People

157. This section reviews the many issues pertaining to staffing and people management within the CCSC.

158. People and systems provide the core capability of the CCSC. The systems that the CCSC employs are world class, but the people capability is under-developed.?

159. The Review Panel has been impressed by the dedication of the CCSC management and staff to the work they do, and their desire to improve the performance.

160. The CCSC needs to ensure a healthy environment for and rapport between sworn and non-sworn staff. In particular, ensuring that non-sworn staff have the opportunity to develop will be important as they are more likely to become long term assets.

Capacity versus Capability

161. Throughout this Review, the Panel has regularly heard that the CCSC’s performance problems could be simply cured by providing more staff. While the Panel accepts that extra staff are required, it does not believe that having more staff will fix all the problems.

162. From observation, discussion and reference to relevant CCSC documentation, the Panel believes there is sufficient evidence to identify that the first priority should be to properly organise, manage and develop the existing staff capabilities. Before determining capacity, Police needs to determine the current demand and call answering standards required.

163. Once those demands have been established, the CCSC will need to determine how best they might be achieved and maintained. Quality assurance will be a vital part of the performance improvement process and, with other management tools, will help support the platform from which the CCSC will develop, (which could not otherwise be provided by increased staff alone).

Determining Staffing Requirements

164. Over the past few years, the CCSC management has presented various business cases for additional staff. The adequacy of staffing levels has been a persistent issue of public and internal police commentary since the inception of the CCSC in 1996.

165. The business cases include detailed analyses supporting the staffing requirements. These analyses use the Erlang C formula for call taker roles but use a modified model for dispatch requirements. Although robust, the business cases analyse the workforce requirements of each centre separately i.e. they do not envisage a scenario wherein calls could be managed nationally as in an NACD environment. The Panel believes that by employing the economies of scale of a single ‘virtual Centre’, workforce requirements would need to be re-calculated if NACD was to be introduced in the future.

166. Erlang C is a good model for call taking but there is a need to develop a principled approach to designating channels, units per channel and dispatch positions.

167. It is clear that the workload experienced by the Central and Southern Centres is as a direct result of declining capability at the Northern Centre. In light of this, one of the first steps is to have each Centre working independently to manage their own business properly before making any move toward a national virtual centre.

168. Police has commissioned analysis of staffing requirements by an external call centre consultancy firm, Mi-Quality. The analysis of staffing levels determined a total increase of 21 staff across the three Centres including both communicators and dispatchers in order to meet the current required service levels.

169. In addition, the analysis determined that the budgeted headcount does not allow for recruitment ?in advance of reasonably predictable attrition rates?. As such, the Mi-Quality report recommends a further 19 staff across the three Centres above the calculated strengths. (Appendix Seven)

170. The Panel acknowledges and supports the redeployment of staff to the CCSC from elsewhere in Police since the announcement of the review, which will enhance the current training and supervisory capabilities. Provided sufficient training and supervision is put in place, this will go some way to increasing the number of staff available for service and alleviate the pressures recently experienced.

171. Until more elementary courses of action are undertaken, such as determining the business including the role and standard of service to be provided by CCSC, accurate analysis of all future staffing requirements cannot be undertaken.

172. Staffing levels should continue to be monitored by the NMG and reported to the NCB in the interim and then reviewed once the services and standards to be delivered by the CCSC have been established.

Rostering

173. All three centres roster teams on rolling forward shift patterns[11]. The rolling forward patterns are well liked by staff and should be retained.

174. The Panel does have reservations however about the lack of flexibility team rostering creates. More fluidity in rostering staggered start and finish times would allow for graduated staffing more reflective of predicted call demand.

175. The number of part-time, fixed hour staff and the ongoing high sick leave rates also interfere with rostering.?

176. The workforce coordinators attempt to augment staffing with other team staff on anticipated high call volume shifts e.g. Friday nights, but there is not that much flexibility.

177. The rostering practices and employment terms therefore conspire to constrain flexible rostering around known and anticipated high call volume periods.

178. The Panel has assessed that the CCSC needs a sophisticated workforce management tool. Additionally, the CCSC needs to look for ways in which to make its rostering and employment terms more adaptable to call demand forecasting.

