Police has commissioned analysis of staffing requirements by an external call centre consultancy firm, Mi-Quality. The analysis of staffing levels determined a total increase of 21 staff across the three Centres including both communicators and dispatchers in order to meet the current required service levels.

169. In addition, the analysis determined that the budgeted headcount does not allow for recruitment “in advance of reasonably predictable attrition rates”. As such, the Mi-Quality report recommends a further 19 staff across the three Centres above the calculated strengths. (Appendix Seven)

170. The Panel acknowledges and supports the redeployment of staff to the CCSC from elsewhere in Police since the announcement of the review, which will enhance the current training and supervisory capabilities. Provided sufficient training and supervision is put in place, this will go some way to increasing the number of staff available for service and alleviate the pressures recently experienced.

171. Until more elementary courses of action are undertaken, such as determining the business including the role and standard of service to be provided by CCSC, accurate analysis of all future staffing requirements cannot be undertaken.

172. Staffing levels should continue to be monitored by the NMG and reported to the NCB in the interim and then reviewed once the services and standards to be delivered by the CCSC have been established.

**Rostering**

173. All three centres roster teams on rolling forward shift patterns\(^\text{11}\). The rolling forward patterns are well liked by staff and should be retained.

174. The Panel does have reservations however about the lack of flexibility team rostering creates. More fluidity in rostering staggered start and finish times would allow for graduated staffing more reflective of predicted call demand.

\(^{11}\)Rolling forward shift pattern is as follows: early, early, late, late, night, night, four days off.
175. The number of part-time, fixed hour staff and the ongoing high sick leave rates also interfere with rostering.

176. The workforce coordinators attempt to augment staffing with other team staff on anticipated high call volume shifts e.g. Friday nights, but there is not that much flexibility.

177. The rostering practices and employment terms therefore conspire to constrain flexible rostering around known and anticipated high call volume periods.

178. The Panel has assessed that the CCSC needs a sophisticated workforce management tool. Additionally, the CCSC needs to look for ways in which to make its rostering and employment terms more adaptable to call demand forecasting.

179. In the interim, the CCSC may benefit from investigating how other jurisdictions do their rostering. For example, the Toronto Police Service operates five platoons, with three working on any given day on 9.5 hour shifts and two rostered off (referred to as a Compressed Work Week (CWW) cycle). Part time staff are hired for peak hours, overtime is available for unscheduled vacancies and staff get their leave within the platoon complement. The overlap hours allow for training, about ten hours in a five week cycle.

180. Information on rostering should be sought from existing contacts within other jurisdictions, including the relevant panel members, as a no cost option for New Zealand Police.

Sick Leave Rates

181. The Panel was repeatedly told by CCSC managers and staff that sick leave is often used by staff when they need time to recover from either acute incident induced, and/or accumulated, stress and fatigue of the work. The anecdotal reports of sick leave behaviour to the Panel appeared to indicate that the rates are high in comparison with the experience of other communications centres. However, Police advised that historical absenteeism in the CCSC has been trending down due to the management of staff with histories of high sick leave.

182. The Panel acknowledges the efforts made by CCSC management to reduce sick leave and absence as part of a broader initiative across Police. The Panel remains concerned however, with the general perception and acknowledgement that increases in sick leave are a ‘barometer’ of the stress, fatigue and morale levels within CCSC\(^\text{12}\). As such, the Panel endorses Police’s ongoing efforts to better manage sick leave within CCSC and the potential individual and organisational reasons causing it.

183. An absenteeism strategy is required and managers must be measured against it to achieve performance. This needs to be incorporated as a key element of the performance framework.

\(^{12}\) Global Human Capital Survey, 2003, Pricewaterhouse Coopers
**Annual Leave**

184. From discussions with staff and submissions received, it was reported to the Panel that leave is difficult for staff to take even when planned months in advance. This is due to flexibility of rostering, ongoing staff shortages (vacancies) and absenteeism.

185. Staff also voiced dissatisfaction at the length of time taken to communicate decisions to them on whether or not leave requests had been granted. This is an administrative issue and should be easily resolved.

**Attrition**

186. Voluntary attrition within CCSC (currently at 17% or thereabouts) is higher than the Police average but lower than call centre averages. However, the CCSC is not merely a call centre similar to those in the private sector. The risks inherent in the CCSC business are much higher and CCSC decision-making roles are much more stressful and can carry serious consequences.

187. The Panel is concerned with what is considered to be higher than desirable staff attrition and the potential effect of this on the CCSC capabilities, particularly given the long lead time to recruit and train replacements. Police notes that some of the recent attrition is attributable to actions taken in sick leave management. Notwithstanding this effect, the Panel remains concerned with how the inherent job stress, and the staff’s reported current frustrations with their performance, will continue to impact absenteeism and attrition rates.

**Job Roles**

188. Currently there are two fundamental roles within each Centre: communicators or call takers; and dispatchers, which account for the majority of staffing allocation. The other roles are team leader and shift supervisor.

189. Career development within CCSC is quite structured. All non-sworn staff join as communicators and as dispatcher vacancies occur, suitable communicators are identified, trained and moved into dispatcher roles.

190. Many communicators however, never seek dispatcher roles, and once in dispatch, staff reported resistance to return to call taking even if for a short period within a shift.

191. The Panel believes that more staff should be ‘dual role’ so that they can be moved between the two roles depending on call taking/dispatch demand. Accordingly, recruitment criteria should be broadened to include dispatcher competencies.

192. Sworn staff have traditionally only been used for dispatch. Again, the Panel believes that sworn staff should work in either role but only when they have demonstrated the required aptitudes and skill levels.
193. The panel envisages that if Centres start to recruit and train dual role operators, then over time and through natural attrition the majority of staff would be ‘dual-role’, a significant advantage for rostering. Dispatch training would need to run more regularly to build the capability and experience levels.

194. Such a change will necessitate some re-organisation but will make the CCSC capabilities more flexible. Police advise that during 2003/04 a process of negotiation was entered into with the Police Association in order to complete development of a career progression model. The proposal presented by New Zealand Police contained all of the elements suggested by the Review Panel, however, all were rejected by the Police Association. Whilst some progress towards dual roles has been achieved, further industrial negotiations will be required to achieve the desired outcome.

**Competencies**

195. In 2003, the CCSC prepared competency profiles for Communicator and Dispatcher roles, and team leaders and shift supervisors. The competency profiles are comprehensive and are meant to act as the foundation for recruitment, training and development, and performance management.

196. The Panel does not believe these profiles have been utilised as thoroughly as they could have been in recruitment, training, development and performance management.

**Recruitment**

197. Recruitment is primarily conducted by an external agency which specialises in call centre recruitment.

198. The process is comprehensive in its use of an assessment centre format, psychometric tests and interviews. However, the assessment exercises have been designed to measure the communicator competencies and should more properly include dispatcher competencies.

199. Despite its comprehensiveness, the recruitment process for both roles could be improved by:

- better aligning the assessment exercises with the competency profile which may mean deleting some exercises and replacing them with more competency relevant exercises;
- using more appropriate and robust psychometric tests than the Wonderlic Personnel Test;
- assessing relevant personality features through psychometrically reliable and valid personality questionnaires; and
- making the interviewing more comprehensive through the use of behavioural based interviewing techniques and the inclusion of more senior CCSC staff once they have received appropriate interview training.
Training

200. The Panel believes that training within the CCSC needs considerable improvement. There is no documented training plan. Training needs analyses do not appear to have been completed. However, logically the roles and responsibilities need to be determined before a successful needs analysis can be undertaken.

201. Training is the cornerstone of the CCSC operations. If staff are selected well and supported by training in accordance with well defined standards and principles, they are more likely to be able to deliver according to the business expectations.

202. The training needs to be well prepared, delivered, valid and expert. The expertise is a shared attribute utilising those staff who know the job and those who are skilled in teaching adult learners. Consideration should be given to identifying who in the CCSC are the motivated, skilled staff and train them to be effective trainers and coaches.

203. The initial six week course for communicators in the experience of the Panel appears to be too long and does not include enough focus on managing calls. The course structure and content should be reviewed.

204. Training beyond the initial course is confined to dispatcher training other than on the occasion of system upgrades. There appears to be little, if any, ongoing refresher skills training.

205. New managers in the room require a management development training programme. This must include all aspects of critical incident command. It is important to note the distinction between the management and command roles within the CCSC, as indicated in the recommended structure at the senior management level. (Appendix Six)

206. The programme must consolidate the command skills required of newly promoted team leaders and shift managers. It must also provide them with knowledge of the command requirements of higher ranked officers. Command training must be undertaken regularly, include peer review, table-top scenario training and be well documented.

207. The objectives of the course must be such that when tested, managers are able to:
   - distinguish between tactical and strategic command of critical incidents;
   - explain the structures and systems required to provide strategic support and support critical incidents command from a comms centre environment;
   - devise and support management of three key areas of critical incident management – planning, execution and aftermath;
   - conduct responsibilities of post-incident managers within a comms centre environment;
   - identify clear response to critical incidents, follow clear policy guidelines and ensure actions taken are appropriate, proportional and compliant with New Zealand legislation; and
   - demonstrate skills, knowledge and experience at developing critical incident support teams within a comms centre environment.
Coaching and Mentoring

208. Coaching and mentoring on the job depends on the style of the individual team leader. The Review Panel received reports from staff that current work demands result in very little time for any sort of coaching. There does not appear to be a coaching/mentoring type of culture. Staff learn more informally from their peers than they do from any formal or structured coaching.

209. The introduction of a formal mentoring role, such as that employed by the Field Training Officer (FTO) role in Districts would significantly enhance the mentoring capability.

210. The current high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1) also impact on a supervisors ability to provide adequate mentoring and support to staff.

Performance Management

211. Individual performance management does occur in relation to annual reviews, although some Panel members spoke to staff who said they had not had a performance review.

212. There is an absence of a performance management culture within the CCSC that encourages and expects regular coaching of and feedback to staff by team leaders and shift managers. The Panel acknowledges that work pressures can and do make this difficult to achieve but without performance coaching and feedback, performance issues will not be dealt with promptly and easily.

213. A robust quality assurance system must also form part of the performance management process. Currently, quality assurance is lacking and should be re-instigated.

214. Quality assurance checks must also be documented and used in the performance review process. This documentation will also serve as a valuable source for scenario training.

Debriefings following Serious Incidents or Errors

215. Given the criticality of the business the CCSC is in, it is important that members involved in critical incidents or incidents involving trauma in some way are debriefed by their team leader and/or shift supervisor. This is not occurring on a regular basis, usually only includes incidents that have been badly handled; and often when it is completed, the interaction is said by staff to resemble an investigative interview.

216. Likewise, the lack of debriefing reduces the opportunity for staff to share positive performances and receive acknowledgment for when they perform well.

217. The Panel believes that these debriefings are an extremely useful and beneficial practice. They are vital in assisting with the prevention of stress, fatigue and illness and need to be re-instigated as a matter of urgency.

218. Debrief sessions should be well documented and signed by all participants.
**Sworn Officer Employment in CCSC**

219. Sworn staff the Panel spoke with claimed that the CCSC is not a place that many police officers want to come to. Hence the CCSC has difficulty attracting enough junior sworn staff to fulfill dispatcher roles. By not having the option to appoint ‘best fit’ candidates because of a limited pool of applicants, the overall capability of the staff can be compromised.

220. The Panel believes that probationary constables, where time and travel allow, should spend time in a Communications Centre as observers and as part of their probationary experience. Given the practical and resource implications of such a move however, a more achievable aim would be to ensure all officers have some experience of the CCSC within their first five years of service.

221. Later, when constables with the required aptitudes and skill sets are transferred to the CCSC, it should be for a minimum of six months and ideally two years. A goal for the NMG should be to have more constables than the CCSC can employ wanting to transfer because they realise the valuable operational experience it provides.

222. The CCSC appears to be a more attractive option for Sergeants and Inspectors not only because of the promotional benefits, but also, for a more regular lifestyle.

**Career Structure and Progression**

223. Whereas the CCSC has certain career advantages for sworn staff, there are few career progression options for capable and achieving non-sworn staff.

224. The Panel believes that by adopting the command and management structure recommended earlier, there will be more career opportunities for non-sworn staff.

**Remuneration Differences**

225. Another issue is the remuneration differences between sworn and non-sworn staff. These differences vary depending on the seniority of staff being compared; but generally, sworn staff receive greater remuneration than non-sworn staff. Non-sworn staff however are more easily able to earn overtime payments if available due to the conditions of TOIL (time off in lieu) included in the sworn collective agreement. A dissatisfaction expressed by non-sworn staff however, was the delay in payment of overtime often experienced. This is an administrative issue and should be quickly and easily resolved.

226. For non-sworn staff, remuneration at the junior levels is competitive with other call centre salaries, but as non-sworn staff become more experienced, they receive more than their peers in other call centre roles and potentially can earn more than sworn constables because of the banding and progressive system employed.

227. A move to ‘dual role’ staff within the CCSC many attract a reassessment of remuneration.
Recommendations

228. A workforce planning tool should be purchased for use by the workforce coordinators.

229. An absenteeism strategy should be developed and absenteeism incorporated into the performance framework of supervisors and managers.

230. The CCSC should critically examine how to create more flexibility into its rostering to meet call demand forecasts.

231. Administrative processes and activities should be tidied up to ensure expediency, for example, processing leave requests and overtime payments.

232. The CCSC should move to ‘dual role’ staff in call taking and dispatch so that staff can be moved between roles as demands change.

233. The competency profiles need to be integrated into recruitment, training and performance management processes.

234. A training plan based around the competency profiles and a thorough training needs analysis needs to be produced once position roles and responsibilities are fully determined.

235. Training in call management should assume prominence in initial and refresher training.

236. New managers to the CCSC require a management development training programme. This must include all aspects of critical incident command as identified in this report.