179. In the interim, the CCSC may benefit from investigating how other jurisdictions do their rostering. For example, the Toronto Police Service operates five platoons, with three working on any given day on 9.5 hour shifts and two rostered off (referred to as a Compressed Work Week (CWW) cycle).? Part time staff are hired for peak hours, overtime is available for unscheduled vacancies and staff get their leave within the platoon complement. The overlap hours allow for training, about ten hours in a five week cycle.

180. Information on rostering should be sought from existing contacts within other jurisdictions, including the relevant panel members, as a no cost option for New Zealand Police.

Sick Leave Rates

181. The Panel was repeatedly told by CCSC managers and staff that sick leave is often used by staff when they need time to recover from either acute incident induced, and/or accumulated, stress and fatigue of the work. The anecdotal reports of sick leave behaviour to the Panel appeared to indicate that the rates are high in comparison with the experience of other communications centres. However, Police advised that historical absenteeism in the CCSC has been trending down due to the management of staff with histories of high sick leave.

182. The Panel acknowledges the efforts made by CCSC management to reduce sick leave and absence as part of a broader initiative across Police. The Panel remains concerned however, with the general perception and acknowledgement that increases in sick leave are a ‘barometer’ of the stress, fatigue and morale levels within CCSC[12]. As such, the Panel endorses Police’s ongoing efforts to better manage sick leave within CCSC and the potential individual and organisational reasons causing it.

183. An absenteeism strategy is required and managers must be measured against it to achieve performance. This needs to be incorporated as a key element of the performance framework.

Annual Leave

184. From discussions with staff and submissions received, it was reported to the Panel that leave is difficult for staff to take even when planned months in advance. This is due to flexibility of rostering, ongoing staff shortages (vacancies) and absenteeism.

185. Staff also voiced dissatisfaction at the length of time taken to communicate decisions to them on whether or not leave requests had been granted. This is an administrative issue and should be easily resolved.

Attrition

186. Voluntary attrition within CCSC (currently at 17% or thereabouts) is higher than the Police average but lower than call centre averages. However, the CCSC is not merely a call centre similar to those in the private sector. The risks inherent in the CCSC business are much higher and CCSC decision-making roles are much more stressful and can carry serious consequences.

187. The Panel is concerned with what is considered to be higher than desirable staff attrition and the potential effect of this on the CCSC capabilities, particularly given the long lead time to recruit and train replacements. Police notes that some of the recent attrition is attributable to actions taken in sick leave management. Notwithstanding this effect, the Panel remains concerned with how the inherent job stress, and the staff’s reported current frustrations with their performance, will continue to impact absenteeism and attrition rates.

Job Roles

188. Currently there are two fundamental roles within each Centre: communicators or call takers; and dispatchers, which account for the majority of staffing allocation. The other roles are team leader and shift supervisor.

189. Career development within CCSC is quite structured. All non-sworn staff join as communicators and as dispatcher vacancies occur, suitable communicators are identified, trained and moved into dispatcher roles.

190. Many communicators however, never seek dispatcher roles, and once in dispatch, staff reported resistance to return to call taking even if for a short period within a shift.

191. The Panel believes that more staff should be ‘dual role’ so that they can be moved between the two roles depending on call taking/dispatch demand. Accordingly, recruitment criteria should be broadened to include dispatcher competencies.

192. Sworn staff have traditionally only been used for dispatch. Again, the Panel believes that sworn staff should work in either role but only when they have demonstrated the required aptitudes and skill levels.

193. The panel envisages that if Centres start to recruit and train dual role operators, then over time and through natural attrition the majority of staff would be ‘dual-role’, a significant advantage for rostering. Dispatch training would need to run more regularly to build the capability and experience levels.

194. Such a change will necessitate some re-organisation but will make the CCSC capabilities more flexible. Police advise that during 2003/04 a process of negotiation was entered into with the Police Association in order to complete development of a career progression model. The proposal presented by New Zealand Police contained all of the elements suggested by the Review Panel, however, all were rejected by the Police Association. Whilst some progress towards dual roles has been achieved, further industrial negotiations will be required to achieve the desired outcome.

Competencies

195. In 2003, the CCSC prepared competency profiles for Communicator and Dispatcher roles, and team leaders and shift supervisors. The competency profiles are comprehensive and are meant to act as the foundation for recruitment, training and development, and performance management.

196. The Panel does not believe these profiles have been utilised as thoroughly as they could have been in recruitment, training, development and performance management.