237. Performance coaching needs to become a regular feature of the CCSC operating culture.

238. A mentoring role similar to that of the Field Training Officer (FTO) operating in Districts should be established.

239. Quality assurance checks must be carried out and documented for use in the performance review process.

240. Debriefings following critical incidents, or mishandled situations, need to be re-instigated and should be fully documented.

241. A career structure for non-swear staff needs to be designed following confirmation of revised organisational structure and roles.

242. Time spent in the Communications Centres as an observer, should, where possible be included in a probationary constable’s orientation programme.

243. After probation, sworn constables transferred or deployed (as opposed to appointed) to the CCSC should stay for a minimum of six months.

244. All sworn staff applying or directed to work in the CCSC should complete a comparable assessment to non-swear staff, and complete comparable training courses.

245. Further analysis of staffing requirements should be undertaken in three and six months time as the determination of services and standards; other initiatives implemented in the meantime will affect the required staffing levels.
PROCESSES AND SYSTEMS

246. There are a large number of issues with the CCSC processes and systems that the Panel has identified. The processes and systems relate to how calls are received by the CCSC, decisions made about appropriate actions, and then dispatch of police units in response.

Initial Handling of Calls by Telecom New Zealand Ltd

247. Telecom has requirements under the Telecommunication Service Obligation (TSO) Deed to:

- provide a free service for genuine ‘111’ calls to Telecom residential customers; and
- meet certain service standards in delivering that service, such as: Telecom must answer 85% of ‘111’ calls within 15 seconds.

248. Telecom answers approximately 200,000 calls per month of which 68% are false calls. After filtering by Telecom, up to 40,000 calls are put through to Police CCSC each month. The Telecom operators manually route these calls to the relevant Communications Centre.

249. The first issue in these statistics is the extremely high number of false or bogus ‘111’ calls. Telecom has achieved some reductions in these calls by charging $6 for the second and subsequent non-genuine Telecom land-line call in a month. There are technological solutions that would assist in filtering these calls such as ‘natural language speech recognition’ but such utilisation requires funding and approval/support from emergency service providers and Government, which the Commissioner may wish to raise with Government. The Panel would not promote this as a priority course of action as Police has other priorities to deal with. However, such a course of action will assist with the effective handling of ‘111’ calls in the future.

250. A second issue is the growing number of ‘111’ calls that Telecom operators divert or ‘bounce’ between Centres. In November 2004, there were 1760 ‘bounced’ calls which is currently about 5% of all the calls Telecom presents to Police, although recently the number of bounced calls has increased to up to 3,000 a month. This occurs when Telecom operators manually re-route calls to another Centre if the calls are not answered after 25 rings or 75 seconds. When the call is re-presented to another Centre, it goes to the bottom of the queue and does not receive priority. This process was introduced in 1996 as an interim measure.

251. The number of ‘bounced’ calls misrepresents Police statistics on call response (wait) times.

252. The Review Panel believes this situation can be readily solved by introducing automated queue technology (NACD) to present calls to the first available call taker in any one of the Communications Centres. This would improve call response times and optimise call taking resources.

13 Source: Telecom New Zealand Ltd. 2004 Call Data.
253. Furthermore, operating on this basis would enable a national rostering model which in turn would ensure that all abstractions are managed across the three Centres.

254. However, as previously mentioned, each Centre needs to be developed to cope with the current demand and should ideally operate independently in the interim to ensure that each site has sufficient capability before any move is made towards a virtual model.

255. Other operational issues at the Telecom side of the process include calls presented and answered by Police with no speech from the Police communicator and calls held i.e. calls not released by Police when they are completed.

256. The ‘no-speech’ phenomenon, although accounting for only 30 – 60 calls a month, can significantly increase call response times as the Telecom operator has to liaise with Police and/or the Telecom Operation Centre to find the call and manually release it so it can be re-presented to another Centre. Despite a number of reviews to solve the problem, it persists.

257. The general causes for the ‘no-speech’ problem are a headset or cable problem, a shift changeover where the police operator logs out incorrectly or when auto-answer is activated by the operator but there is no operator there to answer the call. As the primary causes appear to be operator error, the Panel believes the problem should be readily solved through adherence to operational procedures, and training.

258. The call held issue is again apparently caused through Police call taker error and should be readily minimised and ideally eliminated, by training and effective performance management.

**Non-Urgent Calls**

259. The CCSC operates a ‘dual gateway’ model wherein Communications Centres accept both emergency (111) calls as well as non-emergency calls from Police stations and *555 traffic calls. There are also call queues from the Ambulance Service and Rescue Coordination Centre (AES queue).

260. Non-emergency, non ‘111’, calls represent around 65% of all calls coming into the CCSC.

261. The Panel strongly believes that there are definite operational advantages in all non-emergency calls to Police nationally, being channelled though a common 0800 number (SNEN) or similar.

**Call Taking**

262. Having observed call takers (communicators) in all the Centres, the Panel considers that the consistency of call quality needs to be significantly improved. The Panel accepts that many calls are answered appropriately, but has also
observed call taking behaviours that frustrated and angered callers and delayed retrieval of essential information.

263. The Panel knows from experience that the call taking role is the most crucial in the response process. The time spent in training and coaching on the job to get call management effective and efficient is an essential investment.

264. The Panel observed behaviour such as poor questioning techniques, little rapport being established with the caller, little clarification to the caller of why the questions are being asked, long silences from call takers during data entry which leads to callers querying whether anyone is still on line with them, lack of consistency in what is being asked, expressed anger and frustration with the caller, and some arguments as a result.

265. The Panel strongly believes that initial and ongoing training for communicators needs to concentrate on call taking skills such as structured call taking, active listening, and call management and control. The better call quality becomes, the quicker communicators will get the information required to categorise the priority of the call, enabling more efficient dispatch.

Communication issues between Communicators and Dispatchers

266. The Panel also observed communication issues between communicators and dispatchers. These arose from dispatchers being frustrated with the lack of information on an incident provided by communicators. The Panel believes that these issues can be readily resolved through training, clarity around procedures, and supervision.

267. A move to dual role operators will help staff understand the priorities and difficulties associated with each role and ideally lead to more cooperative working arrangements.

268. The addition of dispatch assistants should be considered as an option for high volume periods. This role would alleviate dispatch pressures by completing computer checks and making any necessary telephone calls to enable a dispatcher to focus on managing the radio channel. Obviously, the deployment of such a role would need to consider the associated logistical and financial implications.

Caller Identification

269. The new Intergraph upgrade to version 7.9 of CARD will support Centre process improvements by enabling access to caller line identification (CLI) for unlisted Telecom customers. Police reports however that there are issues with data matching and this is being progressed with Telecom.

270. The inclusion of CLI data for customers of service providers other than Telecom will require commercial data sharing. Such a move will require long term negotiations, as it involves matters of commercial sensitivity, privacy issues and may require changes to legislation.
271. Similarly, the development of a Mobile Line Identification (MoBI) capability to identify the caller and location of a mobile or cellular telephone, should be investigated as a future long term opportunity.

**Dispatch**

**Channel Usage**

272. Dispatch channel volumes vary considerably by area and time of day. The central city channels e.g. ‘Auckland Central’, are extremely busy and on some occasions, become unsafe because front line police cannot get on to the channel due to so much radio traffic.