Recruitment

197. Recruitment is primarily conducted by an external agency which specialises in call centre recruitment.

198. The process is comprehensive in its use of an assessment centre format, psychometric tests and interviews. However, the assessment exercises have been designed to measure the communicator competencies and should more properly include dispatcher competencies.

199. Despite its comprehensiveness, the recruitment process for both roles could be improved by:

• better aligning the assessment exercises with the competency profile which may mean deleting some exercises and replacing them with more competency relevant exercises;
• using more appropriate and robust psychometric tests than the Wonderlic Personnel Test;
• assessing relevant personality features through psychometrically reliable and valid personality questionnaires; and
• making the interviewing more comprehensive through the use of behavioural based interviewing techniques and the inclusion of more senior CCSC staff once they have received appropriate interview training.

Training

200. The Panel believes that training within the CCSC needs considerable improvement. There is no documented training plan. Training needs analyses do not appear to have been completed. However, logically the roles and responsibilities need to be determined before a successful needs analysis can be undertaken.

201. Training is the cornerstone of the CCSC operations. If staff are selected well and supported by training in accordance with well defined standards and principles, they are more likely to be able to deliver according to the business expectations.

202. The training needs to be well prepared, delivered, valid and expert. The expertise is a shared attribute utilising those staff who know the job and those who are skilled in teaching adult learners. Consideration should be given to identifying who in the CCSC are the motivated, skilled staff and train them to be effective trainers and coaches.

203. The initial six week course for communicators in the experience of the Panel appears to be too long and does not include enough focus on managing calls. The course structure and content should be reviewed.

204. Training beyond the initial course is confined to dispatcher training other than on the occasion of system upgrades. There appears to be little, if any, ongoing refresher skills training.

205. New managers in the room require a management development training programme. This must include all aspects of critical incident command. It is important to note the distinction between the management and command roles within the CCSC, as indicated in the recommended structure at the senior management level. (Appendix Six)

206. The programme must consolidate the command skills required of newly promoted team leaders and shift managers. It must also provide them with knowledge of the command requirements of higher ranked officers. Command training must be undertaken regularly, include peer review, table-top scenario training and be well documented.

207. The objectives of the course must be such that when tested, managers are able to:

• distinguish between tactical and strategic command of critical incidents;
• explain the structures and systems required to provide strategic support and support critical incidents command from a comms centre environment;
• devise and support management of three key areas of critical incident management - planning, execution and aftermath;
• conduct responsibilities of post-incident managers within a comms centre environment;
• identify clear response to critical incidents, follow clear policy guidelines and ensure actions taken are appropriate, proportional and compliant with New Zealand legislation; and
• demonstrate skills, knowledge and experience at developing critical incident support teams within a comms centre environment.

Coaching and Mentoring

208. Coaching and mentoring on the job depends on the style of the individual team leader. The Review Panel received reports from staff that current work demands result in very little time for any sort of coaching. There does not appear to be a coaching/mentoring type of culture. Staff learn more informally from their peers than they do from any formal or structured coaching.

209. The introduction of a formal mentoring role, such as that employed by the Field Training Officer (FTO) role in Districts would significantly enhance the mentoring capability.

210. The current high staff to supervisor ratios (12-16:1) also impact on a supervisors ability to provide adequate mentoring and support to staff.

Performance Management

211. Individual performance management does occur in relation to annual reviews, although some Panel members spoke to staff who said they had not had a performance review.

212. There is an absence of a performance management culture within the CCSC that encourages and expects regular coaching of and feedback to staff by team leaders and shift managers. The Panel acknowledges that work pressures can and do make this difficult to achieve but without performance coaching and feedback, performance issues will not be dealt with promptly and easily.

213. A robust quality assurance system must also form part of the performance management process. Currently, quality assurance is lacking and should be re-instigated.

214. Quality assurance checks must also be documented and used in the performance review process. This documentation will also serve as a valuable source for scenario training.

Debriefings following Serious Incidents or Errors

215. Given the criticality of the business the CCSC is in, it is important that members involved in critical incidents or incidents involving trauma in some way are debriefed by their team leader and/or shift supervisor. This is not occurring on a regular basis, usually only includes incidents that have been badly handled; and often when it is completed, the interaction is said by staff to resemble an investigative interview.

216. Likewise, the lack of debriefing reduces the opportunity for staff to share positive performances and receive acknowledgment for when they perform well.