273. Channel linking\(^{14}\) is another practice that can clearly lead to overload situations from technical as well as dispatcher workload perspectives. This requires some form of rational assessment of how many channels are required to improve radio communications and support the operational effectiveness of field officers. This practice is discussed further in the Operations section of this report.

274. The Panel is aware that New Zealand Police has far more channels available than it is currently using. The Panel believes therefore, that channel usage should be addressed ideally by the NCB type body recommended earlier in this report. While it is acknowledged there are some considerable costs associated with operating more channels, including staffing, at the very least Auckland should be allocated another channel during times of forecast high radio traffic.

275. The Panel appreciates that opening up more channels will require more dispatchers and potential operational command issues in the larger areas. However, these issues need resolution now before channel volumes become unmanageable and risk officer safety.

**Availability of Units to Respond**

276. There are often more units available to potentially respond, than are logged on for dispatch. Dispatchers are often requesting over the channel if there are any units who can respond because s/he has none available. This situation is potentially extremely serious and should be looked at as a related issue from this review. The role of dispatcher is just that: to dispatch, it is not to request.

277. A second issue is the potential changed behaviour of a dispatcher when they work regularly with the same section. On occasions, dispatchers were observed to be overly familiar with unit staff when dispatching jobs, which could potentially affect their objectivity when they feel they have a loyalty to a particular group.

\(^{14}\) The RCT Radio Control Software allows the linking of up to four Radio Telephone Channels. Linked channels effectively become a single channel with extended coverage area. All transmissions on any one channel are re-transmitted on all the linked channels.
Both of these points are supervisory issues. Service standards, compliance and accountability on the part of District staff must be the responsibility of field supervisors. This issue is dealt with further in the Operations section of this report.

**CCSC Use of Intelligence Nodes or ‘Dummy Units’**

There is a practice of allocating non-urgent jobs to intelligence nodes, colloquially known as ‘dummy units’ in order to clear jobs on the CARD system where urgent dispatch is not appropriate. This practice allows Districts to follow up in their own time. There appears however, to be a lack of clarity and formalisation around this process which needs to be addressed.

The Panel believes this is another CCSC operational practice that needs to be clearly discussed with, accepted by and coordinated with Districts and ideally be included in the Service Level Agreements if the practice is to continue. Without this level of clarity and understanding, Districts may fail to follow-up because watch-house sergeants are unaware of the practice. This practice is not encouraged because of the risk of service delivery failure if not properly managed.

The Panel acknowledges this practice has already been identified by Police and work is planned to progress the issue.

**Unit Technology**

Dispatch effectiveness and efficiency would be significantly improved by employing Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) and mobile data within Police units. The Panel endorses New Zealand Police’s current consideration of these technologies although advises that the deployment should be included in mid term plans rather than immediate implementation.

**Ease of Use with LES (Wanganui) and NIA**

Dispatch efficiency is often impeded by the need for dispatchers to cut and paste data from LES (Law Enforcement System) between screens. The Panel understands that the upgraded NIA system will still require dispatchers to cut and paste across screens. Although ‘Checks Channels’ are utilised on the busier channels to do the checks for dispatchers, there remains the technical issue of better linking these applications with CARD.

**Local Knowledge**

A common complaint from public callers and front line police is the apparent lack of locational knowledge of call takers and dispatchers. This issue can partly be addressed through training and familiarisation tours of the CCSC staff. But if Police is to eventually move as the Panel has recommended to a virtual call taking queue by using NACD, then call takers and dispatchers will increasingly have to rely upon the mapping tools at their disposal. The CCSC should have access to the latest aerial mapping technology.
285. The Panel acknowledges the concerns of the rural community that a lack of local knowledge within the CCSC can affect response times to rural emergencies. The Panel believes that by incorporating district council rapid numbering system data for every rural house into its mapping programme, call takers and dispatchers will be better able to identify locations.

286. It is acknowledged that Police has forged some slow progress but the issue relies on the co-operation of and delivery from other agencies, as well as impacting all emergency service providers. An alternative would be to provide GPS coordinates for every rural property, although this would take longer and be more costly to collect. Both concepts have merit, but a requirement for Centre staff, or candidates thereof, to display proficiency at some level for familiarity with New Zealand geography would also assist in this area.

287. The implementation of AVL in rural Districts will enhance a dispatcher’s ability to guide a unit to a static point, provided this is used in concert with up-to-date mapping systems.

Intergraph CARD screen field

288. An apparently minor formatting issue with the ‘Address Search’ screen field can cause significant delays in confirming a caller’s location. If call takers omit to broaden the address search parameters then they will often fail to confirm a particular street in the caller's location.

289. It may be possible to investigate the inclusion of a technical fix or pop-up reminder, but this type of minor error inducing programme feature should be overcome through training.

Radio Discipline and Security

290. Panel members have been surprised by the lack of radio discipline in communications between dispatchers and field staff. Communication is often ‘long winded’ and conversational. Master Standard Operating Procedures (MSOPs) and training should address these issues.

291. There remains concern about the security of radio channels and the risk this poses to front line staff. However this issue requires rigorous study and assessment before action can be undertaken. The Panel understands that Police currently has this issue under consideration.

MSOP and Full Deck

292. CCSC staff have access to MSOPs and Full Deck. From submissions made, the Panel understands that CCSC MSOPs are incomplete in some instances or out of date. This should be addressed as a priority by the National Management Group once resourced.
Performance Management Framework

293. The current performance indicators reported are inadequate to evaluate the overall performance of the CCSC and therefore provide the CCSC management and Police Executive with an incomplete and possibly even skewed picture of performance.

294. A full suite of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be designed to enable managers to accurately monitor the performance of each Centre. KPIs should not be limited to call answering and handling times but should also include abandoned and ‘bounced’ calls.

295. More administrative items should also feature as part of the performance framework, including the records of critical incident handling, debriefings and consultation undertaken either internally or externally.

296. The amount of training time, coaching and volume and regularity of quality control checks should also be considered for the performance framework.

297. Standardised reporting structures need to be developed to support the performance framework.

298. Monthly management reviews, including the KPIs, should be conducted with each team leader, shift manager and Centre manager in the interim to monitor performance and ensure progress is being made to improve performance.

Recommendations

299. The consistency of communicator call management skills should be improved as a priority through initial and refresher training, and on the job supervision.

300. A structured call taking approach should be adopted and included in communicator training.

301. More radio channels need to be allocated to metropolitan areas to ease channel loadings particularly during critical incidents and periods of predicted high radio traffic.

302. Rural Rapid Numbering Systems or GPS coordinate data, should be investigated for inclusion in mapping resources.

303. CCSC MSOPs (Master Standard Operating Procedures) should be completed as soon as is practicable and updated on a regular basis.

304. In consultation with the Organisational Performance Group, a full suite of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) should be designed to enable managers to accurately monitor the performance of each Centre, shift manager and team leader.
OPERATIONS

Operational Planning

305. There appears to be limited involvement of the CCSC in District planning and the execution of operations. In examples provided it appears that District staff and management tend to advise rather than consult Centres on operational orders and in some cases, provide no advice at all of planned operations that Centre management and staff should be made aware of as they are likely to be impacted on. More importantly, no knowledge of or involvement in contributing to planning denies the opportunity for setting a support plan for Comms in place.

306. Where operational orders for major events or operations are sometimes made available to Centres, staff indicated that although they are shown to them, no formal briefing is undertaken.

307. An opportunity exists for District operational planners to consult Communications Centres when drawing up operation orders to ensure a coordinated approach and gain from the experience and demonstrated expertise available within the Centres.

308. Interestingly, District Commanders report relative satisfaction with the service delivery provided by the CCSC, although they acknowledge there has formerly been some concern with level of support.

Debrief, Special Events

309. Debriefing practices after incidents are poor. Staff reported that debriefings are quick and not purposeful. Centre debriefs are also inconsistent. During the panel’s visit to one of the Centres, three major incidents occurred, two air craft crashes and an incident involving a man who had doused himself with petrol. Enquiries did not reveal what, if any, k debrief of staff was undertaken. A shift manager was observed departing the Centre at the end of shift following a major incident although no debrief had been undertaken. One dispatcher reported to the panel that they had not received an operational debrief in five years.

310. As well as being an opportunity to learn from experience, debriefing is an important process to combat stress, fatigue and illness that might otherwise develop due to the high pressure and often disturbing experiences Communications staff are faced with every day. Debriefing sessions are also an opportunity to praise and encourage staff when appropriate.

311. District operational managers invite centre shift managers to participate in debriefs on rare occasions and this only serves to prolong the lack of clarity and understanding around roles and responsibility for command, both for dispatch and incident control.
312. This exclusion is further evidence of the CCSC not being considered as part of the front line response. The status quo must not continue in this regard but it is up to management and staff to work towards changing attitudes.

**Control and Command**

313. The Panel raised questions about the confidence of Shift Managers to exercise command. Some of the issues have already been alluded to in the recommendation to ensure new managers undergo a management development training programme including all aspects of critical incident command.

314. At all times, New Zealand Police needs to fully articulate the responsibilities and roles when a critical incident, firearms incident or other occurs. Strict operational rules and procedures regarding who takes command and when command should transfer from the CCSC to District must be clearly defined and understood. These command skills will be developed and strengthened through continuing education, table top exercises and the practicalities of day-to-day operations.

315. There was concern among the Panel members that shift managers and team leaders do not willingly take on this critical incident command role. This must be addressed through training and coaching to ensure adequate coverage of a competent commander at all times. It should be clearly stated what is required, training provided and clear expectations communicated throughout the organisation. Each person must know his or her role and be held accountable for doing so.

316. Documentation of each critical incident including the debrief process undertaken should be recorded in a policy book or similar and used to assess the quality of command. This record can then also be referred to for individual performance reviews and as a source for scenario training.

**Operational Practises**

**Local station dispatch in Districts**

317. Numerous opinions and comments were presented to the panel from those who work in the CCSC and the Districts. There is an opportunity to employ the use of i-Net dispatch in Districts but there must be clear business rules established between Districts and the CCSC. As a critical business process this might be an ideal foundation for building future Service Level Agreements (SLA) around. It is also vital that this is not seen as a divestment of the CCSC and any changes are communicated to all staff regarding the changes to business operations. Close District liaison and updating of SLAs should occur in order to manage operational priorities.

318. In the opinion of the Panel, SLAs should not be unique to each District. The CCSC cannot work differently for or provide unique standards of service to each District. Attempting to do so would pose a monstrous training and competency problem. Any such standards need to reflect the mission and
mandate of CCSC and the broad range of services that it is resourced to provide, recognising as well, the overall mission of New Zealand Police.

319. It has been submitted to the panel that the benefits of operating i-Net Dispatch within Districts will enable enhanced tactical coordination in line with proactive policing strategies.

320. Any move to implement District based dispatch must be carefully coordinated with the CCSC and strict business rules defined and adhered to, to ensure a comprehensive dispatch capability. Staff will need to be trained and monitored over a trial period before any move to implement such a change nationwide.

**Channel linking**

321. During quieter periods and sometimes due to staff shortages, Dispatchers are required to link channels, or dispatch two channels simultaneously. In some instances there is nothing wrong with channel linking, particularly during very quiet periods of radio traffic. However, during periods of higher radio traffic this can be a risk for the public requiring assistance by causing delays in dispatching and also puts police safety at risk if a call for assistance can’t be made. Dual dispatch has the same risks attached and the added problem of information or a call for assistance potentially being missed as both channels are open at the same time.

322. Some undesirable behaviour by District staff was reported in response to the practice of linking channels. Claims that some officers repeatedly open and close the channel to disrupt traffic and signal their disapproval of channels being linked are of concern. Such behaviour, if it exists, must be identified and remedial action taken by District management.

323. Clear business rules need to be established in consultation with District Commanders and the agreed practice communicated to all staff. The practice should continue to be monitored to ensure that rules surrounding safe radio use are adhered to.

**Night switching**

324. Stations which do not operate 24 hours a day should redirect incoming calls to one of the 24 hour stations in the same District when the switch board is not manned. It is reported this practice of ‘night switching’ regularly occurs but calls are redirected to one of the Communications Centres rather than another station. Also reported is that the practice is not limited to after hours but occurs during business hours with claims that this is to enable station telephonists to take breaks.

325. This is an issue as it increases the volume of calls are directed to the Centres. It is also a customer service issue as some callers are reported to be dissatisfied when their call is picked up by a Communications Centre when they were trying to contact their local station.

326. Clear business rules need to be reinforced to District management and staff. Continued non compliance must be identified and appropriate action taken to ensure the practice is discontinued.
Unit availability

327. All District units available for dispatch are required to log themselves on at the start of each shift. District Service Level Agreements identify exceptions where staff that commence duty away from their home station will have this duty performed for them by Comms.

328. From the number of units reported to be available by dispatchers at any given time, it appears that not all District units are logging on or declaring themselves available for dispatch. This is further evidenced by the number of events that are coded ‘no unit available’ or NUA. There are rules and procedures in place regarding dispatch under NUA including referring to field commanders and reprioritising or diverting units in attendance at or en route to other events.

329. Police operates a Status Monitoring and Calling System (SMACS) which allows field staff to change their status, result events and call for assistance without speaking to the dispatcher. It was reported that SMACS is not widely used as staff prefer voice communication which provides the assurance that the message has been received.

330. The use of alternate communications devices (i.e. cell phones) as a work around or alternate to using the CARD and radio system is risky. Transmissions are not taped and the Centres do not then know what is going on. The appropriate and acceptable use of cell phones for the tasking of jobs in contravention of established business rules must be communicated to all staff and unacceptable use not tolerated.

Recommendations

331. Operational planning needs to become a critical part of the CCSC business. All operational plans must have the CCSC management buy-in at some level.

332. Consultation with the CCSC should appear as a mandatory requirement for operational orders.

333. Documentation of each critical incident including the debrief process undertaken should be recorded.

334. Clear business rules regarding channel linking need to be established in consultation with District Commanders and the agreed practice communicated to all staff. The practice should continue to be monitored to ensure that rules surrounding safe radio use are adhered to.