217. The Panel believes that these debriefings are an extremely useful and beneficial practice. They are vital in assisting with the prevention of stress, fatigue and illness and need to be re-instigated as a matter of urgency.

218. Debrief sessions should be well documented and signed by all participants.

Sworn Officer Employment in CCSC

219. Sworn staff the Panel spoke with claimed that the CCSC is not a place that many police officers want to come to. Hence the CCSC has difficulty attracting enough junior sworn staff to fulfill dispatcher roles. By not having the option to appoint ‘best fit’ candidates because of a limited pool of applicants, the overall capability of the staff can be compromised.

220. The Panel believes that probationary constables, where time and travel allow, should spend time in a Communications Centre as observers and as part of their probationary experience. Given the practical and resource implications of such a move however, a more achievable aim would be to ensure all officers have some experience of the CCSC within their first five years of service.

221. Later, when constables with the required aptitudes and skill sets are transferred to the CCSC, it should be for a minimum of six months and ideally two years. A goal for the NMG should be to have more constables than the CCSC can employ wanting to transfer because they realise the valuable operational experience it provides.

222. The CCSC appears to be a more attractive option for Sergeants and Inspectors not only because of the promotional benefits, but also, for a more regular lifestyle.

Career Structure and Progression

223. Whereas the CCSC has certain career advantages for sworn staff, there are few career progression options for capable and achieving non-sworn staff.

224. The Panel believes that by adopting the command and management structure recommended earlier, there will be more career opportunities for non-sworn staff.

Remuneration Differences

225. Another issue is the remuneration differences between sworn and non-sworn staff. These differences vary depending on the seniority of staff being compared; but generally, sworn staff receive greater remuneration than non-sworn staff. Non-sworn staff however are more easily able to earn overtime payments if available due to the conditions of TOIL (time off in lieu) included in the sworn collective agreement. A dissatisfaction expressed by non-sworn staff however, was the delay in payment of overtime often experienced. This is an administrative issue and should be quickly and easily resolved.

226. For non-sworn staff, remuneration at the junior levels is competitive with other call centre salaries, but as non-sworn staff become more experienced, they receive more than their peers in other call centre roles and potentially can earn more than sworn constables because of the banding and progressive system employed.

227. A move to ‘dual role’ staff within the CCSC many attract a reassessment of remuneration.

Recommendations

228. A workforce planning tool should be purchased for use by the workforce coordinators.

229. An absenteeism strategy should be developed and absenteeism incorporated into the performance framework of supervisors and managers.

230. The CCSC should critically examine how to create more flexibility into its rostering to meet call demand forecasts.

231. Administrative processes and activities should be tidied up to ensure expediency, for example, processing leave requests and overtime payments.

232. The CCSC should move to ‘dual role’ staff in call taking and dispatch so that staff can be moved between roles as demands change.

233. The competency profiles need to be integrated into recruitment, training and performance management processes.

234. A training plan based around the competency profiles and a thorough training needs analysis needs to be produced once position roles and responsibilities are fully determined.

235. Training in call management should assume prominence in initial and refresher training.

236. New managers to the CCSC require a management development training programme. This must include all aspects of critical incident command as identified in this report.

237. Performance coaching needs to become a regular feature of the CCSC operating culture.

238. A mentoring role similar to that of the Field Training Officer (FTO) operating in Districts should be established.

239. Quality assurance checks must be carried out and documented for use in the performance review process.

240. Debriefings following critical incidents, or mishandled situations, need to be re-instigated and should be fully documented.

241. A career structure for non-sworn staff needs to be designed following confirmation of revised organisational structure and roles.

242. Time spent in the Communications Centres as an observer, should, where possible be included in a probationary constable’s orientation programme.

243. After probation, sworn constables transferred or deployed (as opposed to appointed) to the CCSC should stay for a minimum of six months.

244. All sworn staff applying or directed to work in the CCSC should complete a comparable assessment to non-sworn staff, and complete comparable training courses.

245. Further analysis of staffing requirements should be undertaken in three and six months time as the determination of services and standards; other initiatives implemented in the meantime will affect the required staffing levels.

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Endnotes

[11] Rolling forward shift pattern is as follows: early, early, late, late, night, night, four days off.

[12] Global Human Capital Survey, 2003, Pricewaterhouse Coopers