335. Supervisors and managers in both the CCSC and Districts need to ensure all business rules surrounding night switching are understood and adhered to. Staff not operating in line with standard business rules must be identified and held accountable.

336. Management must make policy compliance and consistency an issue of accountability and performance management.
RELATIONSHIPS

337. The CCSC has a variety of stakeholder groups it interacts with. These include Police Districts, other government departments, community groups and the public. The strength of the relationships with these stakeholders varies considerably.

338. Relationships with Police Districts at the senior level are generally good. However, relationships with front-line police are not as good although this varies across the country.

Police District Relationships

339. The Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between the CCSC and Police Districts are not highly valued by Districts. There is a lack of standardisation in the SLAs which, while understandable from a district tactical perspective, does lead to confusion among CCSC staff on how and why a particular District likes things to be done.

340. The Review Panel believes there needs to be closer working relationships between the CCSC and Districts to clarify mutual expectations. There are a variety of ways this could be achieved including District staff spending more time in Communications Centres and vice versa. The flip-side to this is that Districts may have to adopt more nationally standardised communication protocols set by the CCSC.

341. Where collocation of Centre and Station exists, this should provide excellent opportunity for interaction by CCSC staff with District management teams and staff within the respective district. Conversely this structure means that CCSC managers and staff are less accessible to Districts outside of the immediate area. However, as very little evidence was seen of any physical interaction between District and CCSC staff, it appears there are more inherent relationship issues.

Community Group Relationships

342. There are a myriad of organisations that the CCSC does and could, interact with. Clearly, confidence in Police by some community groups has waned. The Review Panel believes that the CCSC contact with these groups should be coordinated through the broader Police liaison officer network (i.e. Iwi, Pacific or Ethnic Liaison Officers) to maximise the opportunities to consult and inform.

Public Education and Information

343. The New Zealand Police has to more readily establish the public's expectations on police contact and emergency response. The Review Panel notes there is no formal mechanism to consult the public and community groups about police response expectations. By learning about what these expectations are, Police
could better orientate their communications strategy to either satisfy or manage those expectations.

344. Managing the public’s expectations can be accomplished through public education programmes focused on when and how to contact Police. The Panel’s view is that the public need to be better educated about the use of ‘111’. Similarly, they will need to be informed about the establishment of alternative ways of contacting the Police that may flow from this Review.

**Liaison with Emergency Management Organisations**

345. Relationships between the CCSC and Ambulance and Fire, are generally good. However there is a gap in national operational relationships with governmental emergency response organisations such as Civil Defence. Relationships appear to exist, however, at the strategic Governmental level between Police and these agencies.

346. The NCB type body the Panel has recommended, should consider deepening these relationships and task the CCSC National Management Group with achieving this.

**Recommendations**

347. The CCSC and Districts should seek ways to improve their formal and informal relationships.

348. The form and content of Service Level Agreements should be reviewed by the ‘National Communications Board’ so that their utility and value to Districts and the CCSC are enhanced.

349. Community group liaison by the CCSC should continue through the relevant District Liaison Officers (i.e. Iwi, Pacific or Ethnic Liaison Officers).

350. Public expectations on contact responsiveness by Police should be regularly measured so these can be used to set performance targets, and shape the content of public education campaigns.

351. Working relationships between the CCSC and emergency response agencies should be deepened.
IMPLEMENTATION

352. New Zealand Police will need to consider what short, medium and long term actions are required and consolidate the recommendations in this report with work already underway relating to the Communications Centres.

353. An implementation plan should be devised to outline what needs to be done now (within six months), including the priority items to develop better service and enable a sustainable operation pending the implementation of mid to long term actions which will be more strategic in nature.

354. The planning phase will require considerable consultation and it will be necessary to ensure effective communication across Police for the entire duration of the project. Messages must remain factual, accurate, consistent, timely and challenge rumour and undesirable attitudes.

355. Project plans should be put in place outlining methodology, assignment of responsibility, accountability, time lines, assignment of resources, agreed measurement references, tracking, change process and progress review.

356. It will also be important to interweave a peer review process throughout the duration of the project. The Review Panel, or representatives thereof, will be well positioned to maintain a peer review capability to ensure Police remains on target towards what it wants to achieve.

357. As Police moves to the implementation phase, it will need to identify good team-based individuals who want to be challenged, work hard and learn with a desire to achieve the seemingly impossible. Those people selected to carry forward implementations, and the future development of communications, will be critical to the success of the project.

CLOSING COMMENTS

358. The Review Panel identifies throughout this report that there are issues with the CCSC that need to be addressed and makes recommendations to deal with them. The recommendations made are not exhaustive and deliberately not overly prescriptive but offer guidance for the future direction of New Zealand Police communications.

359. The deficiencies displayed by the CCSC, both real and perceived, should not overshadow the excellent work and commitment demonstrated by staff. However, neither should the criticality of the successful operation of communications be understated in the ability of thousands of police staff to operate every day and who strive to provide services the public both demand and deserve.

360. The importance of public consultation on this issue cannot be stressed enough and will be vital in maintaining public confidence and determining the direction of Police communications in the future.
361. Prior to and throughout the duration of the review, a broad range of commentators have repeatedly stated a belief that more staff will alleviate the problems demonstrated. This report evidences that an increase in staff is only one of a whole range of measures needed to address the matters at hand and that a broad range of strategic and tactical options must be implemented at the same time in order to fully realise any benefit additional staff may bring.

362. Any wholesale change to the way police and public interact is likely to incur significant cost in other areas. The challenge for New Zealand Police will be to examine all the available options and balance its duty of care and the needs and expectations of the public with the cost the public is willing to bear.

363. Police relies heavily on public support and the principle of policing by consent. Police must continue to fully engage communities and its other stakeholders to manage their needs and expectations and provide a quality service for the whole of New Zealand. Being a victim of crime does not bestow expertise of how to respond to or deal with crime and public opinion and expectations are initially likely to vary greatly from the Police perspective. It is not suggested that Police should be directed by public opinion; however, Police needs to take responsibility for communicating more effectively with the public to explain its actions and motivations and enhance public reassurance.

364. The Panel acknowledges that the Police Executive has maintained a determined focus on the CCSC since the announcement of this review and that initial steps have been taken in addressing some of the problems identified. It also acknowledges the Commissioner’s expression of commitment to this review and its findings.

365. Finally, the Review Panel is grateful to members of the public, and those private and public organisations who made submissions to the review, or who gave of their time in order to meet with the Panel. The Panel also wishes to acknowledge the cooperation and support of the Police Executive, management and staff of the CCSC, and other Police managers and staff, without whose time and contribution this review would not have been possible.

APPENDICES

Appendix One – Terms of Reference

The Commissioner’s Terms of Reference for the review were to:

a. Examine New Zealand Police Communication Centre practice and compare with stated service delivery aims and objectives.

b. Review and provide recommendations on:
   - The demand for Police services presented to the Communication Centres
   - The capability of staffing and technological resources at each Communication Centre to meet current and predicted demand
   - The interaction between Communication Centres and Districts (urban and rural response) including Service Level Agreements
   - Relevant governance and management arrangements including:
     - structures
     - systems and processes
     - initial and ongoing training, including call assessment, caller responsiveness, and decision-making quality and thresholds
     - HR practices and support structures
     - quantitative, qualitative and timeliness performance measures
     - compliance with the New Zealand Police competency framework
     - Health and Safety considerations for both CCSC and operational staff.

c. Review (a) and (b) above against international best practice.

d. Review any other Communication Centres matters found to be necessary by the panel, and agreed with the Commissioner.

e. Make recommendations and provide a final report to the Commissioner, New Zealand Police.
Chief Superintendent Michael Corboy, New South Wales Police

Chief Superintendent Michael Corboy has worked in metropolitan and rural areas both in general duties and as a detective. He has a strong operational background and worked in some of the most difficult policing jurisdictions in New South Wales.

In 2001, Mr Corboy took up a position as Local Area Commander of St Mary’s in Western Sydney where, amongst his normal duties, he was forward commander for the Blue Mountains Fire during the devastating Christmas bush fires.

In 2002 he was appointed Centre Manager of Sydney Communications Centre covering the entire Sydney Metropolitan area with responsibility for radio and emergency telephony as well as the technical support for that network.

In 2004 he took over operational responsibility for Police Communications for New South Wales with six Police Communications Centres and more than 600 employees.

Chief Superintendent Corboy is a current member of the Australian National Emergency Communications Working Group and the Australian Emergency Services Advisory Committee.

He has relieved as Assistant Commissioner of the Communications Command, which comprises the Communications Group, Police Assistance Line and the Business and Technology Command.

He also represents Police Communications in counter terrorist issues and chairs an industry group on spatial data. He holds positions on the Computer Aided Dispatch Steering Committee, the Mobile Data governance group, In-Car Video Committee and Standing Committee on Information Management.

He has recently returned from a tour of Police, Ambulance and Fire Communications Centres in the USA, Canada and UK with a NSW Government group.

Chief Superintendent Corboy has a strong background in industrial relations, has completed the Police Executive Leadership Programme and holds a Graduate Certificate in Applied Management. He is currently Commander of Public Affairs.

Superintendent Ruth Purdie, North Wales Police

Superintendent Purdie has more than 24 years service. She has worked for North Wales, Cheshire and Greater Manchester Police.

This has given her diverse policing experience dealing with both rural and metropolitan policing issues. She is currently a member of the steering panel for the HIMC Thematic on UK call handling standards.

She has a uniform operation background and during the past four years she has been the senior project manager for the implementation of new IT products within
North Wales Police and was Project Executive for the successful national roll-out of CAD in 2003 linked to a mobile data solution for all officers.

Her current role as the divisional commander of the Operation Communications Division involves the management of staff at four communications centres in North Wales. Staff deal with calls for service in both English and Welsh.

Superintendent Purdie is also responsible for the implementation of the police communication project AIRWAVE, which will deliver improved officer communication and interaction with the communications centres.

In October 2005 North Wales Police will open a single communications centre.

Superintendent Purdie holds a First Class Honours Degree in Management and Education from Manchester University. She is a trained Police Negotiator (Metropolitan Police Course) and Silver Firearms and Public Order Commander. She is also a trained CRBN (chemical, radiological, biological or nuclear) Incident Commander.

**Acting Deputy Chief Emory Gilbert, Toronto Police Service**

As a member of Toronto Police for the past 33 years, Acting Deputy Chief Emory Gilbert has acquired extensive experience in general and specialised assignments.

At present, he is responsible for Policing Support Command which is comprised of 15 specialised units such as Mounted and Police Dog Services, Emergency Task Force, Communications Services, Marine Unit, Intelligence Bureau, Homicide, Hold Up, Sex Crimes and Fraud Squads, to name a few.

Mr Gilbert has had considerable experience and training as a tactical officer, police explosives technician, hostage negotiator and operational/contingency planner. He is a former member of the International Association of Bomb Technicians and Investigators and has taught at the Ontario and Canadian Police Colleges.

As the Unit Commander of Communications Support and later Communications Centre, Mr Gilbert has experience directing operations during periods of significant technological change: installation of a new E-911 phone system, Intergraph CAD, administrative phone and voice radio systems.

During the course of his service, Mr Gilbert has been involved in several special projects, Papal and Royal visits, Economic Summit, Special Olympics, implementation of a new 9.1.1. Integrated Communications System and development of a First Offenders Diversion Programme for those charged with solicitation of prostitutes.

In addition to his extensive police training at the Canadian and Ontario Police Colleges and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr Gilbert holds a certificate and diploma in Law Enforcement Studies from Seneca College, and a certificate in Senior Police Administration from the Canadian Police College. He is a graduate of the Police Leadership Programme offered at the University of Toronto, Rotman School of Management.
Kevin McKenna, PricewaterhouseCoopers Ltd

Kevin is the director of the Human Resources Services practice of PricewaterhouseCoopers in Auckland. He specialises in the people aspects of organisational change, HR due diligence, performance measurement and improvement. He leads a national team which provides services to New Zealand organisations in HR strategy development, remuneration, organisational change and performance improvement.

Kevin was previously PricewaterhouseCoopers' internal Director of HR. He led a national team of 13 HR managers and advisers providing HR services to partners and staff.

Before joining PricewaterhouseCoopers, Kevin served for 18 years in the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) attaining the rank of Wing Commander. He joined the RNZAF initially as a psychologist but later completed a pilot’s course. After serving as the Senior RNZAF Psychologist he was appointed the Director of Strategic Human Resources for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).

Kevin was the RNZAF’s performance and human factors specialist on all accident Courts of Inquiry for 18 years. He has also acted as a specialist advisor in human factors and organisational psychology for the Transport Accident Investigation Commission since 1990.

Kevin has been a registered psychologist since 1983. He has a BSc in psychology, MA (Hons) in clinical psychology, and a Diploma in Business. Kevin was also made a Member of the New Zealand Order of Merit in 1999.
**Appendix Three – List of Submissions**

New Zealand Police Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M Palma</th>
<th>G Somerville</th>
<th>C Douglas</th>
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<tr>
<td>P Jones</td>
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<td>S Dow</td>
<td>K Braae</td>
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<td>G J Painting</td>
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<td>L Tocker</td>
<td>K Kortegast</td>
<td>D Dalziell</td>
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Non-Police personnel

K Barnett
R Murcott – Land Information New Zealand
P Sidwell
S J Delaney
G N Cashmore
A Fulcher
A Paul
D G Heanley
N Mayes
G Sinclair
I Goodison
B Palmer
J Hawker
M H Brown
D Wood
N B Hawkins
M Nolan
L W Johansson
B Winstone
M Scannell
R W Ward - Taradale Community Policing Petition Committee
G Wood - North Shore City Council
L H Pratley
I Stonhill - Chair Neighbourhood Support New Zealand
G MacDonald - Northland Civil Defence and Emergency Group
M Potts - President of the NZ Security Officers Association
Executive Committee of Community Patrols of NZ
The Police Managers’ Guild
G O’Connor - The New Zealand Police Association
T Morley
J Johnston - Local Government NZ
Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc.)
Telecom New Zealand Ltd.
M Bentley
W Church
Waitakere City Council
W Thompson
Appendix Four – Consultation

The following Police managers and staff were consulted as part of the review process.

Commissioner R Robinson
Deputy Commissioner S Long - Operations
Deputy Commissioner L Provost – Resource Management
Assistant Commissioner H Broad – Planning, Development and Deployment
Superintendent J van der Heyden – O/C Commissioner’s Support Group
Superintendent M Wilson – National Manager Policing Development
Superintendent J Lyall – National Manager Communications Centres (Acting)
Superintendent P Rose – National Manager Organisational Performance
Superintendent D Trappitt – National Manager Policy, Planning and Evaluation
R Mendis – National Manager Information Technology Infrastructure
Inspector B Smalley – Manager Northern Communications Centre (Acting)
Inspector G Allcock – Manager Central Communications Centre
Inspector K Kortegast – Manager Southern Communications Centre
Communications Centre staff including Shift Managers, Team Leaders, Communicators and Dispatchers
J Legat – CCSC Policing Development Manager (Acting)
C Dewe – CCSC Performance Analyst
J Nicholl – HR Competency Framework Manager
Constable M Quince – Southern Communications Trainer
C Sommers – Workforce Coordinator
G Somerville – Workforce Coordinator
Superintendent V Rickard – District Commander Northland
Superintendent R Carson – District Commander North Shore/Waitakere
Detective Superintendent G Jones – District Commander Auckland (Acting)
Superintendent S Shortland – District Commander Counties Manukau
Superintendent P Munro – District Commander Waikato (Acting)
Superintendent G Smith – District Commander Bay of Plenty
Superintendent M Lammas – District Commander Central
Superintendent G Nicholl – District Commander Eastern
Superintendent R Pope – District Commander Wellington
Superintendent G O’Fee – District Commander Tasman
Superintendent S Manderson – District Commander Canterbury
Inspector B McGurk – District Commander Tasman (Acting)
Detective Superintendent M Burgess – District Commander Canterbury (Acting)
Inspector P Tasker – District Implementation Officer Bay of Plenty
J Sewell – Policing Development Manager Bay of Plenty
Inspector A McGregor – Area Commander Christchurch (Acting)
The panel, or members of, also met with the following individuals and organisations during the course of the review.

Hon G Hawkins – Minister of Police
M Shroff – Privacy Commissioner
B Stewart – Assistant Privacy Commissioner
Judge I Borrin and staff – Police Complaints Authority
K Marlow – Intergraph Corporation
G O’Connor – New Zealand Police Association
Staff and members of New Zealand Police Association
E Cooper – New Zealand Police Managers’ Guild
K Gordon – Ministry of Economic Development
C Pederson, C Petrie – Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc.)
J Goulter, B Buddicom, S Moulter – Telecom New Zealand Ltd.
I Pickard, P O’Driscoll – New Zealand Fire
Appendix Five – Priority Classifications

**Priority One (P1)** – Immediate Response 0-2 minutes unless NUA in text. 0-10 minutes response time.

Actual threat to life or property happening now, violence being used or threatened, serious offence/incident in progress and offenders present or leaving the scene, serious vehicle crashes (persons trapped/serious injury).

**Priority Two (P2)** – Timely Response dispatch 0 – 30 minutes.

Offenders present/held but not violent, suspicious activity not involving threat to any person, vehicle crashes but no serious injury, public order disturbance, distressed informant/victim, sudden deaths, evidence present and may be lost.

**Priority Three (P3)** – Managed Response dispatch 0 – 24 hours.

Police attendance is required when an appropriate resource is available, appointment made with caller.

**Priority Four (P4)** – No attendance required.

Circumstances at the event lead the dispatcher responsible to consider this event does not/no longer requires the dispatch of a resource to attend.
Appendix Six – Proposed Organisational Structure of CCSC Management

‘National Communications Board’

National Manager

Policing Development Manager

Business/Finance Manager

Performance Analyst/Co-ordinator

HR Manager

Manager Operations/Critical Incidents

Northern Comms Centre Manager

Central Comms Centre Manager

Southern Comms Centre Manager

24/7 Critical Incident Inspectors
Appendix Seven – Excerpt from Mi-Quality Report (sic)

“Staffing Levels

Staffing levels are the single most frequently mentioned issue in both submissions and interviews held with staff and management.

Mi-Quality assessed the staffing level requirements by:

- Utilising existing statistical information on; call volumes by time of day, call handling times, and shrinkage\textsuperscript{16} (rostered staff factor).
- Applying the Erlang-C formula (this is a standard formula used to calculate the required staffing levels to deliver a specific service level based on a forecast call volume and call handling time).

………..

Mi-Quality modelled a number of different staffing scenarios based on:

- Current operational processes.
- Alternative structure options, including reducing the number of centres and removing non-emergency calls from the CCSC.
- Alternative operating processes, specifically keeping Communicator and Dispatcher functions separate 24 hours per day and forgoing the operating benefits currently gained by combining these functions at the quietest times.

It was difficult to analyse the data provided and accurately calculate staffing requirements due to:

- Limited data available.
- Staffing being determined to an extent by shift patterns, channel requirements etc.
- Different service levels for different queues.

\textsuperscript{16} Shrinkage is the percentage of total time that a staff member will not be on duty, and includes holidays, breaks, training, sick leave and coaching.
Observations

I. The CCSC have worked hard to create an efficient staffing model, and have spent a great deal of time at both National and Centre level analyzing staffing requirements.

II. Budgeted headcount is a little lower than optimum. Based on our calculations, and continuing with current operating practices we believe the following calculated headcount is required. Please note that these figures are the minimum number of trained staff required to meet the required service levels.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Centre</th>
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<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
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<td>26</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NB. The additional Dispatcher headcount for Wellington and Christchurch can be offset by relieving Communicators when at full staffing levels.

III. Recruitment is only allowed after the departure of a staff member, rather than in advance of reasonably predictable attrition rates. This means that given the time between resignation, and a recruitment intake being recruited, trained and brought up to speed, the CCSC is continuously, and at times significantly, running below required staffing levels. At the time of the review, two of the three centres were running below budgeted headcount.

IV. At times it is clear that service levels will not be met based on rostered staff, a situation that is then further aggravated by sick leave and un-planned absences.

V. At the time of the review, all three centres had staff either suspended or assigned to other duties whilst prolonged disciplinary processes were being carried out.

VI. The lack of a workforce management system is a major weakness, as staffing is not able to be truly demand based.
Recommendations

I. Increase headcount to the calculated levels shown in the above table.

II. Increase headcount budgets allow for recruitment in advance of forecast attrition, to ensure that the headcount figures are maintained at the minimum level calculated above. This will result in a significant additional headcount requirement, calculated as follows:

- NorthComm – 10 FTE
- CentralComm – 5 FTE
- SouthComm - 4 FTE…….